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Intuition is an innate ability through which human beings acquire knowledge about the 
world around them.  Throughout history people have speculated about how intuition 
operates and about the accuracy and usefulness of intuitively derived conclusions, but 
there have been few attempts at empirical investigation primarily due to the fact that a 
person using intuition does not appear to be doing anything at all.  In fact, clinical lore 
suggests that that trying too hard may actually impede progress toward achieving an 
intuitively derived solution. 
 
As source of knowledge or understanding, intuition appears to stand somewhere between 
perception and reason.  Phenomenologically, intuitively derived solutions resemble 
perceptions, in that both are experienced as “given,” however unlike perception intuition 
involves no discernable physiological pathway leading from sensory stimulation to the 
conscious awareness of some thing.  Functionally, intuition has similarities to the process 
of reasoning, in that both can provide useful information about the world to 
consciousness.  In use, however, intuition differs from reasoning, which takes place 
through explicit, observable intermediates between the recognition of a problem in need 
of a solution and the achievement of a successful solution.  Intuition involves no such 
intermediates.  Thus, intuition appears to be a function with neither pathway nor process. 
 
The set of studies discussed in Part A of this thesis was designed to examine the notion 
that, rather than an abrupt and disjunctive “change of state,” intuition is an incremental, 
accumulative process through which implicit and increasingly complete intermediates, or 
states of “partial knowledge” are generated prior to the achievement of a solution in 
consciousness.  In Part A, it was demonstrated that unsuccessful attempts to identify 
objects portrayed in difficult visual gestalts significantly facilitated participants‟ 
performance on a related partial-word solution task.  When the unrecognized stimulus 
items were incoherent, i.e., altered so that the component parts were displaced and rotated 
relative to each other, the facilitation effect, while still significant, was less than when the 
unrecognized gestalt was coherent.  This finding supports the idea that the amount of 
solution-relevant implicit knowledge generated in an unsuccessful attempt to solve a 
problem varies with the quality of information present in the problem situation. 
 
The set of studies in Part B examined the effect of inserting “dead air” interval between 
the visual gestalt and the related partial-word in the partial-word solution phase.  Against 
prediction, coherent partial-word facilitation did not decrease at any interval condition, 
while incoherent partial-word increased at the longest interval condition.  Overall, the 
findings are best explained by a bi-directional, dual-processing model in which the 
organization of visual stimuli and the symbolic labeling of sub-components within the 
visual stimuli are processed independently.  Such a model could provide some context for 
the dispute between proponents of reorganization vs. forgetting in the debate about 
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WHAT YOU DON‟T KNOW CAN HELP YOU:   
INTUITIVE PROCESSING OF INCOMPLETE VISUAL STIMULI 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
“[U]nderstanding consists in reducing one type of reality to 
another…the true reality is never the most obvious… the 
nature of truth is already indicated by the care it takes to 
remain elusive…. to reach reality one has first to reject 
experience, and then subsequently to reintegrate it into an 
objective synthesis.” (Lévi-Strauss, 1992, p. 57-58) 
 
“It takes a lot of time to be a genius, you have to sit around so 
much doing nothing, really doing nothing.” (Stein, 1973, p. 70) 
 
 Intuition is an intriguing, but ephemeral and poorly understood concept.  It is 
likely that almost everyone has at some time had the experience of struggling to solve a 
problem without success, only to have the desired solution appear suddenly and 
unexpectedly in consciousness.  Often the solution appears while the person is engaged in 
some other activity and is no longer consciously thinking about the problem.  The arrival 
of the solution in consciousness is sometimes accompanied by what has been described 
as an “aha” experience, in that the desired solution appears in the problem-solver‟s 
consciousness suddenly, without warning, and seemingly without effort. 
 Perhaps you have had the experience of trying in vain to find your car keys while 
rushing around the house getting ready to leave for work.  After searching all the usual 
places and struggling unsuccessfully for some time to remember where you last saw 
them, you get caught up in your other morning activities, perhaps making your lunch or 
letting the dog out, only to have a sudden, unanticipated realization that you put your 
keys down by the computer last night while checking your email.  Or, perhaps you have 




embarrassment, to recall that person‟s name.  Later, while out for a walk, the desired 
name flashes into awareness without warning, apparently “out of the blue.” 
 Artists typically hold intuition in high regard and it has often been reported that 
artistic inspiration arrives “out-of-the-blue” and seemingly without conscious effort.  
Writer Robert Graves described intuition as “a sort of supra-logic that cuts out all the 
routine processes of thought and leaps straight from the problem to the answer” (Carter, 
1989, p. 147).  Similarly, author Antoine de Saint-Exupéry (1982, p. 8) stated that a 
“theoretician believes in logic and believes that he despises dreams, intuition, and 
poetry…. He does not know that he owes his greatest discoveries to them.”  According to 
British novelist Arnold Bennett (Flower, 1932, p. 36) “the artist is sometimes granted a 
sudden, transient insight…. A flash, and where previously the brain held a dead fact, the 
soul grasps a living truth!  At moments we are all artists.” 
 These sorts of sudden “aha” experiences have also been reported in the process of 
scientific discovery.  In a frequently cited example, Kekulé, a 19
th
 century chemist, after 
extended and unproductive attempts to discover the structure of a peculiar organic 
molecule, reportedly went home after a day of frustration in the lab, fell asleep, and 
dreamed of a ring of snakes, each biting the tail of the next.  When he awoke he realized 
that the ring was the exact structure he was seeking.  As Evelyn Monsay (1997) has 
noted, the sudden and unexpected achievement of an insightful solution after a long, 
fruitless struggle with a puzzling problem is an experience that has been reported 
frequently by researchers.  According to Monsay, creative scientific discoveries are often 
seen to follow a two-phased pattern, in which a period of intense engagement with a 




consciously engaged with the problem.  It is during this latter period, often referred to as 
an “incubation” period, that insightful solutions are likely to occur.  When such a solution 
does arrive in consciousness it is often reported to have come without warning, and 
seemingly without connection to the current contents of the problem-solver‟s conscious 
mind.  Physicist Fritjof Capra (2000, p. 31) noted that: “During these periods of 
relaxation after concentrated intellectual activity, the intuitive mind seems to take over 
and can produce the sudden clarifying insights.” 
 The examples above from everyday life, from artists, and from researchers 
illustrate a type of problem-solving that, while informed by the problem-solver‟s prior 
conscious efforts to solve the problem, is experienced as unconnected to those conscious 
efforts.  In their discussion of the intuitive generation of ideas Harman and Rheingold 
(1984) refer to Poincaré‟s observation that “…the idea came to me, without anything in 
my former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it…. The idea came to me with 
… brevity, suddenness and immediate certainty” (Poincaré, 1946, p. 387-388).  Arvidson 
(Floyd-Davis & Arvidson, 1997, p. 43) further describes the sudden appearance of an 
intuitively generated solution in consciousness as “comprehensive and immediately given 
as true, as a perfect fit,” and experienced phenomenologically as “utterly different…than 
solving the problem of how to construct a child‟s bicycle by following step-by-step 
instructions.”  Monsay, in an essay tracing the impact of intuition on the theory and 
practice of science, provides a quote from mathematician Harald Cramér that aptly 
describes the experience of achieving an intuitively derived solution: 
“When no further progress is within sight, a strangely interesting 
phenomenon will often appear.  The concentrated efforts of the conscious 
part of the mind … seem to have set some wheels going on a deeper level, 




speak a “knock at the door” of the conscious mind, the intuitively attained 
result is presented, and left … to be verified and rigorously proved by 
conscious work” (Davis-Floyd & Arvidson, 1997, p. 110). 
 
Whether the problem is as mundane as a search for a name in memory, or as 
extraordinary as an attempt to discover universal laws, for which, as Einstein has 
remarked, “There is no logical path leading to these…laws.  They can only be reached by 
intuition, based on something like an intellectual love (“Einfuhlung”) of the objects of 
experience” (Popper, 1992, p. 32).  Similarly, Stephen Hawking (1994) has stated that 
“there is no prescribed route to follow to arrive at a new idea.  You have to make the 
intuitive leap…. Once you‟ve made the intuitive leap you have to justify it by filling in 
the intermediate steps.” 
As a result of the unique phenomenological characteristics of intuitively generated 
solutions, including suddenness, comprehensiveness, and certainty, many theorists have 
come to the conclusion that the “operations” of intuition are qualitatively different from 
those of conscious problem-solving procedures, and that the generative phenomena we 
refer to as intuition occurs outside of consciousness.  It is precisely the “subconscious 
work” of intuition that occurs prior to the “knock at the door” of consciousness that is the 
object of investigation in this set of studies.  In following sections I will discuss prior 
philosophical attempts to describe and explain intuition, similarities and differences 
between intuition and reason, similarities and differences between intuition and 
perception, the relation between intuition and concepts such as subliminal/implicit 
perception and memory, priming, and spreading activation.  Each of these discussions 
will provide information for the task of answering the central questions that prompted 




in a single, qualitative change of state or, instead, through a gradual process in which 
knowledge about the solution accumulates incrementally?” and, if the latter, “how might 
such a process operate?” 
A very brief history of the concept of intuition 
As noted above, many have recognized intuition as an important tool that human 
beings can use to generate knowledge about the nature of the world around them, a tool 
which is particularly useful when all other methods fail.  Bastick (1982) has offered the 
opinion that intuition is a universal natural ability.   While practically everyone would 
acknowledge having had some experience that they would describe as intuition, there is 
no consensus about exactly what should be held up as an example of intuition, nor is 
there agreement about how intuition operates.  Some might reserve the term intuition for 
examples similar to those discussed above, in which desired solutions to puzzling 
problems appear in consciousness suddenly and seemingly without effort.  Others might 
use the term intuitive to describe a precocious talent, for example a so-called musical 
prodigy who appears able to understand and generate music directly without having 
engaged in systematic study and practice.  For still others, the term intuition implies 
something mysterious, like magic or voodoo, as Shirley and Langan-Fox (1996) note.  
The latter understanding has led to colloquial usage of the term intuition to describe the 
mechanism underlying such dubious phenomena as prescience, premonition, and 
prophecy.  Since by definition each of these latter phenomena operates through 
supernatural or magical means rather than through a native human ability, they should 
properly be considered to be examples of divination, rather than of intuition.  Even if one 




supernatural being or force would presuppose the generative mechanism to be fully 
external to the human mind, with the mind serving only as a passive receiver. 
 Throughout history there have been shifts in the understanding of intuition that 
are perhaps more revealing of cultural beliefs and concerns than of intuition itself, but 
because investigators have been forced to speculate backward from visible product to 
invisible generative process this is perhaps to be expected.  According to the second 
edition of the Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) (1971), intuition 
can be defined as the action of mentally looking at, or contemplating, i.e., achieving a 
mental view of some thing.  The Latin root of intuition, intueri, conveys a similar 
meaning, i.e., “to look upon, consider, contemplate.”  In fact, intueri may be 
deconstructed to yield the Latin word in, a preposition indicating “motion or direction 
from a point outside to one within limits … now ordinarily expressed by the compound 
in-to,” and the Latin word for sensory vision, tueri, which means “to look.”  Thus, taken 
as a whole, the Latin word intueri means a view, or understanding of the “inner 
workings” of reality obtained through mental operations. 
 Clearly, for Latin thinkers intuition was understood to be something akin to 
sensory vision, but distinct from sensory vision in that the knowledge provided by 
intuition “goes beyond” that provided by sensory vision to the “inner workings” of reality 
that underlie surface appearances.  As well, for Latin thinkers intuition differs from 
sensory vision in that it involves no “intuitive organs” and is a purely mental, or cognitive 
phenomenon, similar to reason.  Thus, Latin thinkers understood intuition to be a native 




which meaningful patterns and relationships not given by surface appearances can be 
known. 
 Scholastic philosophers of the medieval period, from the 9
th
 to the 15
th 
century 
(Radical Academy, 2002-3) also understood intuition as having characteristics similar to 
visual perception, and also agreed that through the use of intuition observers could “go 
beyond” the information provided by visual perception and come to know the inner 
workings of the perceived world.  According to the Radical Academy (2002-3), however, 
Scholastic philosophers understood knowledge to be “a gift of God” and believed that “as 
the eyes have need of the light of the sun in order to see sensible objects, so the intellect 
needs the light of God to know the world of intelligible beings.”  The Scholastics 
understood “any method of knowledge which bypasses sense experience and is based on 
intuition” to be true “if based on an actual supernatural gift.”  
Thus, where Latin thinkers understood intuition to be a native ability fully 
situated within the human mind, the Scholastics, under the influence of St. Augustine‟s 
notion of “illumination,” appeared to consider intuition to be some form of complex 
interaction between mortal and spiritual planes that allowed human intellect to operate 
momentarily at a superhuman level in order to provide “glimpses” of the internal 
workings of reality (OED, 1971).  In other words, through the use of intuition humans 
can briefly tap in to some higher form of consciousness in which “seeing is knowing,” 
temporarily elevating human intellect to the level of the divine. 
 It is likely that such an explanation grew up in part as an attempt to explain 
failures of intuition.  Despite the fact that intuition can provide human beings with 




visual perception, it can not provide the same sort of “on demand” reliability that is 
characteristic of sensory vision.  By locating the mechanism of intuition partly in the 
human mind and partly in the spiritual realm, Scholastic thinkers could explain failures of 
intuition as a lack of connection or misalignment between the two. 
The view of intuition expressed by most modern thinkers is much closer to the 
Latin conception of intuition than to that of the Scholastics.  Most modern theorists 
accept intuition as a native human ability, as an alternative, non-rational source of 
knowledge, and recognize the phenomenological similarities between intuition and 
sensory vision.  According to J. Dolhenty (n.d.), modern philosophical approaches define 
intuition as “the process by which insights or bits of knowledge emerge into 
consciousness from the subconscious or as the direct apprehension of knowledge which is 
not the result of conscious reasoning or immediate sense perception.”  Dolhenty notes 
that, like the Scholastics, modern philosophers regard intuition as a source of knowledge 
that is similar to revelation in that neither can be verified or subjected to any public test, 
but modern philosophers do make explicit a distinction between intuition, which is 
understood to be a native human ability situated within the human mind, and revelation, 
which is understood to be a process through which knowledge is passively received from 
an external, supernatural source.    
In a similar way, the OED (1971) states that modern philosophers understand 
intuition to be a mental tool, like reason, that human beings can use to acquire knowledge 
and understanding of the world around them.  Despite a functional similarity to reason, 
however, the way that objects are presented to the mind by intuition is quite dis-similar to 




intuition resemble those of sensory apprehension, i.e., presented whole and complete.  
The OED definition suggests that intuition occupies a position somewhere “in-between” 
reason and perception, as a native human ability through which knowledge about the 
world is acquired, with similarities to reason and to perception but also with important 
differences from each, which will be discussed further in later sections. 
It should be noted that some important thinkers have accorded a very high place 
for intuition amongst human abilities.  In his Opus Majus (Bacon, 1267, p. 583) Roger 
Bacon (1928) stated that “there are two modes of acquiring knowledge, namely by 
reasoning and experience.  Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the 
conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that 
the mind may rest in the intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by the path of 
experience.”  In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690, Chapter II, ¶ 1) 
Locke wrote that intuitive knowledge, which is immediately known to be true, is the 
“most sure” type of knowledge, and stated that, “[t]his part of knowledge … like bright 
sunshine, forces itself immediately to be perceived, as soon as the mind turns its view 
that way” (The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999).  In Rules for the Direction of 
Mind, Descartes (1961) stated that that all acquisition of knowledge depends on only two 
mental operations, intuition and deduction.  Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, (Kant, 
1781, p. 65) stated that “all thought must, directly or indirectly… relate ultimately to 
intuitions… because in no other way can an object be given to us.”  Monsay (Davis-
Floyd & Arvidson, 1997, p. 117) noted Wescott‟s (1968) observation that many theorists, 
including Bergson, Spinoza, and Croce, have recognized intuition as the path to “true and 




Intuition vs. Insight 
“[I]ntuitions give the appearance of miraculous flashes, or 
short-circuits of reasoning…. they may be likened to an 
immersed chain, of which only the beginning and the end are 
visible above the surface of consciousness.  The diver vanishes 
at one end of the chain and comes up at the other end, guided 
by invisible links.” (Koestler, 1990, p. 211) 
 
Before proceeding, it should be pointed out that there has been a confusing 
tendency to apply the terms intuition and insight interchangeably in the literature.  As an 
indication of how well entrenched this confusion has become, in the OED (1971) 
intuition is defined as both process, i.e., the mental act through which direct, immediate 
knowledge of an object is generated, and product, i.e., the appearance of a completed 
solution in consciousness. 
 Shirley and Langan-Fox (1996, p. 564) acknowledge the tendency to confuse 
intuition with insight, and attempt to clarify the situation by asserting that intuition is “a 
feeling of knowing with certitude on the basis of inadequate information and without 
conscious awareness of rational thinking” and is not “the sudden realizations that occur 
after the incubation of thoughts.”  This is in contrast to insight, which they define as 
becoming “instantly aware of something.”  Unfortunately, this definition also leads to 
some confusion due to the fact that “feeling of knowing” has taken on a specific meaning 
within psychological literature, i.e., an anticipation that a solution is imminent.  The 
attempt by Shirley and Langan-Fox to clarify the definition of intuition, while still 
somewhat confused, points toward an important distinction between intuition, which is a 
generative process that takes place outside of consciousness, and insight, which is the 
sudden appearance of a solution, answer, or understanding in consciousness.  Common to 




“outside” of conscious awareness with the purpose of supplying consciousness with 
insightful solutions to puzzling problems, thereby providing the problem-solver with a 
“glimpse” of otherwise invisible characteristics of the environment and the relationships 
amongst those characteristics.   
In their discussion of intuitive processes, Bowers, Farvolden, and Mermigis 
(1995) described two conceptually distinct stages in the achievement of a solution to an 
insight-type problem, an intuitive stage and an insight stage.  Activities in the intuitive 
stage involve the generation of potential solutions, or hunches, and “trial-fit” of these 
with the available elements of the problem.  When a hunch is discovered that does have 
some degree of “fit” to the elements of the problem it may be passed along to the insight 
stage for further testing.  Any hunch “promoted” to the insight stage may then be 
rigorously tested as a solution, and, if recognized as a potentially viable solution to the 
problem at hand, ushered into conscious awareness.   
 Bowers et al (1995) state that the activities involved in the intuitive generation of 
a potential solution must necessarily take place outside of consciousness.  With the 
recognition of a problem in need of a solution, these activities are engaged automatically 
and operate independently of conscious awareness.  Because all of the activities in the 
intuitive stage occur outside of conscious awareness, there will be nothing to signal to the 
problem-solver that progress toward a potential solution has been made until very late in 
the process.  Perhaps the first opportunity for conscious awareness that a potential 
solution has been generated occurs at the junction between the intuitive and insight 
stages.  If a hunch, or potential solution is promoted from the intuitive stage to the insight 




that a potential solution has been discovered.  Thus, in broad strokes, Bowers posited that 
when a problem-solver‟s initial conscious attempts fail to deliver a satisfying solution to 
a problem the task of discovering a potential solution is taken up by unconscious 
processes in which potential solutions are generated in the intuitive stage and “handed 
off” to the insight stage to be tested for viability as a solution, prior to appearing as in 
consciousness an insightful solution.   
It should be noted that Bowers‟ stage model of intuitive problem-solving has 
parallels in the work of several other theorists.  As discussed earlier, Monsay (1997) 
observed that scientific discovery often follows a course in which a stage of intense 
conscious effort is followed by a stage of disengagement during which the problem-
solver is no longer consciously engaged with the problem, at which time a solution may 
appear in consciousness as an “aha” experience.  It is Monsay‟s stage of disengagement 
that Bowers would further subdivide into intuitive and insightful stages.  In his discussion 
of the creative process, Bastick (1982) also described two distinct stages, a non-conscious 
intuitive stage and a verification stage.  Bastick maintained that the intuitive stage is a 
necessary precursor to all creative insight, from great scientific discoveries to hunches 
about solutions to everyday problems.   
 In The Art of Thought, Wallas (1926) also described problem-solving as a 
progression through stages: a preparatory stage in which there is conscious recognition of 
a problem in need of a solution and some preliminary attempts to find a solution, an 
incubation stage in which the problem-solver disengages from conscious attempts to 
solve the problem, an illumination stage in which a solution appears in consciousness, 




Wallas‟ incubation stage appears analogous to Bowers‟ intuitive stage, and his 
illumination stage can be considered equivalent to Bowers‟ insight stage.   
As Dorfman, Shames, and Kihlstrom (1996) note, Wallas‟ stages of incubation 
and illumination can be thought of as examples of implicit thought, occurring outside of 
conscious awareness.  Wallas (1926) stated that in the incubation stage “a series of 
unconscious and involuntary … mental events may take place …. a successful train of 
association … which has probably been preceded by a series of tentative and 
unsuccessful trains” (pp. 93-94).  With respect to the role of consciousness throughout 
the incubation and illumination stages, Wallas noted that the problem-solver may 
experience some vague awareness that a solution is about to enter consciousness only in 
the illumination stage, very close to the actual arrival of that solution in consciousness.   
 For the purpose of this dissertation, intuition will be considered to be a 
phenomenon that: a) is engaged automatically upon the perception of a problem in need 
of solution, b) occurs outside of consciousness, and c) is responsible for generating and 
optimizing “hunches,” or potential solutions to the perceived problem.  Insight, on the 
other hand, will be considered to be a process through which: a) each hunch generated by 
intuition is judged as a potential solution to the problem at hand, and b) a hunch 
recognized as a viable solution is promoted to conscious awareness. 
The relationship between intuition and reason 
 As noted earlier, by definition intuition and reason have a functional similarity, in 
that both are tools that human beings can use to acquire knowledge and to understand the 
world around them (OED, 1971).  This being said, the experience of using intuition to 




or understanding through intuition does not involve any conscious mediating process.  
Reason, on the other hand, must operate through the mediation of conscious and explicit 
inference, i.e., passing from one explicit statement, or proposition, that is held to be true, 
to a second explicit statement, whose truth is believed to follow from the first.  A second 
difference lies in the dis-similar experiential qualities of intuition and reason.  As noted 
earlier, knowledge acquired through the use of intuition is experienced by the user as 
something akin to a sensory perception, i.e., as sudden, complete, and effortless, while 
knowledge acquired through rational processes is experienced as a sequence of purely 
conscious, cognitive events, without the “given” quality that is characteristic of 
perceptions or intuitively derived insights.   
 Despite these differences, I will argue for a further similarity between intuition 
and reason in that both may operate in either a “part-to-whole” or “whole-to-part” 
fashion.  It is well established that reason may be used in a “part-to-whole” fashion to 
induce a higher order concept from specific instances, or in a “whole-to-part” fashion to 
deduce conclusions about specific instances from a higher-order concept, but to date this 
sort of bi-directionality has not been suggested as an important characteristic in the 
operation of intuition.  The idea to be developed throughout this thesis is that intuition 
may also be used in “inductive” (part-to-whole) and “deductive” (whole-to-part) ways.  
This is speculative with regard to intuition, but evidence pointing toward such a bi-
directional mode of operation will be presented and discussed.  This sort of bi-
directionality may also underlie the operation of visual perception, and may be the norm 
in human information gathering and processing.  In the following section, I will discuss 




tension between “part-to-whole” and “whole-to-part” theories in the study of visual 
perception, before addressing the possible relevance of bi-directionality to the 
phenomenon of intuition. 
Forms of reason: Induction vs. deduction. 
 As noted, reason can take one of two general forms: “part-to-whole” induction or 
“whole-to-part” deduction.  Inductive reasoning is a “bottom up” process in which a 
person repeatedly observes specific instances and then infers a broad generalization, 
conclusion, or theory that describes a pattern of regularity common to all of the observed 
instances.  For example, when one looks at the question of mortality all individual human 
beings studied so far have had a limited lifespan.  This leads us to infer a general 
conclusion about human beings, i.e., all humans are mortal.  This does not mean that we 
have data for every single human being who has ever lived, and so the possibility exists 
that there are some immortals among us who have escaped our notice, but, on the basis of 
the evidence so far we accept as true that all humans are mortal.  In this way, conclusions 
reached through inductive reasoning may “go beyond the information given” thereby 
allowing us to make predictions about specific instances that have not actually been 
studied, and which may not actually exist at this point in time. 
 A person employing deductive reasoning, on the other hand, starts from a general 
statement about regularities that exist amongst a specific set of instances and then infers a 
conclusion about a specific instance, or a subset of instances, from that set.  This 
commonly takes the form of the syllogism, e.g., “all virtues are laudable; patience is a 
virtue; patience is laudable.”  Unlike the conclusions reached through inductive 




contained in the premises.  Thus, if the statements that make up the premises correspond 
with reality, and the conclusion follows logically from these premises, the conclusion 
must also correspond with reality. 
There are two issues of particular relevance to the discussion of intuition that 
should be noted.  First, as discussed above, reason may be used to infer knowledge about 
general regularities from the observation of specific instances, or to infer knowledge 
about a specific instance from the abstract, general regularities that apply to the set of 
instances to which that instance belongs.  It may be that intuition is similarly bi-
directional, allowing for the generation of knowledge in “part-to-whole” and “whole-to-
part” ways, a point which will be developed in a later section. 
A second point of relevance illustrates a very important difference between reason 
and intuition.  A rational problem-solver must move from puzzlement to solution through 
a set of explicit intermediate steps.  Should a rational problem-solver arrive at a faulty 
conclusion the process of reasoning may be traced backward to identify and correct either 
faulty premises, e.g., “All humans are ducks; Socrates is a human; Socrates is a duck,” or 
faulty steps in logic, e.g., “All collies are dogs; Lassie is a collie; All dogs are Lassie.”  
Thus, a problem-solver using reason will necessarily move through a series of explicit 
intermediate statements on the way to a solution, and the process and contents will open 
for inspection and revision at every step.   
An intuitive problem-solver, on the other hand, appears to jump directly from 
puzzlement to solution without apparent intermediate stages.  Most experiences that we 
identify as intuitive involve a subjective sense of immediacy, in which the desired 




without effort.  Because this sort of experience does not involve any observable 
intermediate stages, most historical views of intuition have foreclosed on the idea that 
there is no intuitive process per se.  The fact that intuition does not involve explicit 
intermediates does not mean, however, that one can conclusively rule out the possibility 
that intuition is a process that operates through implicit intermediate stages.  As will be 
discussed throughout this thesis, a demonstration of the presence of implicit intermediate 
stages in intuitive problem-solving would provide strong support for the idea that 
intuition operates as an incremental process, one in which implicit, increasingly complete 
“partial states of knowledge” are generated prior to the entry of a whole and complete 
solution into consciousness.  If it is the case that intuition operates through implicit 
intermediates, the noted operational difference between intuition and reason would be 
lessened, lending some support to the notion that intuition, like reason, can operate in a 
bi-directional manner. 
 Neisser (1967) described two distinct forms of mental organization, which can be 
broadly described as either rational or intuitive.  A rational procedure would be 
characterized as deliberate, logical, reality oriented, and processed in a serial manner, 
while an intuitive procedure would be characterized as automatic, prelogical, autistic, and 
processed in a parallel manner.  In a similar vein, Anderson (1982) and Schneider and 
Shiffrin (1977) have noted that unlike rational procedures, which are conscious and 
volitional, some mental procedures are automatically engaged by inputs not represented 
in the current contents of the person‟s consciousness, and once engaged, operate 




If intuition does operate through automatic, associative, and parallel procedures, it 
may be that successive rounds of parallel processing do generate intermediates between 
puzzlement and solution, but these intermediates would be unlikely to exist in any form 
that could enter consciousness.  As Rumelhart, McClelland et al (1986) have noted, the 
contents of a parallel process are simply too complex to be represented in consciousness.  
In fact, once the intuitive problem-solving mechanism has been set to work it may be 
only at a very late stage in the intuitive process, once a potential solution has been 
generated, that a “representative” of that complex solution may be presented to 
consciousness.  At such a point, the problem-solver may, or may not, experience a sense 
that a solution is imminent, and the potential solution may then enter consciousness as a 
flash of insight.  
The relationship between intuition and sensory vision 
 Despite the fact that intuition has been recognized throughout history as a unique 
and valuable source of knowledge, the lack of any visible mechanism of operation and 
the unexpectedness and immediacy of its products have hindered attempts at 
investigation.  As a result, the literature addressing the question of how intuition operates 
is scanty and mostly speculative, and there is little clarity about what mechanism, or 
mechanisms, might be at work in the achievement of intuitively derived knowledge. 
As has been noted, the experience of achieving an insightful solution to a puzzling 
problem through the use of intuition has frequently been compared to the experience of 
sensory vision because both share the phenomenological quality of “given-ness.”  In the 
same way that we turn our gaze onto some scene and, without apparent further effort, 




problem and, albeit after a seemingly fruitless conscious search for a solution, suddenly 
and effortlessly acquire an insightful solution.  In both cases, once set in motion, our 
experience of “looking” or “intuiting” provides us with the sense of achieving the desired 
result without doing anything at all, i.e., without effort.  Jung (1968) has explicitly 
referred to intuition as a form of perception operating through the unconscious.   
Despite the noted similarities, there are also some very real differences between 
intuition and visual perception.  Most significantly, because no “intuitive organ” or 
“intuitive nerve,” or “intuitive cortex” within the brain has been identified, it is not clear 
what, if anything, is going on at a physiological level during intuitive problem-solving.  
The lack of evidence that intuition is systematically related to some localized 
physiological process has left investigators with few options for direct empirical study of 
the supposed processes underlying intuition.  As a result, theorists have largely foreclosed 
on the notion that intuition operates through a singular change of state.   
In the study of visual perception, on the other hand, information about 
physiological processes is readily available.  Despite this availability, there has been little 
agreement about the mechanism underlying visual perception, and it may be useful to 
briefly review attempts to explain how the objects of visual perception appear in 
consciousness, particularly with respect to the “whole-to-part”/“part-to-whole” 
bidirectionality discussed in relation to reason. 
Theories of visual perception 
 In very broad terms, theorists in this area tend to be either “whole-to-part” or 
“part-to-whole” in their orientation.  For the purpose of this paper, it is unnecessary to 




focus my discussion on the Gestalt approach, as a representative of the “whole-to-part” 
orientation and the Feature Analysis approach, as a representative of the “part-to-whole” 
orientation. 
The Gestalt approach to visual perception. 
 One of the most influential “whole-to-part” approaches has been that of the 
Gestalt theorists of the early 20
th
 century, whose central tenet was that the “whole” of a 
stimulus is more than a simple summation of its parts and that the whole must necessarily 
be perceived before perception of its parts.  Gestalt theories grew out of dissatisfaction 
with the Structuralist approach to visual perception of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
centuries, as exemplified by the work of Wundt, who held that visual perception provided 
“products” to consciousness through the construction of visual percepts from common 
“building blocks,” i.e., discrete basal component parts.  From this point of view, a visual 
percept was built up incrementally, and accordingly “more work should be rewarded with 
more products and greater success” (Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995).   
Gestalt theorists objected from the start to the Structuralist assumption that every 
perception must be built up from “bits” of sensory data sent from the sensory organs to 
the brain.  Instead, Gestalt theorists began from the naïve assumption that visual 
perception must first of all be the perception of something meaningful, i.e., perception of 
a whole, arguing that perception of a meaningful whole could never occur on the basis of 
a simple accretion of meaningless sensory “bits.” 
 Gestalt theorists maintained that visual perception could not be an “arbitrary 
piecemeal … summation of events, but is a process in which characteristics of the whole 




(1990), theorists such as Kohler, Koffka, and Wertheimer were adamant that recognition 
of meaningful patterns could not be achieved by sequentially focusing attention on the 
individual “features” of a stimulus item.  From this perspective, the individual features 
that can be discerned within a larger pattern do not operate independently of that pattern 
as a whole (Wertheimer, 1923).  Gestalt theorists maintained that analysis must begin 
with an understanding of the overall configuration, or gestalt of the stimulus item and 
from this understanding subsequent recognition of individual features or components 
could be achieved.  Thus, from the Gestalt perspective, whether or not recognition of the 
whole actually reaches consciousness, at some level the whole must necessarily be 
perceived before any of the features and the inter-relationships amongst features, all of 
which draw their meaning from the whole, can be perceived. 
 Gestalt theorists proposed that in order to rapidly organize and make the best use 
of the potentially overwhelming flood of information available from a visual stimulus, 
the perceptual system has evolved to rapidly and automatically extract meaningful 
wholes and promote these to conscious awareness.  Gestalt theorists maintained that this 
automatic extraction procedure ensured that the perceiver is provided with useful 
information in the most stable, consistent, and simple form possible, i.e., as a meaningful 
object (Coren, Ward, & Enns, 1994).  According to the Gestalt law of pragnanz, the 
visual perceptual system is designed precisely to extract the wholeness, or “essence” of 
objects in the real world for the perceiver.   
 There has been support for the Gestalt approach.  Using figures in which large 
outlines in the shapes of letters were constructed using smaller component letters, Navon 




the smaller component, as in Figure 1, performance was facilitated for that letter on a 
subsequent auditory discrimination task.   
 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H  H   H   H   H   H  H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
H                                 H 
 
   
Figure 1. Gestalt whole and component parts represent the same letter 
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S                             S 
S                             S 
S                             S 
 
 
Figure 2. Gestalt whole and component parts represent different letters 
 
On the other hand, when the outline and the component represented different letters, as in 
Figure 2, participants‟ performance on the subsequent auditory discrimination task was 




interference.  No such interference occurred on the auditory discrimination task when 
participants responded to the letter corresponding to the larger outline, e.g., “H.”  As 
would be predicted by the Gestalt approach, Navon‟s participants were responding 
preferentially to wholes, i.e., the larger letter-shape outlines, over features of the wholes, 
i.e., the smaller component letters.  
  In a second study using the same stimulus materials, Navon (1977) asked 
participants to simply identify the letter corresponding to either the outline or the 
component as rapidly as possible.  Results showed that decision speed in identifying 
letters corresponding to outlines was unaffected by the status of the component letter.  It 
made no difference whether the component letter was the same or different than the one 
represented by the outline.  In stark contrast, decision speed in identifying component 
letters was strongly affected by the status of the letter represented by the outline.  
Participants took significantly longer to identify component letters when they differed 
from the ones represented by outlines than when they were the same.  Once again, 
participants appeared to be responding preferentially to the overall shape of the visual 
stimulus over features of that stimulus, a result that would be predicted by Gestalt 
theorists. 
The Feature Analysis approach to visual perception. 
 Feature Analysis has its philosophical roots in Structuralism, and retains the 
Structuralist assumption that perceptions are constructions, built up from the raw data 
sent from sensory organs to the brain.  In contrast to the “whole-to-part” Gestalt approach 




to-whole, and that perception of the whole can take place only after completion of a 
process of identification and summation of simple stimulus features.   
 Template and Prototype theories of visual perception, which preceded Feature 
Analysis, both presumed that the unit of analysis must be a representation, and that what 
was sent from the retina to the brain was a largely unprocessed copy of the retinal image.  
Upon arrival at some “comparison station” of the brain this copy of the current retinal 
image would be directly compared to copies of other images stored in memory.  
According to the Template approach, visual perception resulted when the copy of the 
current retinal image exactly matched a stored copy of a previous retinal image, or 
template.  The first problem with such an approach is that an infinite number of stored 
retinal patterns would be required to account for all possible variations in orientation, 
size, interposition, etc., of any particular object to be perceived.  Second, even if one 
could accumulate and store such an exhaustive library of templates in memory the search 
for an exact match would be prohibitively slow.  These difficulties led to the 
development of the Prototype approach, in which it was proposed that visual perception 
occurred as a result of a match between features of the visual stimulus and the key 
features of some stored prototypic form.  According to Moates and Schumacher (1980), 
what is held in memory for any specific object is the prototype for its general category, 
i.e., a form representing the key features of that category, plus a list of acceptable 
variations specific to that object.  When an object enters the visual field whose features 





 Thus, while both Template and Prototype approaches rely on representational 
forms in the comparison process, in the Prototype approach features of the retinal image 
must match key elements of simplified general categorical forms, rather than exactly 
match a copy of some stored retinal image.  With the adoption of a generalized 
representation as the unit of analysis, demands on memory and search processes are 
reduced, and as Moates and Schumacher (1980) note, there has been some support for 
this approach (Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed, 1972; Lindsay and Norman, 1977).  Where 
Prototype theories run into difficulty, however, is in specifying how particular features 
become key to a prototype, how many key features are required for recognition, and what 
role, if any, the arrangement and organization of those key features play in recognition.   
 Feature Analysis goes a step further in simplifying the unit of analysis by 
discarding the notion of imagistic representation altogether.  Feature Analysis theorists 
proposed that visual perception takes place through extraction of meaning-free perceptual 
characteristics, or features from the stimulus, and assembly of these extracted features 
into a set of criteria.  The sorts of features extracted would be those things that are 
detected by specific cells in the nervous system, e.g., lines, slits, edges, length, 
movement, and changes in speed of movement.  According to Selfridge (1959), 
recognition of a visual stimulus occurs when the set of features extracted from the 
stimulus matches a set of features associated with a particular concept stored in memory.  
As noted by Leahey & Harris (1993), this approach is not affected by the organization or 
orientation of features, and it allows for an almost unlimited number of feature 




 There has been support for the Feature Analysis approach.  Neisser (1964) 
demonstrated that participants could detect target letters amongst lists of six-letter strings 
more quickly when distractor letters shared fewer features with the target letter, an 
indication that participants were paying attention to and processing the features of letters.  
As well, Gibson, Shapiro, and Yonas (1968) demonstrated that as letter pairs shared more 
features participants took longer to decide whether the letters in each pair were different, 
suggesting that participants were paying close attention to the individual features of the 
letters. 
 According to Eysenck & Keane (1990), despite research evidence in support of 
the Feature Analysis approach there are several persistent problems with this model.  
They note that Feature Analysis theorists tend to downplay the importance of context and 
interrelationships amongst features in pattern recognition, and thus may seriously 
underestimate the difficulty of using a Feature Analysis approach with highly complex 
real world stimuli.  As an example of the impact of context, Weisstein & Harris (1974) 
demonstrated that participants were able to detect a target line more frequently when it 
was embedded in a coherent three-dimensional form than when it was embedded in a less 
coherent form, which would not be the case if participants were simply scanning for the 
presence of line features.  Eysenck and Keane (1990) also point out that the Feature 
Analysis approach cannot account for evidence that overall shape often appears more 
important to pattern recognition than the presence or absence of any individual features. 
 To quickly recap, for Gestalt theorists visual perception begins with a singular, 
immediate recognition of a meaningful “whole.”  This recognition may be implicit, but it 




explicit recognition of a part can only occur as a result of the meaning bestowed on that 
part by the whole.  In contrast, Feature Analysis theorists contend that visual perception 
must begin with the extraction of meaningless component features from the visual array, 
followed by summation of those component features into a feature set and subsequent 
comparison of the summed feature set with feature sets of meaningful objects stored in 
memory.   
This brief section was not intended as a full discussion of the area of visual 
perception, but rather as an illustration of a particular tension, i.e., “whole-to-part” vs. 
“part-to-whole,” that has persisted in the attempt to explain how visual perception works, 
and which may be useful in the following discussion of possible mechanisms of intuition.  
I have neglected other important approaches, such as Marr‟s computational approach and 
Gibson‟s ecological approach; however a lengthier discussion of these would not add 
appreciably to the exploration of intuitive operating mechanisms.   
The psychological investigation of intuition 
 Turning once again to the examination of intuition, like visual perceptions of the 
external world the flashes of insight we attribute to intuition appear in consciousness 
“whole,” seemingly without effort and without discernable intermediate states.  
Conceptually, the traditional understanding of intuition as a singular mental act of 
knowing is closer in spirit to the Gestalt description of visual perception as an immediate 
apprehension of “wholes” than it is to the incremental, “part-to-whole” Feature Analysis 
description.  In fact, there does not appear to be a “part-to-whole” conception of intuition 




 As has been noted, it has been possible to identify and directly investigate the 
physiological processes underlying visual perception, which has led many investigators 
of visual perception to adopt a “part-to-whole” approach, taking as their object of study 
the processing of “bits” of information provided to the nervous system by sensory organs.  
This tendency has been particularly attractive since the advent of digital technology.  The 
temptation to model visual perception by analogy to the operation of a computer 
constructing larger, meaningful patterns from “bits” of input data has led to the 
development of many “data-driven” approaches.  In the investigation of intuition, 
however, there is no similar option.  There are no intuitive “organs,” and it is not possible 
to investigate the passage of input data through the nervous system to the brain.  Thus, 
with neither physiological pathways nor explicit intermediates to examine, most theorists 
have foreclosed on the “all-or-nothing” singular act as the operating mechanism 
underlying intuition. 
 As Bowers (1995) has pointed out, despite the lack of an observable physiological 
process or of observable intermediate stages between the onset of problem-solving and 
the achievement of an intuitively derived solution, the psychological perspective on 
intuition has diverged from the philosophically based view of intuition as a singular act.   
Bowers notes that the psychological view of intuition has largely concerned itself with 
the study of “cognitive processes that antedate and generate insight,” and that this 
investigation has largely taken place in the arenas of judgment/decision-making under 
conditions of uncertainty and of insight in problem solving.  For the most part, however, 
the literature in this area has had little favourable to say about intuition.  In particular, 




1982) have repeatedly demonstrated that participants preferentially rely on error-inducing 
implicit cognitive “shortcuts” in making judgments about probability, even when more 
useful predictive information, such as a base rate, is readily available.  As Bowers (1995) 
points out, as a result of the findings of authors such as Kahneman et al (1973, 1982), 
Ross (1977), and Nisbett & Ross (1980), intuition has come to be seen as a systematic 
and persistent source of error in human judgment. 
 Goldstein and Gigerenzer have noted that over the past 30 years it has become 
apparent that human problem-solving procedures do not follow accepted rules of 
reasoning, which has led many investigators to conclude that human reasoning operates 
as a weak approximation of an idealized statistical tool.  With this conclusion, the term 
heuristic, which had previously understood to mean “useful and indispensable cognitive 
processes for solving problems that cannot be handled by logic and probability theory” 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 75), instead became a pejorative term indicating a 
defective mental process generating outcomes that differ from those of an optimal 
rational strategy.  
 Goldstein and Gigerenzer argue that the heuristics that humans use to solve 
problems are not simply lesser versions of an optimized, all-purpose statistical reasoning 
tool, but instead are designed to respond to and exploit information as it exists in the 
environment, i.e., they are “ecologically rational” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 75).  
Goldstein and Gigerenzer note Simon‟s observation that models of human information 
processing must take into account that the mind has evolved in particular environments, 
and that human information processing should be understood as models of bounded, 




a satisficing, rather than an optimizing procedure (Simon, 1956, 1982), in which the first 
object discovered that satisfies the current requirements will be chosen, without the need 
for processing all possible options and “estimating probabilities and utilities for the 
possible outcomes associated with each alternative, calculating expected utilities, and 
choosing the alternative that scores highest” (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996, p. 651).  
Goldstein and Gigerenzer make the case for “fast and frugal” heuristics that are highly 
effective in problem-solving when time, knowledge, and “computational might” 
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p.75) are limited, reporting empirical support for the 
validity of these “fast and frugal” heuristics as effective problem-solving strategies 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). 
 Bowers (1990) has also argued that the general pessimism about the use value of 
intuition is unwarranted and has come about largely because the type of task employed in 
studies by Kahneman and others predisposes participants to make errors from the outset.  
As noted by Mayer (1991), in an example of the sort of problem typically used in this 
area of research, Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1124-1125) asked participants to 
estimate the probability that an individual, chosen randomly from a group, would be an 
engineer.  In the first part of the experiment, participants were given no information about 
the individual.  Half of the participants were told that the group consisted of 100 
individuals, of whom 70 were engineers and 30 were lawyers, while the other half of the 
participants were told that the group consisted of 100 individuals, of whom 30 were 
engineers and 70 were lawyers.  Participants who had been told that 70 of the 100 
individuals were engineers correctly estimated a .70 probability that a randomly chosen 




were engineers correctly estimated a .30 probability that a randomly chosen individual 
would be an engineer, demonstrating that participants were able to make use of base rates 
in judging probability. 
 In the second part of the experiment the same participants were asked to estimate 
the probability that another individual, also chosen at random from the same group, 
would be an engineer.  For this individual, participants were give personal information 
about the chosen individual.  Participants were told that his name is Jack; he is 45-years 
of age and married with four children; he is generally conservative, careful, and 
ambitious; he shows no interest in political and social issues; he spends most of his free 
time on his many hobbies, which include home carpentry, sailing, and mathematical 
puzzles.  In this case the personal information was chosen to be biased with respect to 
profession, engaging the stereotype of engineers, but not of lawyers.  Unlike participants 
in the first part of the experiment who had used base rate information to judge the 
probability that the chosen individual would be an engineer, participants in the second 
part of the experiment ignored the available base rate information altogether.  In the 
second part of the experiment, both groups incorrectly estimated the probability of the 
second individual being an engineer to be .90. 
In the third part of the experiment the same participants were asked to estimate 
the probability that a third individual, also chosen at random from the same group, would 
be an engineer.  For this individual, participants were told his name is Dick; he is 30-
years of age; he is married with no children; he has high ability, is highly motivated, and 
promises to be quite successful in his field; he is well-liked by colleagues.  In this case 




engaging stereotypes of neither engineers nor lawyers.  Participants again ignored the 
available base rate information, and both groups incorrectly estimated the probability of 
the third individual being an engineer to be .50.  From the results of these and other 
similar studies, the use of intuition in problem-solving has, for the most part, come into 
general disrepute as a kind of “mental laziness” or willful disregard of truly predictive 
variables, i.e., a strategy that leads to error more often than not. 
It should be pointed out that successful solution of the type of problem employed 
by Tversky & Kahneman and others typically demands that participants employ a 
particular problem-solving strategy, and focus on particular types of predictor variables 
within the problem-situation.  As Mayer (1991) notes, participants in the 1974 Tversky & 
Kahneman study were obviously familiar with the use of statistical inference in decision-
making and they were able to make good use of base rate information when no personal 
information about the chosen individual was available.   On the other hand, when given 
information that appeared to match preconceptions about the personal characteristics an 
engineer should possess and a lawyer should not possess, or even when given neutral 
information that did not match preconceptions about the personal characteristics of either 
engineers or lawyers, participants chose to base their predictions on information about 
personal characteristics while ignoring base rate information altogether.  Thus, 
participants did not appear able to judge the relative importance of the predictive 
information available to them within the problem situation, which led them to 
preferentially choose less predictive, but more familiar and subjectively more salient 




On the other hand, as Mayer (1991) notes, when probability problems are restated 
in terms of frequency of occurrence the biasing of predictions observed in the above 
studies does not occur.  For example, Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky (1982, p. 496) posed 
the following problem to participants: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright.  She majored in 
philosophy.  As a student, she was deeply concerned with the issues of 
discrimination and social justice and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
 
Based on this information, which of the following two alternatives is more 
probable: a) Linda is a bank teller, or b) Linda is a bank teller and is active 
in the feminist movement? 
 
Kahneman et al found that most participants (77%) chose the second alternative, despite 
the fact that the probability of a single fact being true is greater than the probability of 
that fact plus another fact both being true.  Participants again chose to base their 
prediction on information about personal characteristics and ignored base rate 
information.  This tendency disappeared, however, when Fiedler (1988, p. 345) restated 
the question in the following way: 
There are 100 persons who fit the description above.  How many of them are: 
 
a) Bank tellers 
b) Bank tellers and active in the feminist movement 
 
With the question rephrased in this way the majority of participants (73%) were able to 
correctly state that of 100 persons fewer would be both bank tellers and active in the 
feminist movement. 
In another example, Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky (1982) report that Casscells, 
Schoenberger, and Grayboys (1978, p. 999) asked faculty and students at Harvard 




If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 has a false positive 
rate of 5%, what is the chance that a person found to have a positive result 
actually has the disease, assuming you know nothing about the person‟s 
symptoms or signs? 
 
In actuality, 1000 tests would yield one true positive and 50 false positives; thus any 
individual positive test should have a likelihood of being a true positive of 1 out of 51, or 
just under 2%.  Only 18% of respondents were able to state the correct 2% likelihood that 
the person had the disease, while 45% stated a 95% likelihood, ignoring base rate 
information and focusing exclusively on the reported false positive rate.  Mayer (1991) 
notes that Cosmides and Tooby rephrased the problem statement in the following way: 
How many people who test positive for the disease will actually have the disease?  ____ 
out of ____.  With the question rephrased in this way the majority (76%) of participants 
were able to generate the correct answer (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996, p. 62).  It may be 
that people are simply more comfortable and familiar with a problem that is stated “how 
often does event X happen?” than with one stated “how probable is event X?”  In any 
case when restated in terms of frequency participants did not ignore base rate 
information. 
 From the discussion above, when participants are asked to solve problems whose 
solution requires them to use strategies that are well-known, frequently used, and perhaps 
over-learned, conclusions about the viability and usefulness of intuitively derived 
solutions may be very different than those that have arisen from the findings of 
Kahneman et al and others.  When one thinks about situations in which successful 
solutions have been achieved through the use of intuition, generally the intuitive 
problem-solver is very familiar with the elements of the problem situation.  As Monsay 




background knowledge of the intuitive problem-solver.  Kekulé, for example, had expert 
knowledge of known chemical structures and chemical reactions prior to his intuitive 
discovery of the novel structure of benzene.  Thus, the use of intuitive methods is more 
likely to generate successful solutions when tasks are posed in areas in which the 
problem-solver has much prior experience and has expert knowledge of the variables 
within the problem situation. 
 With this in mind, Bowers proposed that a fitting task for the examination of 
intuition would be one within what Reichenbach (1938, p. 6-7) referred to as the “context 
of discovery,” rather than one within the “context of justification.”  The sort of task 
envisioned by Bowers would allow examination of the process through which hunches 
are generated that implicitly point the problem-solver toward a viable solution.  From this 
perspective, Bowers described intuition as a heightened sensitivity to the presence of 
some underlying “coherence,” or tacit pattern of regularity within the problem space.  
This is not a dissimilar position from that of Einstein (1932, p. 10), who described his 
search for elemental laws governing the universe as necessarily relying on “intuition… 
helped by a feeling for the order lying behind the appearance.”  While not represented in 
consciousness, this sensitivity to underlying coherence can guide the problem-solver 
toward a “hunch or hypothesis about the nature of the coherence in question” (Bowers, 
1990).  Thus, for Bowers intuition was, simply put, a very sensitive attunement to 
patterns of regularity that human beings use to navigate, investigate, and generate 
knowledge about their environment. 
 Other theorists have expressed similar notions about the intuitive process 




discovering tacit patterns of regularity that may be passed along to consciousness.  
Goldberg (1989) has proposed that the mind is automatically and simultaneously set in 
operation on many levels at the onset of problem-solving.  Only one of these levels may 
be attended to in conscious awareness at any given time.  Outside of consciousness, 
however, there may be many different levels simultaneously engaged in generating 
solutions.  Goldberg referred to this process of unconscious generation of solutions as 
incubation, but he did not comment directly on how such a process of incubation might 
operate. 
Bastick (1982) proposed that intuition is an emotionally directed process in which 
implicit progress toward a viable solution results in a lessening of the anxiety, or 
cognitive dissonance aroused by the encounter with a puzzling problem.  Through 
intuition, primary process associative thinking is directed outward from the initial 
problem state.  The outward spread of associative thinking is guided toward a solution by 
decreases in anxiety that occur when the problem-solver implicitly follows a line of 
thought that leads toward a solution, with a final, relatively large decrease in anxiety 
accompanying the entry of a solution into consciousness.  Unfortunately, while such a 
theory might explain a subjective feeling of having a hunch, or of being on the right 
track, or of having the answer “on the tip of the tongue” that sometimes accompanies the 
intuitive process, it really does not help us to understand how particular directions in 
thought become associated with the lessening of anxiety.  Logically, one would have to 
have some sense of where the solution resides in the first place in order to judge whether 




 Agor (1989) and Rowan (1989) have presented the idea that intuitive problem-
solving relies on retrieval of “chunks,” i.e., perceptions, experiences, and relationships 
stored as meaningful patterns, from long-term memory.  Upon retrieval, these patterns 
may then be used to guide our thoughts toward a desired outcome without triggering 
conscious awareness of the process of retrieval and guidance.  While there is some appeal 
to this idea, how one goes about meaningfully chunking material for storage or how one 
retrieves the appropriate chunks is left unanswered.   
 As noted earlier, there has been little empirical research in the area of possible 
processes underlying intuition, but there have been investigations of processes operating 
outside of conscious awareness in the area of implicit memory (Dorfman et al, 1996; 
Shimamura, 1994; Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Tulving, 
Schacter, & Stark, 1982).  One line of research in this area that is particularly relevant for 
the discussion of intuition is the investigation of semantic priming effects.  Tulving et al 
(1982) defined priming as the facilitative effect of an encounter with a stimulus on 
subsequent processing of either the same stimulus (direct priming) or a related stimulus 
(indirect priming).  As noted by Burton (2004), studies of semantic priming typically 
expose participants to prime stimuli and then ask for simple judgments about subsequent 
target stimuli, e.g., a word/non-word lexical decision task.  Semantic priming is judged to 
have occurred when target judgments are facilitated.  
As an example of priming using semantic stimuli, Marcel (1983) presented 
participants with stimulus words, or primes, followed by a pattern mask so that 
participants reported seeing the primes on less than 60% of trials.  Following each prime 




with a string of letters and asked to decide whether the string of letters was an actual 
word or not.  Marcel found that participants‟ decision speed for actual target words was 
faster when the prime was a word associated with the target word than when the prime 
was not associated with the target. 
Cheeseman & Merikle (1984, 1985) have pointed out that participants in this type 
of study are able to perform at above-chance levels in guessing the identity of the prime, 
despite claiming no conscious awareness of the prime.  This has led to an explicit 
distinction between an objective threshold, at and below which participants would guess 
the identity of primes at chance levels, and a subjective threshold, at which participants 
would guess the identity of primes at above-chance levels while still claiming no 
conscious awareness of the primes.  As Eysenck and Keane (1990) have noted, it is 
possible for participants to report no conscious awareness of prime stimuli and to 
nonetheless guess the identity of primes at above chance levels and show facilitation on 
subsequent, related criterion tasks.  Both of these phenomena may be explained by 
reference to patterns of residual energy generated by spreading activation, which will be 
discussed in more detail in the following section. 
Compared to intuition, which is the use of implicit procedures to generate a novel 
solution to a problem, priming appears to be similar but a less complex phenomenon in 
that it involves the use of a familiar prime stimulus, whether consciously recognized or 
not, to speed a known and likely response.  Both, however, involve a pattern of 
engagement with problem stimuli followed by facilitated performance on a related 




the purpose of investigating the process of intuition, it may be illustrative to examine the 
most common explanation of the mechanism of priming, i.e., spreading activation. 
Priming and spreading activation. 
 Priming effects have most often been explained through reference to the 
spreading activation model (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983, 1993).  In very 
simple terms, according to the spreading activation model information is stored in 
memory in clusters of associatively interconnected nodes or terminals.  Each of these 
nodes would stand for some facet of understanding, a concept, a verbal label, an image, a 
feeling, a sensation, etc.  When a concept, verbal label, etc. becomes associated with 
another concept, verbal label, etc., an associative link is formed between their respective 
nodes.  As the degree of association increases, the number of linkages back-and-forth 
between nodes for the associated concepts also increases.  This degree of association, and 
the corresponding number of linkages, may change over time as the person has additional 
experiences involving associated concepts.   
For example, the concept “horse” would be highly associated with the word 
“horse,” and there will be many links between their nodes.  The concept “horse” will also 
be associated with images of horses, and perhaps with emotions such as pleasure or fear.  
As well, the concept “horse” will be associated with other concepts, such as “mammal,” 
“buggy,” or “saddle.”  The number of associations between these and the concept “horse” 
will differ from person to person, depending on their experience and expertise with 
horses.  With only simple exposure to Western movies and television programs, it is 
likely that for most people in North America the concept “horse” will be associated with 




these concepts with their respective verbal labels, images, sensory experiences, and 
emotional tones.  With more extensive experience with horses, concepts such as “sorrel,” 
“Arabian,” and “tack” may become highly associated with the concept “horse.” 
As an example of how experience can alter the strength of associations, a person 
wishing to overcome a fear of horses might decide to spend a summer learning to take 
care of horses.  The person may experience enjoyment in a number of activities related to 
caring for horses, so that many horse-related nodes become linked, and perhaps multiply 
linked, with pleasure nodes.  The net effect of these positive experiences with horses is 
that the person comes to more strongly associate horses and activities involving horses 
with enjoyment than with fear.  In addition to changing the strength of existing 
associations, new experiences may also lead to the creation of new nodes and new 
associative linkages in the associative network.  For the person trying to overcome a fear 
of horses, reading about horses may result in the creation of many new horse-related 
nodes and linkages.  The person might discover that there are many words used to 
describe differences in the coat and color of horses, e.g., a sorrel is solid red, yellowish-
red, or reddish-brown, without black on the mane, tail, or lower legs, while a bay is 
reddish-brown, with black on the mane, tail, and lower legs (Casa de Whatever, 2004).  
In learning that some horses are called sorrels, the person has altered his/her associative 
network by creating/assigning a new “sorrel” concept node and a new “sorrel” verbal 
label node, each linked to the other and to nodes for the concept “horse,” the verbal label 
“horse,” the concepts “red,” “yellowish-red,” and “reddish-brown,” the verbal labels for 




 When a person wants to bring a particular concept to consciousness, s/he must 
focus attention on the relevant concept and in so doing provides activation energy to the 
node for that concept, raising the level of residual energy at the target node from the 
resting state to the threshold level at which the concept enters consciousness.  As 
activation energy is provided to the target node, some portion will drain off even as it is 
being added, spreading outward along associative links between the target node and other 
nodes whose concepts are closely associated with the target concept.   From these close 
associate nodes energy will spread to other nodes that are associatively linked with them.  
As the spread of activation energy proceeds “outward” from node to node, some of the 
activation energy will be retained at each node in the form of residual energy, and some 
will be passed along links to nodes for associated concepts.  Despite this ongoing 
“leakage,” if the person persists in attempting to bring a particular concept into 
consciousness, barring a failure of memory, the level of residual energy at the target node 
will continue to increase until it exceeds the level required for the desired concept to 
enter consciousness.   
Nodes for closely associated concepts, which will be multiply interlinked with the 
target node and with each other, will have received energy directly from the target node 
and also from other close-associate nodes in the spread of energy from the target node.  
Nodes for things that are associatively closest to the target concept will accumulate 
relatively high, but still sub-threshold levels of residual energy.  Examples might be 
nodes for specific images, semantic labels, and affective valences associated with the 
target concept.  At nodes for things less closely associated with the target concept the 




the target concept there will be no accumulation of residual energy.  See Figure 3.  Thus, 
as the person brings a concept to consciousness, a pattern of residual energy is created 
within the person‟s associative network in which the level of residual energy held at 
nodes will vary from the resting state to just below the threshold. 
 
 
Figure 3. Residual energy at nodes within the associative network  
following activation of a concept to consciousness 
 
For as long as the target concept is held in consciousness, energy will continue to 
flow through the associative network, maintaining the established pattern of residual 
energy.  Nodes for close associates of the target concept will maintain a level of residual 










corresponding to any one of these close associate nodes to be brought to consciousness 
quickly with the addition of very little activation energy.  In terms of an evolutionary 
advantage, this arrangement makes sense because it would be advantageous in many, if 
not most situations to be able to rapidly bring to consciousness concepts, names, images, 
etc., that are closely associated with the concept currently in consciousness, e.g., bear   
danger, bear    escape, bear    climb tree, bear    get weapon, bear    make noise, 
etc.   
Nodes for concepts that are only distant associates of the target concept, on the 
other hand, will have accumulated a very low level of residual energy, and each of these 
will require the addition of a great deal of activation energy for its concept, word, image, 
etc to enter consciousness.  This also makes sense from an evolutionary perspective, 
because being able to rapidly bring such a concept to consciousness would be unlikely to 
provide any advantage, e.g., bear   belly-dancing, food  escape. 
It should be noted that spreading activation is a parallel process, and in the spread 
of activation from a target node, more than one node will receive activation energy 
simultaneously.  Consciousness, on the other hand, operates as a serial process in which 
one conscious thought gives way to the next.  Because a parallel process involves the 
simultaneous processing of multiple pieces of information, a parallel search for relevant 
information can be much more rapid and will employ far fewer mental resources than a 
serial search process, which, by definition, must move sequentially from one piece of 
information to the next.   
 In the case of a semantic priming task, a person attempting to memorize a word 




level of activation at the node for that word and, through the outward spread of 
activation, at nodes for closely associated words/concepts.  Due to the limited and serial 
nature of consciousness, however, only the target node will accumulate enough residual 
energy to breach the threshold.  In the priming task, as the person transfers his/her 
attention from the first word to the next on the list to be memorized, the level of residual 
energy at the node for the first word will drop below the threshold as the residual energy 
at the node for the next word rises above the threshold.  The decrease in the level of 
residual energy at the first word node occurs because no further activation energy is being 
provided to the node, but energy continues to spread outward from the node to its 
associates.  Through rehearsal techniques a person may continue to provide enough 
activation energy to keep the residual energy level very close to the threshold at several 
nodes, but this will quickly reach a limit for most people. 
 Disregarding rehearsal effects, as the first word is replaced in consciousness the 
residual energy at its node will drop below the threshold level, but further decreases are 
likely to be gradual because most non-trivial problems require that a problem-solver shift 
attention back and forth quickly between different aspects of the problem to reach a 
solution that can incorporate all of the elements of that problem.  This being the case, it 
would be advantageous for the level of residual energy at a node whose concept is being 
replaced in consciousness to decay slowly so that a rapid return to consciousness could be 
achieved with the addition of only a small amount of energy.  The notion of shifting 
attention back-and-forth amongst different elements of the problem will be discussed 




If, on the other hand, following the exit of the first word from consciousness the 
level of residual energy at its node was allowed to drop to the resting state, a large input 
of activation energy would be required to reach the threshold again, meaning that a return 
of the first word to consciousness would take more effort and would take longer.  If one 
thinks of this process as a play and each of the concepts as actors, having each of the 
actors remain onstage and “primed” to deliver their lines would result in a performance 
that would be much more coherent and intelligible to the audience than one in which each 
actor, upon receiving a cue, had to start from home, travel to the theater, deliver a line, 
and then go home to await the call to deliver his/her next line.  It is likely that the 
audience would not find the latter performance engaging and they would rapidly tire of 
trying to make sense of such a disjointed and incoherent play. 
 In a similar way, when a person engaged in a priming task focuses on a 
memorizing a new word, the residual energy at the node of the previously memorized 
word will decrease, but will remain at a level somewhere between the resting state and 
the threshold.  When the person is later tested for recall of the memorized words, only 
those whose nodes retain a level of residual energy very close to threshold should be 
recalled.  Words whose nodes retain lower levels of residual energy will not be accessible 
to recall, but the residual energy held at these nodes may still have an impact on 
participants‟ behaviour on implicit learning tasks, such as word-nonword recognition, 
which are more sensitive to low levels of residual energy than direct recall tasks.  With a 
word-nonword recognition task it can be shown that despite the fact that some of the 
previously memorized words are inaccessible to recall, they are recognized as real words 




residual energy at the nodes for these words, although too low to promote direct recall, 
will be higher than the level of residual energy at the node for a new word.  The 
previously memorized word will be recognized as a word more quickly because less 
activation energy will need to be provided at its node to reach the threshold of 
consciousness than at the node for the new word.  This can be likened to a race between 
two equally fast runners, but one runner, the new word, must start at the starting line 
while the other runner, the previously memorized word, gets to start at a point midway to 
the finish line.  Clearly the previously memorized word will arrive at the finish line more 
quickly and with less effort. 
 In a 1987 study of verbal priming, Yaniv and Meyer demonstrated that 
participants‟ unsuccessful attempts to produce words corresponding to provided 
definitions could have the effect of speeding the recognition of those words on a 
subsequent lexical decision task and also the correct recognition of those words as “old” 
on a subsequent old-new judgment task, despite the fact that the latter judgment took 
place 30 minutes after the initial definition task.  Yaniv and Meyer gave participants 
definitions of rare words and following each definition asked participants to produce the 
word corresponding to that definition.  The rare words were organized two per item, so 
that for each item half the participants received the definition for word A and half 
received the definition for word B.  If a participant received the A-version of an item as 
the target word, the B-version served as the control word, and vice-versa.  When 
participants could not produce a response to a definition, they were asked if they felt the 
target word was “on the tip of their tongue” and to rate their “feeling of knowing” the 




lexical discrimination task in which they were asked to indicate as quickly as possible 
whether a stimulus was a word or a non-word.  For each item participants responded to 
six stimulus items: the target word, the control word, 1, 2, or 3 other words, and 1, 2, or 3 
non-words.  After completing 13 blocks participants were asked to make old-new 
judgments about the target and control words used in the study and an equal number of 
new words that participants had not encountered in the study. 
 Yaniv and Meyer found that for trials in which participants successfully produced 
the target word in response to definitions lexical decisions were more rapid for target 
words than for control words.  For trials in which participants produced an incorrect word 
in response to the definition, lexical decision speed was essentially the same for target 
and control words.  Of particular interest, for trials in which participants were unable to 
produce a response to the definition target, lexical decisions were more rapid as ratings of 
accessibility increased.  For control words, however, there was no change in lexical 
decision speed as accessibility ratings increased.   
In the old-new judgment task a similar pattern emerged.  For trials in which 
participants were able to successfully produce the correct word in response to the 
definition, correct “old” judgments were more rapid for target words than for control 
words.  On the other hand, for trials in which participants produced an incorrect word in 
response to the definition, correct “old” judgments were actually less rapid for target 
words than for control words, indicating an interference effect.  For trials in which 
participants were unable to produce a response to the definition, correct “old” judgments 




words there was no change in correct “old” judgment speed as accessibility ratings 
increased.   
 In their explanation of these results, Yaniv and Meyer note that several theorists 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 
1971, 1976; Morton, 1969) have proposed that facilitation of lexical decisions in priming 
studies reflects changes to levels of residual energy held at nodes within the semantic 
network as a result of the operation of spreading activation in long-term memory.  Yaniv 
and Meyer proposed that unsuccessful attempts to recall target words leads to a 
“memory-sensitization” effect, in which memory traces critical to the problem‟s solution 
are activated to sub-threshold levels.  While these traces did not accumulate sufficient 
residual energy to allow the target word to reach consciousness in the recall task, their 
relatively high levels of residual energy facilitated recognition of the target word in a 
subsequent encounter in the environment.  As Yaniv and Meyer note, when the semantic 
network is activated by a failure to reach solution, assimilation of new related stimuli will 
occur more efficiently and with a higher probability.   
 With respect to encounters between a sensitized problem-solver and solution-
relevant environmental stimuli, Posner (1973) noted that a break introduced between the 
initial period of conscious engagement with a difficult problem and a subsequent period 
of conscious engagement often increases the likelihood that the problem will be 
successfully solved, a phenomenon he referred to as the incubation effect.  Yaniv and 
Meyer (1987) noted that as the length of the break, or incubation period increases so too 
do opportunities for encounters with relevant stimuli, leading to an increased probability 




residual activation at solution-critical traces for periods long enough to allow for such 
encounters.  As noted above, Yaniv and Meyer have reported that participants have 
demonstrated word-nonword facilitation for as long as half an hour following failures to 
produce target words in response to definitions. 
 Yaniv and Meyer‟s memory sensitization hypothesis may also be useful in 
explaining the mechanism underlying problem-solving when achievement of a solution 
occurs as a flash of insight.  An often cited example of this sort of problem is Maier‟s 
string problem (1931), in which participants were presented with two strings hanging 
from the ceiling and asked to tie the hanging ends of the string together.  The strings were 

















Figure 4.  Maier‟s string problem (adapted from K. Stange, 2005, pp. 21-22). 
 
Solving this problem required participants to recognize that a pair of pliers, which were 
in plain sight, could be used as a pendulum bob.  By tying the pliers to one string and 




string and grasp it, then, as the pliers swung back, the participant could catch them and tie 
the two strings together. 
 In Maier‟s experiment, only 39% of participants were able to solve the string 
problem correctly within the 10-minute time limit.  Participants who had not solved the 
problem were then given an important clue.  The experimenter “accidentally” nudged one 
of the strings, setting it in motion.  After receiving this clue, 62% of the remaining 
participants solved the problem within 60 seconds.  When interviewed later, however, 
none of these participants mentioned the clue as an important factor in solving the 
problem, and many reported having no memory of seeing the string move at all.  Thus, 
despite being either not consciously aware of the movement of the string, or not aware 
that it was important in their solution of the problem, participants appeared to be making 
use of the clue.  In other words, they were generating successful solution strategies based 
on information not consciously experienced as important, or not consciously experienced 
at all. 
 Maier‟s finding was replicated by Judson (1956), who substituted semantic 
priming for the “accidental” nudge of the string as the subtle clue.  The priming effect is 
well-established in the context of memory-research, where the use of incidental, or 
implicit learning tasks is common.  In Judson‟s study participants were first asked to 
memorize a list of words and then, after a period of time, to explicitly recall as many of 
those words as possible.  The list of words participants were given to memorize included 
the words string, pendulum, and swing.  Following the explicit recall test participants 
were given an implicit learning task, a word-nonword recognition task and a second 




string, pendulum, and swing on the memory task had the effect of facilitating 
participants‟ performance on both the word-nonword recognition task and the string 
problem.  With respect to participants‟ awareness of the semantic priming clues, 
participants reported having no awareness of any connection between the stimulus words 
and their solution of the string problem. 
 In general terms, according to the spreading activation model, recognition of a 
problem in need of a solution sets in motion a search for a solution through outward 
spreads of activation in the problem solver‟s associative network from nodes which are in 
some way relevant to the problem at hand.  When two problem-relevant elements 
(concepts, images, names, etc.) are considered by the problem-solver, there will be near-
simultaneous spreads of activation from each of their nodes.  If the two spreads of 
activation then intersect at nodes whose elements are associatively linked to both of the 
original elements, these points of intersection will receive energy from each of the 
originally activated nodes.  If a third element is then considered, more intersections may 
occur, and residual energy will build up rapidly at these intersection nodes with 
associative links to each of the activated nodes.  These intersection nodes are especially 
likely to be relevant to a solution, since a solution must, in some way, bring together and 
integrate all of the elements present in the problem in a coherent manner.  As additional 
problem elements are juxtaposed, the level of residual energy at common intersection 
nodes builds until it exceeds the threshold of consciousness at one node, at which time 





It is likely that intermediate stages between the onset of puzzlement and the 
achievement of an insightful solution will exist only as complex patterns of residual 
energy in the problem-solver‟s associative network that cannot be represented in 
consciousness; however, one should be able to demonstrate the presence of partial, or 
intermediate states of knowledge at solution-relevant nodes.  A problem-solver who is 
interrupted before achieving a solution will have generated a complex, but unfinished 
pattern of residual energy in which solution-relevant nodes, due to their multiple 
interconnections with nodes for problem elements, will be amongst the nodes with the 
highest levels of residual energy.  If the problem-solver is on the right track, the pattern 
generated will resemble the one that would exist if the person had actually achieved a 
solution, i.e., the solution pattern, in which nodes for solution relevant concepts will hold 
the highest levels of residual energy.  The nearer the problem-solver is to achieving a 
solution, the closer the resemblance will be between the pattern of residual energy 
generated and the solution pattern.   
 Since these complex patterns of residual energy, or intermediate states of partial 
knowledge cannot be represented in consciousness directly, one would need to employ 
indirect measures sensitive to the presence of residual energy to demonstrate the 
existence of partial knowledge.  For example, a problem-solver interrupted before 
achieving a solution to a problem will have generated a pattern of residual energy in 
which the level of energy at solution-relevant nodes will be relatively high.  If the 
problem-solver is subsequently asked to solve a second problem whose solution requires 
knowledge of the solution to the first problem, s/he should perform at a level somewhere 




attempted the first problem and that expected from persons who had actually solved the 
first problem.  As well, a problem-solver near to solving the first problem at the point of 
interruption should perform at a higher level on the second problem than a problem-
solver who is not near to solving the first problem at the point of interruption. 
 This is, in fact, the general notion underlying the set of studies included in this 
thesis.  If intuition involves a movement from puzzlement to solution through a set of 
intermediate states of partial knowledge which take the form of increasingly-complete 
complex patterns of residual energy within the problem-solver‟s associative network, 
then one should be able to demonstrate that a problem-solver who attempts but fails to 
solve a problem will have generated partial knowledge of a solution, i.e., a pattern of 
residual energy in which a relatively high level is held at solution-relevant nodes that will 
facilitate performance on a related problem.  This would be the case despite the fact that 
the intuitive problem-solver would have no conscious awareness of the solution to the 
first problem, or of having any knowledge about that solution.   
 Further, when the problem-solver is provided with enriched information in the 
first problem, s/he would have more potential sites for activation to work with than would 
a problem-solver working with impoverished information.  The problem-solver working 
with enriched information should, therefore, generate a pattern of residual energy that 
more closely approximates the solution pattern, and should accumulate a level of residual 
energy at solution-relevant nodes that is nearer to the threshold of consciousness, 
The discussion above is premised on the idea that the intuitive generation of a 
potential solution occurs through the creation of a pattern of residual energy that 




energy will occur at solution-relevant nodes.  This will occur as a result of intersections 
in several simultaneous spreads of activation from solution-relevant nodes.  It is, 
however, possible that once the problem-solver has activated some problem element 
nodes and generated a tentative pattern of residual energy in his/her associative network, 
the process of generating a potential solution could be sped up considerably by directly 
testing a potential solution by activating the node in the tentative pattern of residual 
activation that has accumulated the highest level of residual energy.  In the following 
section I will discuss how such an activation of a potential solution node could be helpful 
in problem-solving. 
A possible model of organization within the associative network 
As discussed earlier, a person‟s associative network may be thought of as clusters 
of associatively interconnected nodes or terminals.  As a heuristic, one can think of the 
associative network as a two-dimensional “plane” on which nodes for associated 
concepts are linked to each other by linkages, or “jumper wires.”  See Figure 5. 
 





As a person matures, his/her associative network develops and differentiates, with new 
nodes added to accommodate new concepts, words, images, etc., and new linkages 
formed between nodes to reflect newly developed understanding of the associations 
between different concepts, names, etc.  In addition to expanding to accommodate newly 
experienced phenomena, the person‟s associative network also develops in a new way, 
with the creation of logical, meaningful categories that organize concepts into groupings 
on the basis of the presence of important shared characteristics, for example the presence 
of life.  The “animate” category can be conceptualized as a new plane at a “higher level 
of abstraction,” upon which nodes representing living things from the basal level can be 
represented.  See Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. Linkage between basal nodes for living things and 





As a person‟s experience and expertise with a category grows, new planes of 
abstraction may be introduced between the basal level and the category level to reflect 
finer „sub-categories” whose members all share a characteristic at the highest level of 
abstraction, e.g., they are all “animate,” but all differ from members of other sub-
categories on other important characteristics, e.g., “fish” vs. “bird” vs. “mammal.”  See 
Figures 7 and 8. 
 
Figure 7. Linkage amongst basal nodes for a specific type of living thing 
 
In a similar way, as one‟s expertise with a sub-category such as “bird” develops, finer 
sub-categories will be introduced between the basal level and the bird level, whose 









Figure 8. Linkage amongst nodes on basal, midlevel,  
and higher levels of abstraction. 
 
In this way, one may go on creating sub-categories to organize members of a 
category on the basis of the presence or absence of important characteristics.  For 




category for birds in his/her associative network  The expert‟s “bird” category will 
include sub-categories such as “hawk,” “duck,” and „sparrow,” and finer sub-categories 
such as “hawk characteristics,” “duck characteristics,” and „sparrow characteristics.” The 
number of levels of abstraction, the number of planes at a given level of abstraction, the 
number of nodes and the amount of interlinkage amongst those nodes on a given plane, 
and the complexity of the linkages between planes at different levels of abstraction would 
be entirely dependent on how much knowledge and experience the person has in a 
particular topic area.  An expert in a particular area would likely have more levels of 
abstraction, more nodes and more interlinkages between the nodes on a given level, and 
more linkages between levels than would a beginner. 
The obvious advantage of re-organizing the associative network in this way is that 
one may rapidly localize searches on the basis of the characteristics required to belong to 
a particular category, or to a particular sub-category within that category.  A problem-
solver employing a purely associative approach when searching for a desired solution 
would be forced to rely only on the strengths of the associative linkages between 
concepts established by personal experience, and would have no basis for inferring 
similarities across discrete experiences.  Thus, a purely associative approach would 
involve a search through associations forged in past experiences in that particular 
situation.  On the other hand, with the reorganization of the nodes in the associative 
network into a logical, categorical structure, problem-solvers have the opportunity to use 
a new and more efficient search process.   
For example, activation of a specific “hawk beak” image node will send energy 




pass upward to “hawk characteristic” level, from there to the “bird characteristic” level,  
and from there outward to other nodes in the “bird system,” but the majority will be 
retained at the “hawk” and ”hawk characteristic” levels because of the complex pattern of 
multiple interlinkages amongst nodes on these levels with the “hawk beak” image node, 
for example, “hawk wings,” “hawk tail,” “hawk talons,” “hawk size,” “hawk feather,” 
etc..  Thus, the majority of the energy introduced into the associative network by the 
initial activation of the “hawk beak” image node will recirculate amongst nodes within 
the “hawk system,” resulting in a relative increase in residual energy held at nodes within 
the “hawk system,” compared to nodes in other systems, such as the “sparrow system.” 
Thus, a person with a logical categorization scheme can create new categories of 
similarity that can meaningfully unite discrete experiences, and create new logical links 
amongst nodes for different things experienced at different times in different situations.  
For example, “dolphin,” „skunk,” and “butterfly,” all different and all experienced at 
different times in different contexts, can all be meaningfully subsumed under a purely 
mental category that can logically integrate those specific things, e.g., they are all 
“animate.”  Using this logical categorization scheme, problem-solvers can search in 
memory for desired solutions in either an inductive, “part-to-whole” manner or a 
deductive, “whole-to-part” manner.  In an inductive search the problem-solver might 
activate nodes for specific things, e.g., “duck,” “sparrow,” and “hawk,” and energy would 
flow “upward” from these through logical links to the node for a category that can 
integrate those things in a meaningful way, e.g., “bird.”  A deductive search, on the other 
hand, would involve activating a category level node, e.g., the node for the concept 




things that belong to that category, e.g., “bay,” “quarter horse,” and “thoroughbred.”  
Further, the inductive and deductive search process may be integrated into what will be 
discussed throughout this thesis as the alternating activation hypothesis. 
The alternating activation search process 
“He did not arrive at this conclusion by the decent process of 
quiet, logical deduction, nor yet by the blinding flash of 
glorious intuition, but by the shoddy, untidy process halfway 
between the two by which one usually gets to know things.” 
(Allingham, 1942, p. 145) 
 
Gigerenzer (1991) notes that there has been a tendency to too-strongly divide the 
context of discovery from the context of justification, with the assumption that the 
context of discovery exists as a discrete stage that simply precedes the stage in which 
justification procedures occur.  Gigerenzer makes the point that checking and testing 
(justification procedures) are likely to take place in all stages of inquiry, as is the 
generation of new ideas (discovery processes).  Gigerenzer further states that discovery is 
unlikely to occur through a process of pure induction from data, or of irrational guessing, 
but instead is likely to involve heuristics guided by “the tools of justification” (p. 264).  It 
will be argued that intuition operates to generate potential solutions to puzzling problems 
through the process of alternating activation, in which inductive procedures alternate with 
deductive procedures throughout.  As will be discussed, the latter involves checking and 
testing procedures, and these occur throughout what Bowers labeled the intuitive stage 
well prior to the appearance of a potential solution in the insight stage. 
In the alternating activation model of intuitive processing, the intuitive search for 
a solution to a problem begins with a primary “inductive” activation event at the node for 




primary activation event, energy will spread along logical links to nodes at a higher level 
of abstraction, one of which may serve as a hunch or “potential owner” of the problem 
feature.  At this point a reversal in the direction of activation occurs, and the higher level 
node that has accumulated the highest level of residual energy following primary 
activation will be selected as the hunch node, which will be the site for a secondary 
“deductive” activation event.  Following the secondary activation event at the hunch 
node, energy spreads along logical links to nodes for the set of characteristics for that 
“potential owner.”  If the activated hunch node is in fact the correct solution, many of the 
expected characteristics may “match” actual features present in the gestalt, and because 
of the increase in residual energy held at expected characteristic nodes the likelihood of 
noticing a matching gestalt feature increases.  When a match occurs between an expected 
characteristic and an actual feature, residual energy at the expected characteristic node 
will increase sharply.  Because of this increase in residual energy, a matching 
characteristic node may become the site for a new primary inductive activation event.  
Each new primary activation event will send another spread of activation into the 
associative network, and wave after wave of activation energy will flow from matching 
characteristic nodes to the hunch category node. 
For the beak/bird example discussed above, when a problem-solver responds to 
some aspect of a drawing as a beak, the initial activation event occurs at the node, or 
nodes, that would be activated had the problem-solver seen an actual beak.  This in itself 
is not a trivial event in that it involves attempting to match some aspect of an incomplete 
and never-before-seen image with different, stored examples in memory, and so it is 




activated on a trial basis, however, the spread of activation energy from that node will 
generate a pattern of residual energy within the problem-solver‟s associative network.   
At this point, the problem-solver could simply continue to attempt further primary 
inductive activations of nodes for characteristics that seem relevant to other data features. 
Once a pattern of residual energy has been established the search process may be more 
efficient if the problem-solver shifts from the “data” of the image to “things” at a higher 
level of abstraction most useful to solving the question at hand, i.e., “what is the thing 
that this beak belongs to?”  If, following primary activation of the “beak” node, one such 
“potential owner” node has accumulated enough residual energy to set it apart from other 
nodes at its level of abstraction, that node may then serve as a hunch, i.e., the site for a 
secondary activation event.  A secondary activation event at a hunch node will send a 
highly-focused spread of activation energy to nodes for characteristics closely associated 
with that particular “potential owner.”  See Figure 9.   
   
Figure 9. Deductive activation of a “hawk” node (left) leads to accumulations of residual 
energy at “hawk characteristic” nodes on a lower plane of abstraction (right). 
 
Logically, if the activated hunch is in fact the correct solution, one would expect that 




features of the image.  In the case of the example given above, if “hawk” is the hunch 
identified in the spread of activation from the “beak” node, secondary activation of the 
“hawk” node will send a spread of activation energy to “hawk characteristics,” some of 
which should be present as features of the image if “hawk” is in fact the correct solution. 
When an expected characteristic does correspond with an actual feature of the 
image, for example, “hawk eye,” the likelihood of its recognition is enhanced by the high 
level of residual energy at the expected characteristic node.  Since the level of residual 
energy at the “hawk eye” characteristic node will already be part-way to the threshold of 
conscious recognition, little additional activation energy will be required to boost the 
level above the threshold, increasing the likelihood that the gestalt feature will match and 
be recognized as a hawk eye.  The “match” characteristic node may then serve as the site 
for another primary inductive activation event, sending another spread of activation 
throughout the associative network and depositing additional energy at the “hawk” node. 
With each match between an expected characteristic and an actual feature, another 
spread of activation energy will flow “upward” to the node for the “likely owner” of the 
matching characteristics.  If a hunch node has been chosen that can serve as the “owner” 
of each of the activated image features, that node will receive energy from each of these 
activations and the residual energy at that node will accumulate rapidly to the threshold 
of consciousness at which point the problem-solver will become aware of the “owner” of 
the image, “Oh, it‟s a hawk!”  See Figure 10.  Depending on the quality of information 
available and the problem-solver‟s acuity with visual images, it may be that several 




energy in the “hawk system” to allow the problem-solver to become consciously aware of 
“hawk” as the correct solution.   
It may be that the node chosen as the site for a secondary activation event is an 
incorrect hunch, for example the “duck” node, the subsequent accumulation of residual 
energy at “expected duck characteristic” nodes, for example nodes for “webbed foot,” 
“side-facing eyes” and “thin neck,” will not facilitate matches with actual features of the 
image.  Without expected/actual matches there will be no new sites for primary activation 
events, and so no further additional energy will flow “upward” to the hunch node.  Very 
quickly, the “duck” node will dead-end as hunch pointing the problem-solver toward the 
“likely owner” of the beak. 
   
 
Figure 10. Inductive activation of expected characteristic/actual feature “match” nodes (left) leads 
to rapid accumulation of residual energy at the “hawk” node on a higher conceptual plane (right). 
 
It should be pointed out that in the process of alternating activation it is not 
necessary that the problem-solver achieve conscious awareness of either the gestalt 
features or the hunch in order for their nodes to be used as sites for activation events.  It is 
likely sufficient that, following primary activation, the accumulation of residual energy at 




secondary activation and the matching process, the accumulation of residual energy at a 
characteristic node be significantly above the level of accumulation at other characteristic 
nodes.   
The process of alternating activation allows a problem-solver to rapidly limit and 
localize the search area for “likely owners.”  Using primary activation the problem-solver 
can move quickly from specific instances, i.e., the “data,” to a higher-level abstraction, 
i.e., a “hunch,” that can subsume and meaningfully integrate those specific instances.  
Using secondary activation the problem-solver can move from the “hunch” back toward 
the “data,” engaging in a matching process between actual gestalt features and the set of 
characteristics that would be expected for that “hunch” to be the correct solution.  With 
many expected/actual matches, the level of residual energy at the “hunch” node will 
increase rapidly, until it reaches the level at which the problem-solver becomes aware of 
the hunch as the desired solution.  As noted, the problem-solver could, of course, simply 
continue to activate different feature nodes serially in the hope of mechanically 
depositing sufficient residual energy at a solution node to bring its concept into 
consciousness, but it would be more efficient to directly test any higher-level node that 
has accumulated a sufficient level of residual energy to set it apart from others on its level 
as a potential solution.   
In terms of evolution, there would be a distinct advantage to the model described 
above, in that a problem-solver who can maintain a large, associatively linked pattern of 
activation within his/her associative network through the conscious activation of a single 
thought would be able to rapidly bring to consciousness other information that is 




the example of “eagle,” if a problem-solver is currently thinking about a particular eagle, 
for example a bald eagle, and has some reason to want to know where a bald eagle lives, 
the activation provided to conceptual/semantic nodes for “bald eagle” in order to bring 
the concept of “bald eagle” to consciousness will have generated a pattern of residual 
energy amongst nodes associatively linked to the “bald eagle” node, one or several of 
which will represent “habitat of bald eagle.”  Because a high level of residual energy will 
have accumulated at the “habitat of bald eagle” node(s) in the spread of activation from 
the “bald eagle” node while the person maintained bald eagle in consciousness, the 
problem-solver will be able to bring information about bald eagle habitat to 
consciousness rapidly with the input of a minimal amount of activation energy.   
Had the problem-solver simply activated the highest-level “owner” node to 
consciousness, e.g., “bird,” bringing information about bald eagle habitat to 
consciousness would take longer and require the addition of more activation energy.  This 
higher level of abstraction will include the required information about bald eagle habitat, 
but will also include information about the habitat of other species of birds known to the 
person, which would make access to information specific to the bald eagle much more 
difficult.  It would simply not be an efficient strategy to go to a higher-than-necessary 
level of abstraction if the goal is to rapidly access information about something at a 
particular level of abstraction.   
Note that activation of “bird” in response to seeing a bald eagle would correspond 
to a child‟s unsophisticated understanding, reflecting a relatively undifferentiated 
associative network.  With more experience and developing expertise with different types 




linkages between nodes and an organization that includes more meaningful/useful levels 
of abstraction.  For a person who has spent time studying bald eagles, “habitat of bald 
eagle” may be too abstract for the current situation, and s/he may instead activate a node 
for “winter habitat of western coastal bald eagle.” 
Bowers‟ previous studies 
 The studies included in this thesis have their conceptual roots in several studies 
performed by Ken Bowers in the 1990s.  In these studies, intuition was understood to be a 
tacit perception of clues to coherence that activates and guides thinking toward discovery 
of the nature of that coherence.  Using intuition, problem-solvers extract “something” 
from the problem situation that they can use to generate patterns of spreading activation 
relevant to the task of discovering a solution to the problem at hand.  It is this process of 
extraction and generation that are at the core of Bowers‟ intuitive stage.  Activation of a 
concept in long-term memory that is in some way relevant to “something” extracted from 
the problem situation sends a spread of activation energy through the problem-solver‟s 
associative network, generating a residual energy pattern in which relatively high levels 
of residual energy are held at nodes for concepts, words, images, etc. that may then serve 
as hunches or implicit hypotheses about the nature of the solution to the problem at hand.  
When a problem is very familiar, the problem-solver will likely accumulate a high level 
of residual energy at a hunch very rapidly, and that hunch will likely be correct and 
immediately relevant to all of the elements of the problem situation, so that movement 
from puzzlement to solution is rapid and glitch-free.  When a problem is unfamiliar, 




process takes the same route, beginning with the activation of concepts experienced as 
similar in some way to elements within the problem situation. 
 Bowers maintained that one of the first and most important “somethings” that 
problem-solvers respond to in the problem situation is the presence of coherence within 
the stimuli.  From the outset of problem-solving, identifying the presence of some form 
of coherence amongst elements in the problem situation would seem to be an efficient use 
of resources.  If no general coherence can be discerned amongst the elements of the 
problem situation, it would be pointless to continue the attempt to discover any specific 
pattern of regularity, i.e., a solution.  If some form of coherence can be discerned, 
however, it is likely to be related to the solution in some way, since the solution must 
logically integrate the elements of the problem situation.  Thus, problem-solvers are 
likely to be very attuned to the presence or absence of coherences amongst challenging 
stimuli. 
In the first of three 1990 studies by Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, and Parker, 
stimuli were created based on items drawn from the Remote Associates Test (RAT) 
(Mednick and Mednick, 1967) and Arthur‟s (1964) revision of the Kent-Rosanoff Word 
Association Test (Kent & Rosanoff, 1910).  Sixty pairs of three-word items, or Dyads of 
Triads (DOT), were constructed so that each pair contained: a) a coherent triad, in which 
each of the three stimulus words was a remote associate of a fourth word, and, b) an 
incoherent triad, in which the three stimulus words did not have a common remote 
associate, barring loose, psychotic associations.  In addition, each Dyad of Triads was 
constructed so that the most closely associated pair of words within the coherent triad and 




associative closeness.  One DOT item with the remote associate for coherent triad A is 
illustrated in Figure 11.  
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       Associate 
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Figure 11. Sample DOT Item 
 
Participants were given a brief exposure (8 or 12 s.) to each Dyad of Triads 
arranged as in Figure 11, without the remote associate word or any indication of which 
triad is coherent.  Pairs of triads were counterbalanced with respect to left/right 
positioning of the coherent triad.  Participants were asked to generate the remote 
associate word, or, failing that, to simply indicate which of the two triads was the 
coherent version, and then to provide a confidence rating that they had chosen the correct 
triad as coherent.  Bowers et al found that amongst unsolved items the coherent Dyad 
was chosen at a rate significantly greater than chance, and higher confidence ratings were 
associated with increased likelihood of choosing the correct triad as coherent. 
Coherent triads were then separated into convergent coherent triads, in which the 
common remote associate of the triad maintained the same meaning for each stimulus 
word, e.g., “goat-pass-green” are all associated with the same meaning of the word 
“mountain,” and divergent coherent triads, in which the common remote associate of the 
triad did not maintain the same meaning for each stimulus word, e.g., “strike-same-




asked to rate the convergence of each triad and the resulting average rating was correlated 
with the proportion of times that triad was chosen as the coherent triad in the first study 
when the item was not solved.  
Bowers et al found that an increased rating of semantic convergence was 
significantly correlated with the likelihood of being correctly chosen as the coherent 
triad, indicating that participants were responding to the differing “quality” of 
information available within each coherent triad.  As noted by Bowers et al, it was 
unlikely that participants in the first study were conscious of the degree of semantic 
convergence in each of the coherent triads while making decisions about which triad of 
each pair was coherent, and it was therefore argued that the influence of semantic 
convergence on decisions regarding coherence was implicit, taking place through the 
process of spreading activation, rather than through conscious analysis of the semantic 
properties of the triads. 
 In the second 1990 study, Bowers et al replaced verbal stimuli used in the first 
study with the Waterloo Visual Closure Task, i.e., difficult visual gestalts in the form of 
incomplete black-and-white representations of common objects.  Students from the Fine 
Arts program at the University of Waterloo were asked to construct a set of ambiguous 
visual gestalt stimuli in which coherence was manipulated.  Each item consisted of two 
versions of a black and white line drawing of a common object.  In the coherent version 
some parts of the drawing had been removed forcing participants to mentally “fill in the 
blanks” to recognize the object portrayed.  The incoherent version contained the same 
components that were present in the coherent version, but these were rotated and 




Participants were shown the visual gestalts in coherent/incoherent pairs and asked 
to identify the object portrayed and failing that to choose of the pair they believed to be 
coherent and rate their confidence that they had chosen correctly.  Of the unsolved gestalt 
items, participants were able to choose the coherent gestalt 60% of the time, 
demonstrating their sensitivity to coherence.  The average correlation between confidence 
ratings and the proportion of unsolved items in which the correct version of the gestalt 
was chosen as coherent was .23, indicating that while participants were able to 
successfully respond to coherence at an above-chance level, they had little sense of how 
well they were actually doing. 
In the third of their 1990 studies, Bowers et al used items from Arthur‟s (1964) 
revision of the Kent-Rosanoff Word Association Test (Kent & Rosanoff, 1910) to create 
a finely gradiated version of the RAT, which they referred to as the Accumulated Clues 
Task (ACT).  Each ACT item consisted of a list of 15 clue-words, each having a single 
common associate.  For each item, the common associate was relatively remote from the 
first 12 clue-words, but relatively close to the last 3 clue-words on each list.  One 
































Figure 12.  Sample ACT item 
 
Beginning with the most remote clue-word, the list for each item was revealed one clue-
word at a time.  Each clue-word was revealed for 10s., after which the next clue-word 
was revealed.  As each clue-word was revealed, participants were asked to write down an 
association to that particular word.  As they wrote down their associations to the 
individual clue-words, participants were also asked to judge whether one of their 
responses was associated with each of the clue-words revealed so far for that item.  When 
they discovered a common association, participants were to place a check mark beside 
that response and continue responding to subsequent clue-words.  If a later, different 
response emerged as a more promising solution, participants were to place a check mark 
beside it as well.  On the trial in which participants became absolutely sure that they had 
discovered the correct solution they were to place an “X” beside their response for that 




Results indicated that it took participants an average of 10 clues to arrive at a 
hunch, and just under 2 more clues before they felt confident that they had arrived at the 
correct solution.  In order to determine whether participants‟ associations were becoming 
gradually closer to the correct solution with successive clues, participants‟ responses for 
each ACT item were rated for associative closeness to the solution word by independent 
judges at four different clue-words.  While participants differed in terms of how many 
clue-words were required before they indicated discovery of a potential solution, 
participants‟ responses demonstrated a pattern of increasing associative closeness to the 
correct solution as they responded to each of the clue-words for each item, supporting the 
notion that intuitive problem-solving proceeds through an accumulative, incremental 
process involving increasingly complete, implicit states of partial knowledge. 
In a 1995 study, Bowers, Farvolden, and Mermigis returned to the visual gestalt 
stimuli employed in the second 1990 Bowers et al study.  In this study, participants saw 
only one version of the gestalt for each item, with half of the items displayed in their 
coherent form and half in their incoherent form.  Each gestalt was presented for 5 
seconds, after which the gestalt was removed and a list of four words was presented.  One 
of the words on the list was the correct solution to the gestalt.  When asked to select the 
word that named the object in the gestalt they had just seen, participants were able to 
choose the correct word at a rate of 69% on trials preceded by coherent gestalts.  The 
corresponding rate for trials preceded by incoherent gestalts was 52%.  In both cases 
participants were able to choose the correct word well above the 25% rate expected by 




a result of anything other than participants responding to the quality of coherence in the 
gestalts. 
While participants in Bowers‟ study demonstrated sensitivity to the presence of 
coherence, it was striking that even incoherent gestalts could lead to enhanced 
performance on the word-choice task.  This led to the hypothesis that participants were 
extracting “something” from both coherent and incoherent gestalts that led to states of 
partial, or incomplete knowledge existing somewhere outside of consciousness.  In the 
attempt to solve a visual gestalt, a problem-solver gradually accumulates implicit partial 
knowledge about the object portrayed in the gestalt.  Even when this accumulation of 
partial knowledge fails to reach the level of completeness required to enter 
consciousness, it may still, however, assist the problem-solver in a subsequent attempt to 
solve a related problem. 
Bowers‟ findings and bi-directional activation 
As noted above, in Bowers‟ 1995 study participants‟ word choice performance 
was facilitated to above-chance levels for both coherent and incoherent gestalt trials, but 
facilitation on trials with coherent gestalts was greater than facilitation following trials 
with incoherent gestalts.  This result will be referred to in this thesis as the “Coherent 
Advantage” and Bowers understood it to occur because the coherent gestalt for each item 
was simply a better clue than its incoherent counterpart, allowing problem-solvers to 
accumulate a higher level of residual energy at the correct “hunch” node.  From this 
perspective, despite the fact that the same elements are contained in coherent and 
incoherent versions of each gestalt, sites for primary activation events are simply more 




On the other hand, it may be that a coherent gestalt offers problem-solvers more 
than just increased opportunities for primary activation events.  It may be problem-
solvers engage with coherent gestalts in a quite different way than is possible with their 
incoherent versions.  Problem-solvers may be able to employ what has been described 
above as secondary inductive activation from a “hunch” node back to the data of the 
gestalt.  It is, however, likely that the process of secondary activation will be different for 
the coherent version of a gestalt than for the incoherent version because spatial 
relationships are maintained amongst image features in the coherent versions of gestalts 
but not in incoherent versions.   
Secondary activation of a correct hunch node will send a wave of activation 
energy to nodes for a set of characteristics and spatial relationships amongst those 
characteristics that should be present for the hunch to be the correct solution.  If the 
hunch is correct and the gestalt is coherent, many of these features and spatial 
relationships will actually be present in the “data” of the gestalt.  The high level of 
residual energy at “expected characteristic” nodes will lead to recognition of matching 
features within the gestalt, further increasing the level of residual energy at “match” 
nodes.  These high residual energy match nodes may then become sites for new primary 
activation events, from which additional activation energy will spread inductively to the 
hunch node.  The resulting increase in residual energy at the hunch node may prompt 
another secondary activation event at that node, and another spread of deductive 
activation that will deposit additional residual energy at “expected characteristic” nodes.  
In this round more of these “expected characteristic” nodes may reach a level of residual 




primary activation events, from which new inductive spreads of activation will deposit 
more energy at the hunch node. 
Thus, by starting from one aspect of the gestalt and establishing a testable hunch 
about the identity of the thing that could legitimately “own” that aspect, a problem-solver 
can engage in rounds of alternating “inductive” and “deductive” activation, with each 
round of inductive/deductive activation incorporating new “bits” of the data from the 
gestalt, and each newly incorporated “bit” providing additional support for the hunch.  
Each new successful match of expected characteristic and actual gestalt feature will 
increase the amount of energy recirculating amongst the set of nodes belonging to the 
hunch.  Like a wave carrying a surfer to shore, residual energy at the hunch node rises 
pushing the hunch closer and closer to the threshold of consciousness.  Finally, as the 
level of residual energy reaches the threshold the problem-solver will experience the 
"aha" of achieving the desired solution. 
In a case where an incorrect hunch is chosen, secondary activation of that node 
will activate nodes for a set of expected characteristics and for spatial relationships 
amongst those characteristics that will not be present in the data of the gestalt.  It is 
possible that there may be a few matches between expected characteristics and actual 
features, but these will likely be limited to the node(s) responsible for the initial primary 
spread of activation that prompted the choice of the incorrect hunch in the first place. 
Without the discovery of expected/actual matches, there will be no new sites for 
primary activation events, and no further deposits of energy at the hunch node, so, after a 
few rounds of fruitless inductive/deductive activation with an incorrect hunch node, the 




feature/organization nodes and a relatively low level of residual energy at the incorrect 
hunch, or “owner” node.  At this point, the problem-solver may experience a sense of 
being stuck, of re-treading the same paths several times with no further success and 
arriving at the same dissatisfying dead-end pattern of residual activation. 
For problem-solvers working with incoherent gestalts, the disruption of spatial 
relationships amongst the features of the gestalt will impact on the process of alternating 
activation.  If the problem-solver generates an incorrect hunch from the data of the 
gestalt, the process of alternating activation simply dead-ends as described above.  If, on 
the other hand, the problem-solver generates a correct hunch, secondary activation of the 
correct hunch node will produce virtually the same pattern of residual activation amongst 
expected characteristic nodes and spatial/organization nodes that would occur had the 
problem-solver generated and activated the correct hunch node from the coherent version 
of the same gestalt.  As in the coherent case, the increased residual energy at expected 
characteristic nodes may lead to recognition of previously unattended gestalt features.  
These match nodes may then become sites for new primary activation events, from which 
inductive spreads of activation deposit energy at the correct hunch node.   
Nodes for spatial relationships amongst expected characteristics, likely in the 
form of stored images, however, will not map onto the actual spatial relationships 
amongst features in the incoherent gestalt.  Even though the problem-solver has been 
sensitized to perceive a particular set of spatial relationships amongst features in the data, 
these will not be present in the gestalt, and no expected/actual matches will occur.  
Without expected/actual matches, spatial organizational nodes will not accumulate the 




so no further energy will be passed inductively from these nodes to the correct hunch 
node.  The ongoing presence of a moderate level of residual energy at these nodes will be 
of no further help to, and may in fact hinder, the problem-solver‟s attempts to incorporate 
previously unrecognized information from the gestalt.  The problem-solver will simply be 
wasting time and resources by continuing to attempt to match expected spatial 
relationships with the actual relationships amongst gestalt features.   
For trials involving incoherent gestalts, secondary activations from a correct 
“hunch” node can lead to further primary activations at nodes for expected 
characteristics, but not at nodes for the spatial organization of those characteristics.  Thus, 
the overall potential for accumulation of residual energy at a correct hunch node through 
the process of alternating activation would be greater for trials with unsolved coherent 
gestalts than following trials with unsolved incoherent gestalts.   
Preamble to Studies I to III 
 In the studies included in this dissertation, the visual gestalt methodology 
developed in the Bowers et al studies described above (1990, 1995) has been adapted and 
extended to provide what Bowers described (1995) as “a more subtle test of …. the thesis 
that cognitive processes prior to solving a gestalt are in fact converging toward a 
solution.”  As noted above, in Bowers et al (1995) study participants were presented with 
coherent and incoherent gestalts individually for five seconds.  After each gestalt was 
removed, participants were presented with a list of four words, one of which was the 
name of the object they had just seen.  Participants were then asked to choose the word 
from the list that correctly named the object they had seen in the gestalt.  If participants 




in choosing the correct word.  What Bowers et al found, however, was a 69% success rate 
for trials involving coherent gestalts and a 52% success rate for trials involving 
incoherent gestalts.  Bowers concluded that participants were gaining something from 
each gestalt presentation that informed their selection of the correct solution word for that 
trial, and that coherent gestalts provided participants with more to work with than did 
their incoherent counterparts. 
 Bowers‟ methodology required that participants simply choose the correct name 
of each visual gestalt object from a list containing four words.  The current set of studies 
employs a much more difficult secondary task in which participants are asked to solve 
difficult partial-word puzzles, which, solved correctly, will reveal the name of the object 
portrayed in the gestalt for that item.  Unlike participants in Bowers‟ study, participants 
in the current set of studies will not encounter the name of gestalt items at any point prior 
to achieving a successful solution to the secondary task.  Participants are expected to use 
whatever implicit partial-knowledge they accumulate in their encounter with each visual 
gestalt as a “clue” to the solution of the corresponding partial-word puzzle.  This more 
difficult secondary task provides a stricter test of the idea that participants can generate 
useful partial knowledge about a solution outside of conscious awareness through 
encounters with visual gestalts, and that the amount of partial knowledge accumulated 
will vary depending on the “quality” of the gestalt.   
The studies that follow will demonstrate that intuition, which feels like an “all-or-
nothing” phenomenon, is in fact an incremental, accumulative process in which a 
problem-solver will move gradually from a state of puzzlement through increasingly 




perspective of an all-or-nothing model, such as the qualitative change in state described 
by Gestalt theorists, failure to identify an object in a visual gestalt indicates that the 
problem-solver has not generated the necessary reorganization of the problem elements 
that must precede the achievement of a solution.  Since the “all-or-nothing” explanation 
does not support states of partial, or intermediate knowledge between puzzlement and 
solution, the unsuccessful attempt to solve a visual gestalt should therefore provide the 
problem-solver with nothing whatsoever that might lead to facilitation of performance on 
a subsequent related problem.  Overall, the “all-or-nothing” model predicts that following 
unsuccessful attempts to solve visual gestalts, participants‟ performance on related 
problems will not differ from the baseline level of performance, i.e., the level that would 
occur had they attempted the related problems without prior exposure to the visual 
gestalts. 
If, on the other hand, intuition is an accumulative process, then the transit from 
puzzlement to conscious awareness of a solution should involve a gradual increase in 
implicit knowledge about the object portrayed in a visual gestalt.  From this perspective, 
attempting but failing to identify a visual gestalt permits participants to generate useful 
partial knowledge about the object portrayed in a gestalt that can facilitate their 
subsequent performance on the related problem.  The accumulative model predicts that 
following unsuccessful attempts to solve visual gestalts, participants‟ performance on 
related problems will be significantly greater than the baseline level of performance. 
A second idea that will be examined is that, as an accumulative process, intuition 
will be very sensitive to the “quality” of the available data.  From the “all-or-nothing” 




a “poor” one, because, in the absence of the qualitative change in state necessary for 
achievement of a solution, neither would provide the participant with anything that could 
be used to facilitate solution of the related problem.  So long as a visual gestalt remains 
unrecognized, the “all-or-nothing” model predicts that the quality or coherence of that 
gestalt should have absolutely no impact on participants‟ performance on the related 
problem.   
From the accumulative perspective, on the other hand, it should matter whether an 
unidentified visual gestalt was a “good” one or a “poor” one.  A problem-solver will 
accumulate more partial knowledge from an unsuccessful attempt to solve a “better” 
coherent gestalt than from an unsuccessful attempt to solve a “poorer” incoherent gestalt, 
which will be reflected in increased facilitation of performance on the related problem.  
Therefore, the accumulative model predicts that participants‟ performance on related 
problems will be significantly greater on trials involving unsolved coherent gestalts than 





Chapter 2 - Part A: Establishing the partial-word facilitation effect 
Preliminary Study A1 
Participants‟ attempts to solve visual gestalts prior to attempting to solve a 
corresponding partial-word puzzle are expected to lead to three distinct levels of partial-
word facilitation.  The greatest amount of partial-word facilitation is expected on trials in 
which participants achieve a successful solution to the visual gestalt and the name of the 
object portrayed in the gestalt reaches conscious awareness prior to the attempt to solve 
the partial-word puzzle.  The next greatest amount of partial-word facilitation is expected 
on trials in which coherent visual gestalts are employed, but participants do not achieve a 
successful solution, i.e., the gestalt is unrecognized.   The least amount of partial-word 
facilitation is expected on trials in which incoherent visual gestalts are employed, but 
participants do not achieve a successful solution.  Preliminary Study A1, was designed to 
test these predictions. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (n = 32) were recruited from the University of Waterloo 
undergraduate pool.  In the initial telephone contact, potential participants were asked if 
their vision was adequate for normal reading and if they had average English language 
proficiency.  Participants were told that the purpose of the experiment was to study 
problem-solving skills and that if they agreed to participate they would be asked to try to 
solve puzzles, some of which would involve identifying objects in drawings and some of 
which would involve solving word puzzles related to the objects in the drawings.  




to solve them had no bearing on one‟s intelligence; rather, some people just have a 
"knack" with this sort of thing much like the way that some people seem to have a talent 
for music or drawing. 
Materials 
Visual gestalt items were chosen from a larger set of incomplete black and white 
drawings of humanly made objects, such as machines, tools, and buildings, and naturally 
occurring objects, such as animals and plants, developed for earlier studies by Bowers 
(1990).  Each visual gestalt item was available in two forms: a coherent variant and an 
incoherent variant.  In the coherent variant parts of the drawing had been omitted, forcing 
the viewer to mentally “fill in the blanks” in order to recognize the object.  In the 
incoherent variant the same parts of the drawing had been omitted and in addition the 
remaining component parts of the drawing had been displaced and rotated relative to each 
other so that spatial relationships amongst component parts were disrupted.  Solution 
rates for each of the visual gestalt items used in Bowers‟ previous studies were available 
in the form of item means, averaged across trials with coherent and incoherent variants.  
It was decided a priori to choose only the most difficult visual gestalts in order to 
maximize the number of trials in which visual gestalts are not recognized, since only 
these trials would be included in the analysis, and so 20 of the most difficult visual gestalt 
items were chosen.  The resulting set of visual gestalts had an average visual gestalt 
solution rate of .12 (SD = .09).  For each visual gestalt item, a partial-word puzzle was 
constructed by replacing several letters in the common name of the object portrayed in 
the gestalt with blanks.  Unfortunately, no partial-word solution rates were available for 





Participants were tested individually.  Participants entering the lab were informed 
that they would be participating in a study of visual perception and would be asked to 
look at some drawings of objects, which could be humanly made things such as 
buildings, tools, or machines, or naturally occurring things, such as people, animals, or 
plants, and then to try to identify them.  It was explained that some of the items portrayed 
in the drawings were not easy to recognize and that everyone had difficulty with some of 
them.  They were informed that after trying to identify the object in each drawing they 
would also be asked to try to solve a missing-letter word puzzle whose correct solution 
was the name of the object in the drawing.  Participants were then asked to sign the 
participation consent form if they wished to participate in the study. 
Participants were then informed that they would have 30 seconds to look at each 
drawing, write down the name of the object in the space provided, and rate how confident 
they were that their response was correct by writing in a number between 0 (indicating 
“no confidence – just a wild guess”) and 100% (indicating “absolutely sure”).  It was 
emphasized that it was important that they respond to each item and if stumped to take a 
wild guess and to rate their confidence for that item at a very low level to indicate that it 
was a guess. 
Participants were then told that after writing down a response and a confidence 
rating they would get another chance to see the drawing, this time together with a word 
puzzle.  The word in the word puzzle would be the name of the object in the drawing, but 




would have 30 seconds to write down the word that correctly solved the word puzzle and 
revealed the identity of the object portrayed in the drawing. 
Participants were timed as they completed each visual gestalt identification form.  
At the 25-second mark, if a participant appeared unable to identify the object, s/he was 
instructed to simply write down “whatever came to mind, even if it seems unlikely” while 
looking at the picture and to complete the confidence rating scale.  After the participant 
supplied a confidence rating, the form containing the visual gestalt and the confidence 
rating scale was removed. 
Immediately following removal of the visual gestalt identification form, the 
partial-word solution form was presented, which contained the same version of the visual 
gestalt item seen on the previous form along with its related partial-word puzzle. On the 
first few items participants were reminded that they would have 30 seconds and that the 
correct solution to the partial-word puzzle was the name of the object portrayed in the 
visual gestalt.  At the end of the 30 second interval, the partial-word form was taken 
away, whether completed or not, and the visual gestalt identification form for the next 
item was presented.  Each participant attempted all twenty stimulus items, ten presented 
in the coherent version and ten presented in the incoherent version.  Stimulus items were 
randomized for each participant with respect to item order and item coherence. 
It was predicted that the partial-word solution rate following successful attempts 
to identify visual gestalts would be significantly greater than the rate following 
unsuccessful attempts to identify visual gestalts.  Second, it was predicted that the partial-




would be significantly greater than the partial-word solution rate following unsuccessful 
attempts to identify incoherent visual gestalts. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Study A1 failed to reveal expected differences between coherent and 
incoherent facilitation of partial-word performance.  A paired-samples t-test revealed that 
participants‟ partial-word performance following unsuccessful attempts to solve coherent 
gestalts (M = 0.36, SD = 0.04) was not significantly different, t(31) = 0.13, p = .45 (one-
tailed), than following unsuccessful attempts to solve incoherent gestalts (M = 0.35, SD = 
0.03).   
A separate samples t-test assuming equal variances revealed that the visual gestalt 
item solution rate (M = 0.11, SD = 0.12) was not significantly different, t(38) = .19, p =  
.85 (two-tailed), from that reported in Bowers‟ previous studies (M = 0.12, SD = .09) for 
this set of gestalt items, which was expected.  A paired-samples t-test revealed that the 
gestalt solution rate for coherent trials (M = 0.20, SD = 0.21) was significantly greater, 
t(19) = 4.35, p < .001 (one-tailed), than the gestalt solution rate for incoherent trials (M = 
0.01 , SD =  0.02), which was also expected to be the case. 
Analysis of item solution data for the set of partial-word stimuli, however, 
revealed serious floor/ceiling problems with several items in the set.  Two items had 
partial-word solution rates above .80 for both coherent and incoherent trials.  For these 
items the partial-word stimuli were simply too easy to solve, leading to high rates of 
partial-word solution regardless of the coherency of the visual gestalt.  In brief, the 
solution rate for these partial-word puzzles was uniformly high with little variability in 




On the other hand, four items had partial-word solution rates below .17 for both coherent 
and incoherent trials.  For each of these items the partial-word puzzle was simply so 
difficult that participants were unable to make use of anything gained from the attempt to 
solve the gestalt to the corresponding partial-word puzzle.  Thus, Preliminary Study A2 
was proposed to establish a set of stimuli with known partial-word baseline solution rates 
for use in subsequent studies that was free from the floor/ceiling problems demonstrated 




















Preliminary Study A2 
The failure to obtain expected results in Preliminary Study A1 made it clear that it 
would not be possible to demonstrate differences in partial-word facilitation without a set 
of partial-word stimulus items free of floor and ceiling effects.  As well, it was noted that 
while it was supposed on theoretical grounds that unsuccessful attempts to solve both 
coherent and incoherent visual gestalts would facilitate subsequent partial-word 
performance, it would not be possible to demonstrate incoherent facilitation without 
explicit performance baselines for the partial-word stimuli for comparison.  Thus, 
Preliminary Study A2 was designed to establish a set of stimuli with known partial-word 
baseline solution rates for use in subsequent studies that was free from the floor/ceiling 
problems demonstrated in Preliminary Study A1. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (n = 65) were recruited from the University of Waterloo 
undergraduate pool.  In the initial telephone contact, potential participants were asked if 
their vision was adequate for normal reading and if they had average English language 
proficiency, and the purpose of the experiment was explained exactly as in Preliminary 
Study A1.   
Materials 
Partial-word puzzle variants were generated by systematically replacing letters in 
the common names of 58 gestalt items with blanks, with the restrictions that: 
a) no more than 50% of the letters in any word should be replaced, and 




For example, for the gestalt item camel, replacing every combination of two letters in the 
word “camel" with blanks would generate the following variants: _ _mel, _a_el, _am_l, 
_ame_, c_ _el, c_m_l, c_me_, ca_ _l, ca_e_, and cam_ _.   
Of the possible partial-word puzzle variants generated for each visual gestalt item, 
each was compared to a 40,000 word dictionary (thought to represent an average 
vocabulary) in order to determine possible matches to words other than the gestalt object 
name.  If a variant did match a word other than the desired object name, it was removed 
from further testing.  From the remaining variants, two were selected for each item for 
testing on the basis of the most apparent difficulty. 
Each of the selected partial-word puzzle variants was then randomly assigned to 
ten 58-item word lists so that only one variant of each item appeared on each list, i.e., 
five of the lists contained variant A of item 1 and five contained variant B of item 1.  
Order of appearance of each item on each list was also randomized.  The word lists were 
laser-printed on 8.5 x 11 inch transparent overhead sheets using 24-point Times font.  A 
cardboard mask was constructed so that each item on a word list could be presented 
individually. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 3-5.  Participants entering the lab were told 
that they would be participating in a study of problem-solving in which an overhead 
projector would be used to project word puzzles on a screen one at a time.  Participants 
were informed that the solution to each puzzle was a real English word, but in each case 
some of the letters in the word had been replaced with blanks (underscore marks).  They 




in the blanks and writing down the correct solution word on the response sheet.  
Participants were asked to read and sign the participation consent form if they wished to 
participate in the study. 
Participants were seated in groups of 2 or 3 at two tables facing a standard 
overhead screen which was 6-7 feet away.  The experimenter was seated between and 
slightly behind the two tables at the overhead projector, which was used to project each 
partial-word puzzle on a screen.  Participants were told that each word puzzle would 
appear on the screen for 30 seconds, and their task was to write down the correct solution 
word on a provided response sheet.  In order to discourage over-cautious response styles, 
participants were asked to write down a response for every item, even if they if they were 
sure it was not the correct answer.  It was explained that writing something down for 
every item, rather than leaving blanks, often led to higher overall success rates. 
At the 20-second mark for each item, participants were asked to write down an 
answer if they had not already done so, or to write down whatever came to mind if they 
could not correctly solve the puzzle.  Participants responded to four practice items and 
fifty-eight stimulus items. 
Results and Discussion 
 It was decided a priori to choose items whose solution rates fell between .20 and 
.40 for both the visual gestalt task and the partial-word task.  Preliminary Study A1 had 
included only the most difficult visual gestalts in order to maximize the number of 
potential unsuccessful visual gestalt trials for analysis; however, it was noted that 
Preliminary Study A1 participants had frequently expressed discouragement about their 




decision was made to select items whose visual gestalt solution rates fell between .20 and 
.40 in order to provide participants in future studies with some evidence of success in 
solving visual gestalts, while still permitting the use of .60 to .80 of the trials for analysis.  
The same .20 to .40 solution rate was proposed for selecting partial-word stimuli, for the 
same reason. 
 In fact, only 12 stimulus items were identified from the results of Preliminary 
Study A2 whose visual gestalt identification rates and partial-word solution rates both fell 
within the preferred .20 to .40 range.  As a result, it was decided to include an additional 
20 items whose visual gestalt and/or partial-word solution rates fell outside the preferred 
.20 to .40 rate.  The resulting set of 32 items was deemed to have an acceptable partial-
word solution rate (M = .27, SD = .10).  See Table 1.   The 32-item set was also deemed 
to have an acceptable visual gestalt solution rate (M = .30, SD = .20) (from Bowers‟ 
previous studies - averaged across coherent and incoherent trials), although subsequent 
testing revealed a mean visual gestalt solution rate for the set of 32 items of .24 (SD = 














Partial-word Stimulus Items 
 
 











1 briefcase __i_f_as_ 9 5 0.56 0.14 
2 camera _am_r_ 6 3 0.50 0.36 
3 coffee..percolator _of__e..p_r_o_at__ 16 8 0.50 0.32 
4 desklamp d__k_a_p 8 4 0.50 0.17 
5 diamond..ring _i_m__d..r__g 11 6 0.55 0.19 
6 doorknob __o_k__b 8 5 0.63 0.19 
7 elephant __ep_a_t 8 4 0.50 0.21 
8 fire..hydrant f_re..__dr_n_ 11 5 0.45 0.33 
9 garbage..can _a_ba__..c_n 10 5 0.50 0.38 
10 giraffe _i_af__ 7 4 0.57 0.42 
11 guitar _ui_a_ 6 3 0.50 0.14 
12 helicopter _el__op_e_ 10 5 0.50 0.14 
13 microscope _i_r_s__pe 10 5 0.50 0.30 
14 mitten mi__en 6 2 0.33 0.37 
15 moose m_o_e 5 2 0.40 0.41 
16 oil..lamp _il..la_p 7 2 0.29 0.15 
17 padlock pa_l__k 7 3 0.43 0.26 
18 pineapple _i_ea_p__ 9 5 0.56 0.22 
19 pliers p_ie_s 6 2 0.33 0.38 
20 sailboat _ai_bo__ 8 4 0.50 0.40 
21 scissors s_i__or_ 8 4 0.50 0.45 
22 shovel s_o_el 6 2 0.33 0.37 
23 squirrel s__ir__l 8 4 0.50 0.25 
24 telephone _e_e_h__e 9 5 0.56 0.21 
25 tennis..racquet _e_n_s..__c_ue_ 13 7 0.54 0.15 
26 toothbrush t__t__r_sh 10 5 0.50 0.16 
27 train..engine t__in.._n_ine 11 4 0.36 0.27 
28 turntable __rn_ab__ 9 5 0.56 0.32 
29 turtle tu_t__ 6 3 0.50 0.31 
30 umbrella _m__el_a 8 4 0.50 0.20 
31 violin _io_i_ 6 3 0.50 0.17 
32 wedding..cake _ed__n_..c_k_ 11 6 0.55 0.27 
       









 Individual visual gestalt item solution rates for each of the 32 items ranged from 
0 to .79 (averaged across coherent and incoherent trials in Bowers‟ previous studies), 
with 9 items (28%) falling in the 0 to .19 range, 12 items (38%) falling in the desired .20 
to .40 range, and 11 items (34%) falling in the .41 to .79 range.  Subsequent testing 
revealed a mean visual gestalt solution rate for the coherent versions of the 32 items of 
.45 (SD = .26), with individual visual gestalt item solution rates ranging from 0 to .93, 
and a mean visual gestalt solution rate for incoherent versions of .04 (SD = .05), with 
individual visual gestalt item solution rates for each ranging from 0 to .20.  See Table 2.  
Individual partial-word item solution rates for each of the 32 items ranged from .14 to 
.45, with 10 items (31%) falling in the .14 to .19 range, 19 items (59%) falling within the 
desired .20 to .40 range, and 3 items (9%) falling within the .41 to .45 range.   
With the development of a set of 32 items with floor and ceiling free partial-word 
solution rates, Study I was proposed, in which participants would attempt to solve each 
visual gestalt and subsequently attempt to solve the related partial-word puzzle.  It was 
predicted that in Study I the partial-word solution rate would be significantly greater than 
the baseline .27 partial-word solution rate established in Preliminary Study A2 for trials 
in which participants are unsuccessful in their attempts to solve visual gestalts, for both 
incoherent and coherent gestalts.  It was also predicted that the partial-word solution rate 
following unsuccessful attempts to solve coherent visual gestalts would be significantly 
greater than the partial-word solution rate following unsuccessful attempts to solve 

















































1 briefcase 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.18 0.13 0.59 0.10 0.29 0.20 
2 camera 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.09 
3 coffee percolator 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.28 0.14 
4 desklamp 0.00 0.55 0.18 0.91 0.08 0.62 0.09 0.69 0.39 
5 diamond ring 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.47 0.23 
6 doorknob 0.18 0.91 0.00 0.82 0.17 1.00 0.12 0.91 0.51 
7 elephant 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.79 0.39 
8 fire hydrant 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.25 0.13 
9 garbage can 0.00 0.82 0.09 0.64 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.65 0.34 
10 giraffe 0.18 0.91 0.18 0.91 0.22 0.97 0.20 0.93 0.56 
11 guitar 0.00 0.27 0.18 0.27 0.21 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.17 
12 helicopter 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.28 0.14 
13 microscope 0.00 0.55 0.09 0.55 0.00 0.47 0.03 0.52 0.28 
14 mitten 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 
15 moose 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.67 0.33 
16 oil lamp 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.03 0.14 0.09 
17 padlock 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.18 0.09 
18 pineapple 0.09 0.64 0.09 0.55 0.07 0.69 0.08 0.63 0.35 
19 pliers 0.00 0.27 0.27 0.45 0.03 0.18 0.10 0.30 0.20 
20 sailboat 0.00 0.64 0.09 0.64 0.00 0.65 0.03 0.64 0.34 
21 scissors 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.75 0.38 
22 shovel 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.75 0.38 
23 squirrel 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.71 0.36 
24 telephone 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 
25 tennis racquet 0.00 0.45 0.09 0.45 0.00 0.45 0.03 0.45 0.24 
26 train engine 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.82 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.62 0.37 
27 toothbrush 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.87 0.06 0.29 0.17 
28 turntable 0.18 0.82 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.72 0.06 0.63 0.35 
29 turtle 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.23 0.11 
30 umbrella 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.02 
31 violin 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.52 0.26 
32 wedding cake 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.28 0.14 
           





Study I was designed to determine whether intuition operates in an “all-or-
nothing” fashion, providing either full knowledge of a solution to a puzzling problem or 
nothing at all, or in a graded, accumulative fashion, providing increasingly complete 
intermediate, or partial knowledge of a solution.  If the former “all-or-nothing” model is 
correct, an unsuccessful attempt to solve a visual gestalt should provide the problem-
solver with nothing that could facilitate solution of a subsequent, related partial-word 
puzzle.  If, on the other hand, the partial knowledge model is correct, an unsuccessful 
attempt to solve a visual gestalt may provide the problem-solver with some accumulation 
of partial-knowledge that will facilitate solution of a subsequent, related partial-word 
puzzle.  Further, while both unsolved coherent and unsolved incoherent visual gestalts 
could lead to partial-word facilitation, an unsolved coherent visual gestalt should provide 
a problem-solver with more partial-knowledge than an unsolved incoherent visual gestalt, 
and coherent partial-word facilitation should be greater than incoherent partial-word 
facilitation. 
The set of 32 stimulus items developed in Preliminary Study A2 was employed in 
Study I.  Each item in the set was represented by a visual gestalt and a partial-word 
puzzle, for which the correct solution was the name of the object represented in the visual 
gestalt for that item.  The presentation of each item could take one of two forms: a 
coherent visual gestalt version and an incoherent visual gestalt version.  The same partial-
word puzzle was used for coherent and incoherent versions of each item.   
It is predicted that participants‟ attempts to solve visual gestalts prior to 




distinct levels of partial-word facilitation.  The greatest amount of partial-word 
facilitation is expected to occur on trials in which participants achieve a successful 
solution to the visual gestalt and the name of the object portrayed in the gestalt reaches 
conscious awareness prior to the attempt to solve the partial-word puzzle.  The next 
greatest amount of partial-word facilitation is expected to occur on trials in which 
coherent visual gestalts are attempted, but not solved.  The least amount of partial-word 
facilitation was expected to occur on trials in which incoherent visual gestalts are 
attempted, but not solved.  It is predicted that in Study I, following unsuccessful attempts 
to solve visual gestalts: 
a) participants‟ partial-word solution rate will be significantly greater than the 
.27 baseline rate for both coherent and incoherent trials, and  
b) participants‟ coherent partial-word solution rate will be significantly greater 
than their incoherent partial-word solution rate. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (n = 22) were recruited from the University of Waterloo 
undergraduate pool on the basis of self-report of vision adequate for normal reading and 
average English language proficiency.  In the initial telephone contact, participants were 
told that the purpose of the experiment was to study perceptual problem-solving skills 
and that they would be asked to try to solve puzzles, some of which would involve 
identifying objects in drawings and some of which would involve solving word puzzles 




were very difficult and that one‟s ability to solve them had no bearing on one‟s 
intelligence. 
Materials 
Materials for the visual gestalt identification phase consisted of coherent and 
incoherent versions of each of the 32 black and white visual gestalt items selected in 
Preliminary Study A2.  From Bowers‟ previous studies, the mean visual gestalt solution 
rate (averaged across coherent and incoherent) for this set of 32 items was known to be 
.30 (SD = .20), and individual item gestalt solution rates (averaged across coherent and 
incoherent) ranged from 0 to .79.  Each visual gestalt item was printed individually on the 
upper half of an 8.5 x 11 sheet of white paper.  Below each visual gestalt on the page was 
the question, “What is this object?” with an underlined space to write in an answer, and a 
confidence rating scale, which consisted of the question, “How sure are you?” and a scale 
from 0 to 100%. 
Materials for the partial-word solution phase consisted of the same set of coherent 
and incoherent visual gestalt items printed individually on the upper half of an 8.5 x 11 
sheet of white paper.  The partial-word solution task was placed on the lower half of each 
page.  Below each visual gestalt was the instruction to “Fill in the missing letters” and a 
partial-word puzzle whose correct solution was the name of the object portrayed in the 
visual gestalt.  It was found in the Preliminary Study A2 that the mean item partial-word 
solution rate for this set of items was .27 (SD = .10), and item partial-word solution rates 







Participants in Study I were tested individually.  Participants entering the lab were 
informed that they would be participating in a study of visual perception in which they 
would be asked to look at some drawings of objects, which could be humanly made 
things such as buildings, tools, or machines, or naturally occurring things, such as people, 
animals, or plants, and try to identify them.  It was explained that some of the items 
portrayed in the drawings were not easy to recognize and that everyone had difficulty 
with some of them.  They were informed that after trying to identify the object in each 
drawing they would also be asked to try to solve a missing-letter word puzzle, for which 
the correct solution was the name of the object in the drawing.  Participants were then 
asked to sign the participation consent form if they wished to participate in the study. 
Participants were then informed that they would have 30 seconds to look at each 
drawing, write down the name of the object in the space provided, and rate how confident 
they were that their response was correct by writing in a number between 0, indicating 
“no confidence – a wild guess,” and 100%, indicating “absolutely sure”.  It was 
emphasized that it was important that they respond to each item and if stumped to take a 
wild guess and to rate their confidence for that item at a very low level to indicate that it 
was just a guess. 
Participants were then told that after writing down a response and a confidence 
rating they would have another chance to see the drawing, but this time it would appear 
together with a word puzzle.  The word in the word puzzle would be the name of the 
object in the drawing, but it would have blanks in the place of some of the letters.  




correctly solved the word puzzle and revealed the identity of the object portrayed in the 
drawing. 
Participants were timed as they completed each visual gestalt identification form.  
At the 25-second mark, if a participant appeared unable to identify the object, s/he was 
instructed to simply write down "whatever came to mind, even if it seems unlikely" while 
looking at the picture and to complete the confidence rating scale.  After the participant 
supplied a confidence rating the form containing the visual gestalt and the confidence 
rating scale was removed. 
Immediately following removal of the visual gestalt identification form, the 
partial-word solution form was presented, which contained the same version of the visual 
gestalt item that had appeared on the previous form along with its related partial-word 
puzzle. On the first few items participants were reminded that they would have 30 
seconds and that the correct solution to the partial-word puzzle was the name of the 
object portrayed in the visual gestalt.  At the end of the 30 second interval, the partial-
word form was taken away, whether completed or not, and the visual gestalt 
identification form for the next item was presented. 
 Each participant attempted all thirty-two stimulus items, sixteen presented in the 
coherent version and sixteen presented in the incoherent version.  Stimulus items were 
randomized for each participant with respect to item order and item coherence. 
It was predicted that the partial-word solution rate following unsuccessful 
attempts to identify visual gestalts would be significantly greater than the baseline partial-
word solution rate of .27 established in Preliminary Study A for both coherent and 




unsuccessful attempts to identify coherent visual gestalts would be significantly greater 
than the partial-word solution rate following unsuccessful attempts to identify incoherent 
visual gestalts. 
Results and Discussion 
With the use of dependent measures free of floor and ceiling effects, Study I 
clearly demonstrated that both successful and unsuccessful attempts to solve visual 
gestalts lead to significant facilitation of performance on the related partial-word task, as 
illustrated in Figure 13.   
Analysis of item partial-word solution rates revealed that, for Study I trials in 
which visual gestalts were solved, the mean item partial-word solution rate was 1.0.  An 
independent samples t-test comparison of item partial-word solution rates established in 
Preliminary Study A2 (partial-word baseline) and item partial-word solution rates 
obtained in Study I for trials in which gestalts were unsolved (collapsed across coherent 
and incoherent trials) revealed that the Study I rate (M = .49, SD = .21) was significantly 
greater, t (43) =  5.41, p < .001, than the Preliminary Study A2 partial-word solution rate 
(M = .27, SD = .10).   
For Study I trials in which gestalts were not solved, an independent samples t-test 
of item partial-word solution rates revealed that the rate for unsolved coherent trials (M = 
.59, SD = .31) was significantly greater, t (62) = 5.56, p < .001 (one-tailed), than the 
Preliminary Study A2 partial-word solution rate.  The rate for unsolved incoherent trials 
(M = .41, SD = .19) was also significantly greater, t (62) = 3.64, p < .001 (one-tailed), 




Within Study I, a paired samples t-test revealed that the item partial-word solution 
rate for unsolved coherent trials (M = .59, SD = .31) was significantly greater, t (30) = 
3.36, p < .002 (one-tailed), than the item partial-word solution rate for unsolved 
incoherent trials (M = .41, SD = .20) (one item-pair deleted due to missing data).  These 
results are consistent with a priori prediction of three distinct levels of partial-word 
facilitation.  As predicted, the greatest amount of partial-word facilitation occurred on 
trials in which participants solved visual gestalts prior to attempting partial-word puzzles.  
Also as predicted, on trials in which visual gestalts were attempted, but not solved: 
a) the item partial-word solution rate was significantly greater than the .27 
baseline rate for both coherent and incoherent trials, and  
b) the item partial-word solution rate was significantly greater for trials with 








































Figure 13. Item partial-word percent solution: Preliminary Study A2 vs. Study I 
 
The latter finding, i.e., that in Study I the item partial-word solution rate was 
significantly greater for trials with coherent gestalts than for trials with incoherent 
gestalts, was echoed by the finding that amongst Study I trials in which gestalts were 
unsolved the participant partial-word solution rate was significantly greater for trials with 
coherent gestalts than for trials with incoherent gestalts.  A paired-samples t-test revealed 
that the mean participant partial-word solution rate for trials involving coherent gestalts, 
M = .55, SD = .17, was significantly higher, t (21) = 3.60, p < 0.001 (one-tailed), than for 
trials involving incoherent gestalt trials, M = .41, SD = .16, a finding that will be referred 
to as the “Coherent Advantage.”  This finding is consistent with a priori predictions, and 




Overall, these findings support the idea that participants exposed to a puzzling 
problem will accumulate increments of useable knowledge about a potential solution to 
that problem through their attempts to solve the problem, even when unable to achieve 
conscious awareness of the solution or to experience a sense of having any information 
about the solution.  Further, the results of Study I demonstrate that the quality of the 
information available in the problem itself plays an important role in how much useable 
knowledge participants can accumulate in the absence of conscious recognition of 
stimuli.  Participants in Study I were able to achieve a higher rate of partial-word solution 
following unsuccessful  attempts to solve higher quality coherent stimuli than following 
unsuccessful attempts to solve the lesser quality incoherent stimuli, indicating that in 
their unsuccessful attempts to solve visual gestalts they were gaining more useful 
information from coherent gestalts than from incoherent gestalts.  Thus, the findings of 
Study I are not seen to support an “all-or-nothing” model, but to support an accumulative 
model. 
While collecting data from participants in Study I, experimenters noted two 
interesting phenomena.  First, in the partial-word solution phase most participants 
appeared to be alternating their attention back-and-forth repeatedly between the visual 
gestalt and the partial-word puzzle.  Second, several participants remarked that they 
found it disheartening that even when they believed that they had solved the partial-word 
puzzle they were still unable to identify the named item within the visual gestalt.  Some 
participants even suggested that they might have performed better with the partial-word 
puzzles had the visual gestalts not been presented a second time.  This raised questions 




and for what reason.  While the shifting of attention back and forth between the partial-
word puzzle and the visual gestalt during the partial-word solution phase was almost 
ubiquitous amongst participants, it was not clear whether this behaviour was helping or 
hindering participants‟ attempts to solve the partial-word puzzles. 
It was reasoned that if participants could achieve the same pattern of partial-word 
facilitation demonstrated in Study I while focusing solely on the partial-word puzzle 
during the partial-word solution phase, then the mechanism producing facilitation could 
be a straightforward example of what Yaniv and Meyer referred to as “memory 
sensitization” through the process of spreading activation.  This explanation has 
frequently been proposed to explain facilitation in studies of verbal priming, i.e., the 
prime generates an accumulation of residual activation at solution-relevant nodes which 
facilitates subsequent performance on an implicit knowledge task.  Thus, it may be that 
the spread of activation energy generated by participants‟ unsuccessful attempts to 
identify a visual gestalt deposits sufficient residual energy at a correct semantic/verbal 
label node to facilitate performance on the partial-word task.  From this perspective the 
back and forth alternation of attention observed in Study I adds nothing to, and may in 
fact impair, partial-word facilitation by wasting attentional resources. 
On the other hand, since most participants were observed to be alternating their 
attention back and forth between the partial-word puzzle and the visual gestalt during the 
partial-word solution phase, it may be that a simple spreading activation explanation is 
not sufficient to explain the pattern of partial-word facilitation demonstrated in Study I.  
It may be that back-and-forth alternation of attention is an important factor in partial-




knowledge by engaging in a different type of activation event, with a second type of 
activation event that takes place at a “hunch” node that is in some way relevant to both 
the visual gestalt and the partial-word puzzle.   
Potential sites for this new, secondary type of activation event would be word 
nodes that have accumulated the most residual energy through participants‟ activation of 
elements within the gestalt and initial attempts to solve the partial-word puzzle.  As with 
the simple activation model, a participant‟s unsuccessful attempts to solve a visual gestalt 
will generate a pattern of residual energy in the participant‟s associative network.  One of 
the nodes likely to have a relatively high accumulation of residual energy will be the 
node for the word that solves both the visual gestalt and the partial-word puzzle, but the 
accumulation may not yet be enough to facilitate solution of the partial-word puzzle.   
While the accumulation of residual energy may not be sufficient to facilitate 
solution of the partial-word puzzle, it may be enough to set it apart from other activated 
word nodes, which would allow this word node to serve as the site for a secondary 
activation event.  Energy from the secondary activation event then spreads from the 
activated node to nodes for concepts that are associatively and logically related to the 
activated node, creating a new, secondary pattern of residual energy in the participants‟ 
associative network.  At this point, there may be intersections with the existing pattern of 
residual activation generated by the primary activation event(s) at nodes for 
characteristics experienced as somehow relevant to the visual gestalt.  These intersections 
will occur at nodes that are in some way meaningful to both information sources, likely at 
semantic nodes that connect images with their labels.  Thus, it may be that an 




energy at a correct word node, but the accumulation is not sufficient to facilitate 
performance on the subsequent partial-word task.  It may be that partial-word facilitation 
is dependent on the addition of activation energy from the intersection(s) of primary and 
secondary spreads of activation.  From this perspective the back and forth alternation of 
attention observed in Study I would be an important contributor to partial-word 
facilitation. 
Returning to the eagle example discussed earlier, in the attempt to identify a 
visual gestalt of an eagle, activation events at nodes corresponding to features perceived 
to be present in the gestalt will deposit a high level of residual energy at the “eagle” word 
node, relative to other word nodes.  If, however, the participant is unable to solve the 
gestalt and then attempts to solve the corresponding partial-word puzzle, the 
accumulation of residual energy at the “eagle” word node may be insufficient to facilitate 
solution of the “eagle” partial-word puzzle.  At this point, if the gestalt is still present the 
participant has the option to activate “backwards” from a “hunch,” i.e., a high residual 
energy word node, to the data of the visual gestalt.  A trial activation of the word node 
retaining the highest accumulation of residual energy will send a spread of activation 
energy outward into the associative network to nodes for things that are associatively 
linked with that word, which logically would be nodes for semantic and imagistic 
information that is highly associated with the activated word node.  If the node activated 
is for the word “eagle,” and the object portrayed in the visual gestalt is, in fact, an eagle 
then very many of the nodes receiving activation energy in the spread from the “eagle” 
word node will represent “eagle characteristics,” and these are likely to map onto features 




Nodes that are in some way meaningful to, and highly associated with both the 
“eagle” visual gestalt and the “eagle” partial-word puzzle may receive activation energy 
from both the initial, or primary spread of activation and the subsequent “backward,” or 
secondary spread of activation.  Some of this energy will be retained at these intersection 
nodes in the form of residual energy, and some will be passed on to other associated 
nodes, with the result being an increased localization of residual energy in the associative 
network at nodes within the “eagle pattern.”  These nodes will accumulate residual 
activation at a rapid rate compared with other possible patterns.  Amongst nodes in the 
“eagle pattern” those at high levels of abstraction will accumulate residual energy at a 
particularly rapid rate due to their being tightly interconnected with each of the nodes in 
the “eagle pattern.” 
Thus, the activation of nodes associated with both the “eagle” visual gestalt and 
the “eagle” partial-word puzzle, will cause a rapid accumulation of residual energy at 
high-level nodes such as the word node for “eagle.”  It may be necessary for the problem-
solver to engage in several rounds of alternating primary and secondary activation, 
activating different combinations of gestalt and partial-word puzzle nodes, before enough 
residual energy has accumulated at the “eagle” word node to allow the word eagle to 
breach consciousness as the desired solution.  Given that repeated alternation of attention 
between gestalt and partial-word puzzle was the actual behaviour demonstrated by 
participants in the partial-word solution phase of Study I, this model, referred to in 
following sections as the alternating activation model, appears to hold promise as an 





Since it was unclear whether partial-word facilitation demonstrated in Study I 
could be best explained by a simple activation model or by an alternating activation 
model, Study II was designed to examine the significance of participants‟ behaviour in 
the partial-word solution phase in Study I.  Study II followed the procedure of Study I, 
with one exception: the partial-word solution phase presentation of the visual gestalt was 
eliminated.  With this alteration in procedure, activation from gestalt nodes to partial-
word puzzle would remain a potential route to partial-word facilitation, but activation 
from a “hunch” word node back to expected gestalt characteristics would be completely 
dependent on participants‟ memory for previously unrecognized gestalt features, and 
therefore unlikely as a route to partial-word facilitation.   
If the simple activation model is correct, eliminating the gestalt presentation in the 
partial-word solution phase should not decrease partial-word facilitation, and may, in 
fact, lead to an increase in partial-word facilitation since participants will be 
concentrating all of their attentional resources on the partial-word puzzle during the 
partial-word solution phase.  From the simple activation perspective, the overall pattern 
of partial-word facilitation in Study II should closely resemble that seen in Study I, i.e., 
facilitation will be greatest on trials in which visual gestalts are solved, less on trials in 
which coherent visual gestalts are unsolved and least on trials in which incoherent visual 
gestalts are unsolved.  In the latter two conditions, item partial-word performance will 
continue to be significantly greater than the partial-word solution baseline of .27 




The alternating activation model, on the other hand, predicts that eliminating the 
partial-word solution phase presentation of the gestalt will significantly disrupt partial-
word facilitation.  From this perspective, without the opportunity to alternate between 
primary and secondary activations participants will accumulate lesser amounts of residual 
energy at the correct word node.  What is not clear, however, is whether eliminating the 
gestalt presentation in the partial-word solution phase will simply reduce partial-word 
facilitation, or eliminate it altogether.  If the accumulation of residual energy at solution-
relevant nodes is reduced somewhat, this may be reflected in reduced item partial-word 
facilitation, falling at some intermediate between the .27 (SD = .10) baseline established 
in Preliminary Study A2 and the .49 (SD = .21) level observed in Study I.  Facilitation 
will likely continue to be affected by the coherence of unrecognized visual gestalts, and 
the partial-word solution rate following unrecognized coherent gestalts will likely 
continue to be greater than following unrecognized incoherent gestalts. 
With the loss of the opportunity to alternate between primary and secondary 
activations, however, it may be that the accumulation of residual energy at solution-
relevant nodes is no longer sufficient to facilitate solution of the partial-word puzzle, in 
which case item partial-word performance will not differ from the .27 baseline, and the 
coherence of unrecognized visual gestalts will have no effect on partial-word 
performance.  In brief, the alternating activation model predicts that elimination of the 
partial-word solution phase presentation of the visual gestalt will reduce, but not 
eliminate, the overall level of partial-word facilitation and the coherent advantage will be 







Participants (n = 22) were recruited from the University of Waterloo 
undergraduate pool on the basis of self-report of vision adequate for normal reading and 
average English language proficiency.  In the initial telephone contact, participants were 
told that the purpose of the experiment was to study perceptual problem-solving skills 
and that if they agreed to participate they would be asked to try to solve puzzles, some of 
which would involve identifying objects in drawings and some of which would involve 
solving word puzzles related to the objects in the drawings.  
Materials 
Materials for the visual gestalt identification phase consisted of coherent and 
incoherent versions of each of the 32 black and white visual gestalt items selected in 
Preliminary Study A2.  The mean item identification rate (pooled coherent and 
incoherent) for this set of stimulus items fell at .30 (SD = .20), and individual item 
identification rates (coherent and incoherent collapsed) ranged from 0 to .79.  As in Study 
I, each stimulus item for the visual gestalt identification phase was printed on the upper 
half of an 8.5 x 11 inch sheet of white paper.  Below each visual gestalt on the page was 
the question, “What is this object?” with an underlined space to write in an answer, and a 
confidence rating scale, which consisted of the question, “How sure are you?” and a scale 
from 0 to 100%. 
Materials for the partial-word solution phase were similar to those used in Study I, 
with the important difference that the upper half of each 8.5 x 11 sheet was left blank in 




As in Study I, the lower half of each sheet contained the partial-word solution task, which 
consisted of the instruction to “Fill in the missing letters” and a partial-word puzzle 
whose correct solution was the name of the object portrayed in the visual gestalt 
identification phase for that trial.  The mean item partial-word solution rate for this set of 
items fell at .27 (SD = .10), and individual Item partial-word solution rates ranged from 
.14 to .45. 
Procedure 
Participants in Study II were tested individually.  Participants entering the lab 
were informed that they would be participating in a study of visual perception in which 
they would be asked to look at some drawings and to try to identify the objects portrayed 
in each of the drawings.  They were told that the objects in the drawings could be 
humanly made things such as buildings, tools, or machines, or naturally occurring things, 
such as people, animals, or plants.  It was explained that some of the objects portrayed in 
the drawings were not easy to recognize and that everyone had difficulty with some of 
them.  Participants were informed that after attempting to identify the object in a drawing, 
they would then be asked to try to solve a missing letter word puzzle, which, if solved 
correctly, would be the name of the object in the drawing they had just seen.   
Participants were then informed that they would have 30 seconds to look at each 
drawing, write down the name of the object in the space provided, and rate how confident 
they were that their response was correct by circling a number on the rating scale or 
writing down a number between 0 (indicating “no confidence – a wild guess”) and 100% 
(indicating “absolutely sure”).  It was emphasized that it was important for the purpose of 




guess.  They were told that they should rate their confidence for that item at a very low 
level to indicate that it was just a guess. 
Participants were told that after writing down a response and a confidence rating 
for a drawing, the drawing would be taken away and they would then be asked to try to 
solve the missing-letters word puzzle.  Participants were informed that the solution to the 
word puzzle would be the name of the object in the drawing they had just seen.  In order 
to reveal the solution they would have to fill in the blanks in the word puzzle with the 
correct letters.  Participants were told that they would have 30 seconds to fill in the 
blanks to solve the word puzzle. 
Participants were timed as they completed each visual gestalt identification form.  
If a participant appeared unable to identify the object at the 25-second mark, s/he was 
instructed to simply write down "whatever came to mind, even if it seems unlikely" while 
looking at the picture and to complete the confidence rating scale.  After the participant 
supplied a response and a confidence rating the visual gestalt identification form was 
removed. 
Immediately following removal of the visual gestalt identification form, 
participants were given the partial-word solution form, which contained the partial-word 
puzzle for the visual gestalt they had just seen. On the first few items participants were 
reminded that they would have 30 seconds to solve the word puzzle and that the correct 
solution was the name of the object portrayed in the visual gestalt they had just seen.  At 
the end of the 30 second interval the partial-word form was taken away, whether 
completed or not, and the visual gestalt identification form for the next item was 




and half in the incoherent version.  Stimulus items were randomized for each participant 
with respect to item order and coherence of each item. 
Results 
The pattern of results for Study II was complex.  As in Study I, Study II trials in 
which visual gestalts were solved resulted a near perfect item partial-word solution rate, 
M = .96, SD = .15.  Also as was the case in Study I, on Study II trials in which visual 
gestalts were unsolved an independent samples t-test revealed that the mean (coherent 
and incoherent collapsed) item partial-word solution rate (M = .39, SD = .20), was 
significantly greater, t(45) = 3.06, p < .002 (one-tailed), than the baseline item partial-
word solution rate (M = .27, SD = .10) obtained in Preliminary Study A2.  The Study II 
mean item partial-word solution rate was, however, significantly lower, t(62) = 2.90, p < 
.04, two-tailed) than the mean item partial-word solution rate obtained in Study I (M = 
.49, SD = .21). 
On Study II trials in which gestalts were not solved, an independent samples t-test 
revealed that the incoherent item partial-word solution rate (M = .38, SD = .21) was 
significantly greater, t(62) = 2.77, p < .004 (one-tailed), than the Preliminary Study A2 
baseline partial-word solution rate (M = .27, SD = .10), as was the coherent item partial-
word solution rate (M = .39, SD = .23), t(59) = 2.54, p < .007 (one-tailed).  Unlike in 
Study I, however, in which the item partial-word solution rate for unsolved gestalts had 
been significantly greater on coherent trials than on incoherent trials, in Study II there 
was no such difference.  A paired-samples t-test revealed that the Study II item partial-




significantly different, t(29) = 0.32, p = .37 (one-tailed), than the rate for incoherent trials 
(M = .38, SD = .21) (two item-pairs deleted due to missing data).   
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 14, while both successful and unsuccessful attempts 
to identify visual gestalts in Study II did lead to significant facilitation of partial-word 
performance, facilitation following trials with unsolved coherent gestalts was less than 
that observed in Study I and was not significantly different than facilitation following 




































Figure 14. Item partial-word percent solution: Preliminary Study A2 vs. Study II  
 
Echoing the finding of equivalence of item partial-word facilitation following 
unsolved coherent and incoherent gestalts in Study II, a paired-sample t-test revealed that 




tailed), between the participant partial-word solution rate for coherent trials (M = .40, SD 
= .18) and incoherent trials (M = .39, SD = .18).   
Comparing the Study I participant partial-word solution rate for trials with 
unsolved incoherent trials, M = .41, SD = .16, with the rate for Study II, M = .39, SD = 
.18, an independent samples t-test using separate variances revealed no significant 
difference, t(42) = 0.46, p = .65 (two-tailed).  On the other hand, comparing Study I 
participant partial-word solution rates for trials with unsolved coherent trials, M = .55, 
SD = .17, with the rate for Study II, M = .40, SD = .18, an independent samples t-tests 
using separate variances revealed that the Study I rate was significantly greater,  t(42) = 
2.81, p < .008 (two-tailed), than the rate obtained in Study II.   
 To summarize, in Study II the elimination of the partial-word solution phase 
presentation of the visual gestalt had no effect on partial-word facilitation on trials in 
which participants attempted but failed to identify incoherent gestalts, a finding that is 
consistent with the simple activation model, but not the alternating activation model.  On 
the other hand, for trials in which participants attempted but failed to identify coherent 
gestalts, the additional increment in partial-word facilitation observed in Study I was 
completely eliminated in Study II, a finding that is consistent with the alternating 








































Figure 15 - Study I vs. Study II: The effect of eliminating the partial-word solution phase 
presentation of the visual gestalt on the coherent advantage 
 
Discussion 
The Study II partial-word solution rate for trials involving unsolved incoherent 
gestalts was unchanged from the rate observed in Study I, clearly demonstrating that the 
absence of the visual gestalt during the partial-word solution phase was irrelevant to 
incoherent partial-word facilitation.  On the other hand, on trials involving unrecognized 
coherent gestalts, elimination of the visual gestalt during the partial-word solution phase 
had the effect of decreasing the coherent partial-word solution rate to a level that was not 
significantly different from the incoherent partial-word solution rate observed in Study I 
and Study II.  In short, elimination of the partial-word solution phase visual gestalt 




facilitation demonstrated in Study I trials with unsolved coherent gestalts, i.e., the 
coherent advantage. 
At first glance, the disappearance of the coherent advantage was puzzling: Why 
should eliminating opportunities for back-and-forth alternation between the partial-word 
puzzle and the visual gestalt result in a decrease in coherent facilitation, while leaving 
incoherent facilitation unchanged?  The answer is likely to lie in a closer examination of 
the back-and-forth attention-shifting behaviour demonstrated by participants in Study I.  
As discussed in earlier sections, when a problem-solver first attempts to solve a visual 
gestalt, s/he may respond to some feature of the gestalt as a known characteristic, such as 
a “beak.”  With primary activation of a node corresponding to the concept “beak,” a 
spread of activation energy is sent throughout the problem-solver‟s associative network.  
Some of the activation energy will spread along logical links to nodes for things at a 
higher level of abstraction that are capable of “owning” the activated characteristic.  
Among these nodes for higher-level things receiving activation energy will be the node 
for the name of a potential owner, which may serve as a “hunch” that can assist the 
problem-solver in his/her subsequent attempts to solve the word puzzle, whose solution 
will be the name of the potential owner of the noted gestalt feature. 
When the problem-solver attempts but fails to solve the partial-word puzzle, a 
secondary, deductive activation at the “hunch” node may occur, sending a highly focused 
spread of activation to nodes for things within the “hunch system,” i.e., nodes for things 
that are closely associated with that hunch.  Included in the “hunch system” will be nodes 
for characteristics and organizational relationships amongst those characteristics that 




correct solution.  Thus, following a secondary activation event at a correct “hunch” node, 
a high level of residual energy will accumulate at nodes for a set of expected 
characteristics and organizational relationships amongst those characteristics.   
When the problem-solver turns his/her attention back to the gestalt, the relatively 
high accumulation of residual energy at nodes for things within the “hunch” system will 
sensitize him/her to detect their presence within the data of the gestalt.   If the gestalt is 
coherent, there may be many matches between expected characteristics/organization and 
actual gestalt features, and whether consciously registered or not, each expected/actual 
match will result in an additional increment of residual energy at nodes where these 
matches occur.  The relatively high residual energy held at these nodes then marks out 
each “match” node as a potential site for a new primary inductive activation event.  When 
a primary activation event occurs at one of these “match” nodes, some of the activation 
energy will flow “upward” through logical links to nodes for things with the potential to 
“own” the matching gestalt feature.  If the “hunch” node is the correct solution, each 
activated “match” node will send activation energy to the “hunch” node, so that the 
residual energy accumulates rapidly at the “hunch” node.   
When the problem-solver shifts his/her attention back to the partial-word puzzle, 
the level of residual energy now held at the “hunch” node may be sufficient to allow the 
problem-solver to solve the partial-word puzzle.  If not, the “hunch node” may serve as 
the site for another secondary activation, sending more activation energy through the 
“hunch system” and depositing more energy at nodes for characteristics/organizational 
relationships that should be present, thereby increasing the likelihood that the problem-




the likelihood of new matches between expected characteristics/organization and gestalt 
features, adding new “match” sites for subsequent primary activation events which will 
send more activation energy to the “hunch” node. 
So long as the problem remains unsolved, this pattern of alternating back-and-
forth between primary and secondary activations can continue, with each secondary 
activation of the “hunch” node differentially depositing energy at nodes in the “hunch 
system” and every primary activation of a new “match” node differentially depositing 
energy at the “hunch” node.  After several rounds of alternating activation, enough 
residual energy may accumulate at the correct “hunch” node to boost it above the 
threshold of consciousness, at which point the problem-solver will experience the “aha” 
of recognition as the concept corresponding to the “hunch” node enters consciousness. 
Logically, however, elimination of the partial-word phase presentation of the 
visual gestalt would severely hamper the strategy of alternating attention back-and-forth 
between visual gestalt and partial-word stimuli.  To engage in alternating activation under 
these circumstances, participants would be forced to attempt to recall features and/or 
organizational relationships from the visual gestalt without ever having consciously 
identified the object portrayed in that gestalt.  Thus, the process of alternating activation 
would be entirely reliant on a participant‟s ability to carry forward something in memory 
from the unrecognized visual gestalt.   The most likely candidate in this would be any 
aspect of the gestalt that participants can “tag” with a verbal label.  For example, it would 
be fairly easy to retain a detail from the visual gestalt in memory if it could be tagged as a 




that when they could not identify the object in a gestalt, they would focus on any feature 
or features that they did feel they could recognize. 
What this means for the alternating activation process is that as the problem-
solver engages in secondary activation from a “hunch” node, the potential for matches 
between expected characteristics/organization and actual gestalt features will be limited 
to nodes for gestalt features that the problem-solver has been able to tag with a verbal 
label.  This in turn limits the amount of activation energy that can be passed back to the 
“hunch” node in the subsequent spread of primary activation from “match” nodes, since 
there will be few or no matches between expected organizational relationships and gestalt 
features not tagged with verbal labels in the visual gestalt identification phase. 
It should be pointed out here that for incoherent gestalts, even in Study I, in which 
the visual gestalt was available throughout the partial-word solution phase, the process of 
alternating activation would likely only involve nodes for characteristics and not nodes 
for organizational information.  While secondary activation of a correct “hunch” node 
will result in the accumulation of residual energy at nodes for an expected set of 
characteristics and for the expected organization amongst those characteristics, this 
organization will not be present in the actual data of the incoherent gestalt.  While 
subsequent attempts to match nodes for expected characteristics may result in matches 
with some of the actual gestalt features, the attempt to match nodes for expected 
organizational information with nodes for the actual organization of gestalt features will 
almost certainly result in mismatches.  For incoherent gestalts, primary activation of 
nodes for correct organizational information will add little or nothing to the overall 




are given the opportunity to alternate attention between visual gestalt and partial-word, as 
was the case in Study I, the accumulation of residual energy at the “hunch” node through 
the process of alternating activation will only involve nodes for expected characteristics 
and not nodes for expected organizational information, and will necessarily be less than 
for its coherent counterpart.  Thus, elimination of the partial-word solution phase 
presentation of the visual gestalt will have little impact on partial-word facilitation for 
trials involving unsolved incoherent gestalts, which was demonstrated by the results of 
Study II, in which the partial-word solution rate for incoherent trials was unchanged from 
that of Study I, despite the elimination of the partial-word solution phase presentation of 
the gestalt in Study II. 
Without the additional accumulation of residual energy provided by matches 
between nodes for expected organization and actual gestalt features, the coherent and 
incoherent form of each visual gestalt should provide relatively equivalent expected 
characteristic/actual feature information to the alternating activation process, and as a 
result, one would expect equivalent participant partial-word performance on trials with 
unrecognized gestalts regardless of coherence, which was the result observed in Study II.  
As noted above, for trials involving unrecognized coherent gestalts this pattern of results 
strongly supports the alternating activation model, and not the simple activation model. 
Since the coherent advantage was clearly present in Study I, in which the visual 
gestalt and partial-word were present together throughout the partial-word solution phase, 
and clearly absent in Study II, in which the visual gestalt was not present during the 
partial-word solution phase, the question arose: "Is the coherent advantage all-or-




gestalt during the partial-word solution stage cause the coherent advantage to degrade in 
an incremental or abrupt manner?"  In order to answer this question, Study III was 
undertaken, in which it was proposed that the visual gestalt be made available to 
participants for differing lengths of time during the partial-word solution phase.  It was 
reasoned that by varying the availability of the visual gestalt during the partial-word 
solution phase, from full availability (gestalt present throughout the attempt to solve the 
partial-word), decreasing partial availability (gestalt present for some portion of the 
attempt to solve the partial-word) and zero availability (gestalt absent during the attempt 
to solve the partial-word), the coherent advantage could  be made to degrade, and the 
coherent partial-word solution rate would drop to the incoherent partial-word solution 
rate, as it had in Study II.  It was reasoned that the coherent advantage could drop 
abruptly, likely at zero gestalt availability, or it could degrade by increments with 













Chapter 3 - Part B: Increasing interstimulus intervals and the facilitation effect 
Preliminary Study B 
 Preliminary Study B was designed to more closely examine the question of 
whether elimination of the coherent advantage was necessarily all-or-nothing, as it had 
been in Study II of Part A, or whether it could be made to degrade in an incremental 
fashion by progressively limiting availability of the visual gestalt during the partial-word 
solution phase.  What was not clear from the results of Study II was how the coherent 
advantage would be impacted if access to the visual gestalt during the partial-word 
solution phase was reduced by increments.  On one hand, the coherent advantage could 
gradually degrade with decreasing availability of the visual gestalt.  On the other hand, 
the coherent advantage could be maintained intact so long as some availability to the 
gestalt is provided, and then degrade suddenly in an “all-or-nothing” fashion at the point 
where the visual gestalt is totally absent from the partial-word solution phase, as was the 
case in Study II.   
 In the Preliminary Study B participants were exposed to four delay conditions in 
which the amount of time that the visual gestalt was available during the partial-word 
solution phase was incrementally reduced.  In Study II of Part A, incoherent partial-word 
facilitation did not degrade with elimination of the partial-word solution phase gestalt 
presentation, and it was reasoned that since total absence of the gestalt during the partial-
word solution phase in Study II had no effect on the incoherent partial-word solution rate, 
decreasing the amount of time that the visual gestalt was present during the partial-word 
solution phase should also have no effect on incoherent partial-word performance.  Since 




since each participant in this study would be exposed to all four delay conditions, the 
decision was made to use only coherent gestalts in order to conserve power.   
Method 
Participants 
Participants (n = 16) were recruited from the University of Waterloo 
undergraduate pool on the basis of self-report of vision adequate for normal reading and 
average English language proficiency.  In the initial telephone contact, participants were 
told that the purpose of the experiment was to study perceptual problem-solving skills 
and that if they agreed to participate they would be asked to try to solve puzzles, some of 
which would involve identifying objects in drawings and some of which would involve 
solving word puzzles related to the objects in the drawings. 
Materials 
Unlike Study I and II in Part A, in which stimulus items were presented on 8.5 x 
11 sheets of paper, stimulus items in Preliminary Study B were presented on a computer 
screen to allow for very precise manipulation of the presentation of stimuli during the 
partial word solution phase.  A presentation program was written specifically for this 
study so that materials could be consistently presented at the appropriate times.  As well, 
the presentation program was designed to allow maximum flexibility in the order of 
stimulus presentation, onset of stimulus presentation, and duration of stimulus 
presentation through customized sets of individual command files. 
Stimulus items consisted of the same set of visual gestalts (coherent versions 
only) and partial-word puzzles employed in Part A studies, which was scanned at high 




computer with a 17-inch monitor.  In the visual gestalt identification phase, each visual 
gestalt item was presented on the upper half of the screen, with the question, “What is 
this object?” appearing below the visual gestalt with an underlined space to type in an 
answer.  Participants‟ responses to the request to identify the gestalt item appeared in the 
space as they typed them in.  Below the space for the response was a confidence rating 
scale, which consisted of the question, “How sure are you?” and a scale from 0 to 100%.  
Below the confidence rating scale was a space to enter a number indicating confidence, 
which appeared as the participant typed it in.  Once the participant entered a response and 
a confidence rating, the visual gestalt identification phase stimuli left the screen. 
At this point the partial-word solution phase began with the reappearance of the 
visual gestalt in the same location onscreen as in the visual gestalt identification phase, 
but this time without the request to solve the puzzle and the confidence rating scale.  At 
some point during the partial-word solution phase the partial-word task would appear on 
the lower half of the screen.  As in previous studies, the partial-word task consisted of the 
instruction to “Type in the word that solves the word puzzle,” below which was the 
partial-word puzzle for that item and a space to type in a response.  Participants‟ 
responses appeared in the space as they typed them in.   
In each trial the visual gestalt appears continuously for 30 seconds during the 
partial-word solution phase.  The partial-word puzzle appears for 30 seconds in one of the 
following conditions: 
a) 0 sec PW delay - gestalt and partial-word puzzle appear simultaneously and are 




b) 15 sec PW delay - gestalt appears for 15 seconds; gestalt and partial-word puzzle 
appear for 15 seconds together; partial-word puzzle appears for 15 seconds. 
c) 25 sec PW delay - gestalt appears for 25 seconds; gestalt and partial-word puzzle 
appear for 5 seconds together; partial-word puzzle appears for 25 seconds. 
d) 30 sec PW delay - gestalt appears for 30 seconds; partial-word puzzle appears for 30 
seconds. 
As determined in the Preliminary Study A2, the mean solution rate for the set of 
32 partial-word items was .27 (SD = .10), and individual item solution rates ranged from 
.14 to .45. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually.  Participants entering the lab were informed 
that they would be participating in a study of visual perception in which they would be 
asked to look at some drawings of objects on a computer screen, which could be humanly 
made things such as buildings, tools, or machines, or naturally occurring things, such as 
people, animals, or plants, and to try to identify them.  It was explained that some of the 
items portrayed in the drawings were not easy to recognize and that everyone had 
difficulty with some of them.  They were informed that after trying to identify the object 
in each drawing they would get a second chance to see the drawing, and at some point a 
missing letter word puzzle would also come onto the screen.  They would then be asked 
to try to solve the missing letter word puzzle, which if solved correctly, would be the 
name of the object in the drawing they had just seen. 
Participants were then informed that they would have 30 seconds to look at each 




they were that their response was correct by typing in a number into the space provided 
between 0 (indicating “no confidence – a wild guess”) and 100 (indicating “absolutely 
sure”).  It was explained that the drawing would only remain onscreen for 30 seconds, but 
the program would not go on to the next part until a response and confidence rating were 
typed in.  It was emphasized that for the purpose of the study it was important that they 
respond to each item and if stumped to take a wild guess and rate their confidence for that 
item at a very low level to indicate that it was just a guess. 
Participants were then told that after typing in a response and a confidence rating 
they would get a second chance to see the drawing for another 30 seconds.  At some 
point, either immediately or after some delay, the missing letter word puzzle for that 
drawing would come onto the screen. The word puzzle would be the name of the object 
in the drawing they had just seen, but it would have blanks in the place of some of the 
letters.  Participants were told that they would have 30 seconds to type a word into the 
space provided that solved the word puzzle and revealed the identity of the object 
portrayed in the drawing, but after 30 seconds onscreen the word puzzle would disappear 
whether they had finished typing in a response or not, and the program would move on to 
the next drawing. 
 Participants were given four practice items, each using the coherent form of the 
gestalt for that item, whose gestalt solution base rate was .12 (SD = .12) and whose 
partial-word solution base rate was .71 (SD = .15).   One item was presented in each of 
the four partial-word delay conditions.  Participants were reminded on the trial items that 




participant attempted all 32 items, with eight items in each of the four delay conditions.  
Items were randomized for order of presentation and delay condition.   
In this study, it was expected that the partial-word solution rate would drop 
significantly in at least one of the delay conditions.  What was not clear from the outset 
was whether the partial-word solution rate would decrease incrementally at each delay 
condition, or be maintained throughout and decrease abruptly in the 30 sec. partial-word 
delay condition, which is most similar to the conditions in Study II in which the coherent 
partial-word solution rate decreased to a rate not different than the incoherent partial-
word solution rate. 
Results and Discussion 
 In Preliminary Study B the mean item partial-word solution rate for trials in 
which gestalts were solved was .98 (SD = .14), while the mean item partial-word solution 
rate for trials in which gestalts were not solved  was .52 (SD = .40), collapsed across 
delay conditions.  Both of these are not dissimilar to Study I solution rates on trials with 
coherent gestalts. 
As expected, for solved gestalts there was no significant difference amongst the 
item partial-word solution rates at the four partial-word presentation conditions, F(3,104) 
= 0.90, p = .45.  Against prediction, however, on trials in which gestalts were not solved, 
analysis of variance with partial-word delay condition as a within-participants factor 
revealed that there was no significant difference in the item partial-word solution rate 
amongst the four partial-word presentation conditions, F(3,96) = 0.11, p = .95.  See 




of the coherent advantage, there was no significant decrease in item partial-word 






























Figure 16. Preliminary Study B item partial-word solution rates at each  
delay condition – Coherent gestalt solved vs. unsolved 
 
It should be noted that it had been expected that the level of partial-word 
facilitation would be similar to the partial-word item solution rate for unsolved coherent 
gestalts (.59) observed in Study I in at least the shortest delay condition in Preliminary 
Study B, in which the visual gestalt and partial-word puzzle were onscreen together for 
the full 30 seconds of the partial-word solution phase.  Instead, the item partial-word 
solution rates following unsuccessful attempts to solve visual gestalts ranged from .50 to 




partial-word facilitation was less than expected, although it may be related to the switch 
from pencil-and-paper to computerized presentation of materials. 
The pattern of participant partial-word solution rates in Preliminary Study B 
mirrored findings with item rates.  On trials in which gestalts were not solved analysis of 
variance with partial-word delay condition as a within-participants factor revealed that 
there was no significant difference in the participant partial-word solution rate amongst 
the four partial-word presentation conditions, F(3,58) = 0.02, p = 1.0.  Participant partial-
word solution rates following unsuccessful attempts to solve visual gestalts ranged from 
.55 to .56, with a mean of .55 (SD = .25). 
It had been predicted beforehand that in one or more Preliminary Study B delay 
condition on trials with unrecognized coherent gestalts, the coherent partial-word solution 
rate would drop.  It was predicted that the partial-word solution rate would drop to a rate 
similar to that observed in Study II in the longest delay condition, in which the visual 
gestalt and partial-word puzzle were not onscreen together during the partial-word 
solution phase, thereby eliminating the availability of the gestalt for alternating 
activation.  It was unclear whether the expected decrease in partial-word facilitation 
would be sudden, occurring only in the longest delay condition, or if it would be gradual, 
corresponding to decreasing availability of the gestalt as partial-word delays increase.  In 
Preliminary Study B the expected decrease in partial-word facilitation did not occur, and 
there was no significant difference in partial-word performance at any of the four delay 
conditions.    
After further thought about this result, it became clear that none of the conditions 




rate of partial-word solution following unrecognized coherent gestalts did decrease 
significantly compared to the corresponding rate in Study I.  Study II, which was a pencil 
and paper study, contained an uncontrolled interval of time between the removal of the 
gestalt stimulus at the completion of the visual gestalt identification phase and the 
beginning of the partial-word solution phase, at which time the participant received the 
partial-word stimulus.  After collection of the gestalt identification form, there was an 
interval of approximately 3-7 seconds during which participants had no stimulus material 
in front of them before receiving the partial-word solution form. 
In the current study there is no condition that replicates this interval of "dead air" 
time between the two stages.  This being the case, it is interesting to note that there was 
no degradation of the coherent solution rate, and by implication, the coherent advantage 
at any condition in Preliminary Study B, including the longest partial-word delay 
condition, which points to the robustness of the coherent advantage.  It appears that in 
Preliminary Study B, the interval of dead air between the offset of the visual gestalt and 
the onset of the partial-word puzzle was not of sufficient length to allow degradation of 
the gestalt in short-term visual memory.  Thus, participants in Preliminary Study B were 
able to maintain the visual gestalt in memory, mentally “carrying forward” the visual 
gestalt for use in alternating activation.   
If it is the case that participants were able to “carry forward” gestalts in short-term 
visual memory, logically there should be some time limit on this ability, since an 
unrecognized gestalt would have few tags for retrieval.  If participants were to experience 
an interval of dead air sufficient to allow the gestalt to degrade in visual memory prior to 




gestalt should be unavailable to alternating activation, at which point the coherent 
advantage should be eliminated, as it was in Study II. 
 Study III was designed to examine the effect of longer dead air intervals between 
the offset of the visual gestalt and the onset of the partial word puzzle.  It was reasoned 
that at some limiting interval of dead air the gestalt would become unavailable to 
alternating activation and the coherent advantage would disappear.  A buffer limit of 
approximately 1 second has been reported consistently in prior studies of sensory 
memory (Sperling, 1960; Averbach & Coriell, 1961; Averbach & Sperling, 1961; 
Treisman, 1964; Bliss et al, 1966; Geyer, 1966; Norman, 1969; Posner, Boies, 
Eichelman, & Taylor, 1969; Darwin, Turvey, & Crowder, 1972).  Blumenthal (1977) 
notes that on tasks such as the same-different letter discrimination procedure employed 
by Posner et al (1969), facilitation of discrimination disappears when delay intervals 
between stimulus letter and target letter are extended beyond 1.5 seconds, suggesting that 






In Study III increasing intervals of dead air will be inserted between the offset of 
the partial-word solution phase presentation of the visual gestalt and the onset of the 
partial-word puzzle.  In Study II the coherent advantage was completely eliminated with 
elimination of the partial-word solution phase presentation of the gestalt and the insertion 
of an uncontrolled dead air interval between the offset of the visual gestalt and the onset 
of the partial-word puzzle.  On the other hand, in Preliminary Study B, which contained 
no such dead air interval in any condition, the coherent advantage was maintained at all 
delay conditions.  This suggested that at longer intervals of dead air between offset of the 
gestalt and onset of the partial-word puzzle, exceeding the limit of visual memory, the 
gestalt would become unavailable to alternating activation and the coherent advantage 
would disappear, as it had in Study II.  As in Preliminary Study B, it was unclear whether 
the degradation of the coherent advantage would occur in a sudden or an incremental 
fashion.   
In this Study III, the decision was made to present half of the visual gestalts seen 
by each participant in the coherent form and half in the incoherent form.  While it was not 
expected that the longer delay conditions employed in Study III would have a significant 
impact on incoherent partial-word performance, this had not been established empirically.  
 In order to test the hypothesis that the coherent advantage could be made to 
degrade at some longer interval of dead air between offset of the gestalt and the onset of 
the partial-word puzzle, Preliminary Study B procedures were modified to include longer 
intervals of dead air.  As was noted earlier, a buffer limit of approximately 1 second has 




intervals of 1.5 seconds and 3.0 seconds would exceed the limit of the sensory memory 
buffer, leading to decreased availability of memory for unsolved gestalts and consequent 
degradation of the coherent advantage. 
 Three delay conditions were created.  The first included a 30-second delay in 
which the offset of the partial-word solution stage presentation of the visual gestalt offset 
was immediately followed by the onset of the partial-word puzzle for that item so that 
participants experienced no dead air interval.  In Preliminary Study B, a similar condition 
yielded no degradation in coherent partial-word performance relative to other delay 
conditions.  The second condition included a 31.5-second delay of which 1.5 seconds was 
a dead air interval, and the third condition included a 33-second delay of which 3 seconds 
was a dead air interval.  In the latter two conditions, it was expected that the interval of 
dead air would exceed the 1 second sensory memory buffer by .5 seconds and 2.0 
seconds respectively.   
It was predicted that, compared to the results of Preliminary Study B, for Study III 
trials in which coherent gestalts are unsolved there should be no degradation in the 
partial-word solution rate in condition one (0 sec. dead air), since the limit of the sensory 
memory buffer would not be reached in this condition.  On the other hand, the dead air 
intervals in conditions two (1.5 sec. dead air) and three (3 sec. dead air) should exceed 
the buffer limit, and therefore it was predicted that, compared to the results of 
Preliminary Study B, for Study III trials in which coherent gestalts are unsolved there 
should be degradation in the partial-word solution rate in conditions two and three.  In the 
conditions two and three, it was expected that the coherent partial-word solution would 




Incoherent partial-word solution rates were not expected to vary at any partial-word delay 
condition, and it was predicted that for Study III trials in which incoherent gestalts are 




Participants (n = 65) were recruited from the University of Waterloo 
undergraduate pool on the basis of self-report of vision adequate for normal reading and 
average English language proficiency.  In the initial telephone contact, participants were 
told that the purpose of the experiment was to study perceptual problem-solving skills 
and that if they agreed to participate they would be asked to try to solve puzzles, some of 
which would involve identifying objects in drawings and some of which would involve 
solving word puzzles related to the objects in the drawings. 
Materials 
Stimulus items for Study III were presented on a computer screen to allow for 
very precise manipulation of dead air intervals in the partial-word solution phase between 
the offset of the visual gestalt and the onset of the partial-word puzzle.  Three dead air 
conditions were created as a between-participants factor in order to reduce the possibility 
that individual participants were being “thrown off” by having to contend with differing 
delays from trial to trial.  Since it had not been demonstrated whether dead air intervals 
would have any impact on incoherent gestalt trials, the incoherent versions of visual 
gestalts were included in Study III.  Thus, each participant was exposed to only one of the 




coherent form and half in the incoherent form.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
delay condition and stimulus items were randomized for item order and item coherence. 
The presentation program written for Preliminary Study B was employed to 
ensure that stimulus materials could be consistently presented at the appropriate times, 
and responses and response latencies saved for each participant.  Each computer-
presented visual gestalt identification form presents one visual gestalt item, either 
coherent or incoherent, on the upper half of the screen.  Below the visual gestalt on the 
screen is the question, “What is this object?” with an underlined space to type in an 
answer.  Participants‟ responses to the request to identify the gestalt item appear in the 
space as they type them in.  Below the space for the response to the request for the 
identity of the gestalt is a confidence rating scale, which consisted of the question, “How 
sure are you?” and a scale from 0 to 100% with a space to enter a response, which 
appears as it is typed in.  
Following the visual gestalt identification stage, the visual gestalt is presented for 
30 seconds on the upper half of the screen.  After the visual gestalt disappears from the 
screen, the partial word task appears in one of three onset delay conditions.  In condition 
one, the partial-word puzzle appears immediately at the offset of the visual gestalt.  In 
condition two, the partial-word puzzle appears 1.5 seconds after the offset of the visual 
gestalt.  In condition three, the partial-word puzzle appears 3 seconds after the offset of 
the visual gestalt.  In the latter two conditions, the screen remains blank in the interval 
between offset of the visual gestalt and onset of the partial-word task. 
As in previous studies, the partial-word task remains onscreen for 30 seconds on 




the word that solves the word puzzle” and a space to type in a response, which appears as 
it is typed in.  As was determined in Preliminary Study A2, the mean partial-word 
solution for the set of thirty-two items was .27 (SD = .10), and individual partial-word 
solution rates ranged from .14 to .45. 
Procedure 
Participants in Study III were tested individually.  Upon entering the lab, 
participants were provided with the same instructions as in Preliminary Study B and first 
completed the same four practice items.  Participants were randomly assigned to delay 
condition and each participant attempted all 32 items.  Stimulus items were randomized 
for order of presentation and coherence.  
 In Study III it is predicted that partial-word solution rates on trials involving 
incoherent visual gestalts will be similar to those observed in Study I and Study II, and 
will not vary at any partial-word delay condition.  It is also predicted that in condition 
one there will be no degradation of the coherent partial-word solution rate, relative to that 
observed in Preliminary Study B, i.e., approximately .52, because the 0 sec. interstimulus 
dead air interval does not exceed the expected limit of the visual memory buffer.  In 
condition one, therefore, the coherent advantage should be maintained.  On the other 
hand, it is predicted that in conditions two and three, coherent partial-word performance 
should decrease to approximately .40, the partial-word solution rate observed for 
unsolved coherent gestalts in Study II, because the 1.5 sec. interstimulus dead air interval 
in condition two and the 3.0 sec. interstimulus dead air interval in condition three should 





Results and Discussion 
 For Study III trials in which gestalts were solved, an ANOVA with coherence as a 
within-participants factor and partial-word delay condition as a between-participants 
factor revealed no significant interaction between coherence and partial-word delay, 
F(2,33) = 0.05, p = .95, and no significant main effect for coherence, F(1,33) = 1.64, p < 
.21, with the coherent partial-word solution rate (M = .98, SD = .09) not significantly 
different than the incoherent partial-word solution rate (M = .91, SD = .28).  There was 
no significant main effect for partial-word delay, F(2,33) = 0.23, p = .80.  
For Study III trials in which gestalts were not solved, an ANOVA with coherence 
as a within-participants factor and partial-word delay condition as a between-participants 
factor revealed a significant interaction between coherence and partial-word delay, 
F(2,62) = 6.77, p = .002, and a significant main effect for coherence, F(1,62) = 25.31, p < 
.001, with the coherent partial-word solution rate (M = .46, SD = .23) significantly 
greater than the incoherent partial-word solution rate (M = .40, SD = .15).  There was no 
significant main effect for partial-word delay, F(2,62) = 0.61, p = .55. 
It had been predicted that the coherent advantage would be maintained in 
condition one, but would disappear in condition two and condition three.  Instead, in 
Study III planned comparisons revealed that the coherent advantage was maintained in 
conditions one and two and disappeared in condition three.  In condition one, as 
predicted, there was a significant difference, t(20) = 3.99, p < .001 (one-tailed), between 
partial-word performance for coherent trials (M = .45, SD = .24) and incoherent trials (M 
= .36, SD = .14).  In condition two, against prediction, there was also a significant 




coherent trials (M = .47, SD = .25) and incoherent trials (M = .37, SD = .14).  In 
condition three, as predicted, there was no significant difference, t(19) = .11, p = .91 
(two-tailed), between partial-word performance for coherent trials (M = .47, SD = .23) 
and incoherent trials (M = .47, SD = .15).  While the finding of equivalence between 
coherent and incoherent partial-word performance in condition three was predicted, it did 
not occur in the manner expected.  It was expected that the disappearance of the coherent 
advantage would occur due to a decrease in the coherent partial-word solution rate to a 
level equivalent to that of the incoherent partial-word solution rate.  Instead, the 
disappearance of the coherent advantage in condition three came about due to an 
unexpected increase in the incoherent partial-word solution rate, rather than the expected 
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Looking only at incoherent trials, an ANOVA using partial-word delay as a 
between-participants factor revealed a significant difference in partial-word performance 
amongst the delay conditions, F(2,62) = 3.69, p < .03.  Pairwise Tukey comparisons 
revealed no significant difference in partial-word performance (p = .997) between 
condition one (M = .36, SD = .14) and condition two (M = .37, SD = .14), but the 
condition three incoherent partial-word solution rate (M = .47, SD = .15) was 
significantly greater (p = .054) than that of condition one and significantly greater (p = 
.053) than that of condition two.  In fact, as noted above, incoherent partial-word 
performance in condition three increased to such an extent that it was not significantly 
different from the coherent rate for that condition, which was not significantly different 
from the coherent rate in the other two conditions, F(2,62) = 0.04, p = .96.  Overall, in 
Study III the predicted decrease in coherent partial-word facilitation did not occur, and 
coherent partial-word facilitation was equivalent in all delay conditions.  Equally 
unexpected was the finding that incoherent partial-word facilitation did not remain stable 
as predicted; instead, in condition three it increased to a level that was not significantly 
different from coherent partial-word facilitation.   
With regard to the failure to demonstrate the expected decrease in coherent 
partial-word facilitation at some interval of dead air in Study III, it may be that the 
changes in methodology worked against obtaining the expected decrease.  First, it is 
notable that for coherent gestalts participant partial-word performance in Study III (M = 
.46, SD = .23) fell at a level midway between those observed in Study I (M = .55, SD = 
.17) and Study II (M = .40, SD = .18).  Thus, coherent facilitation was decreased in Study 




facilitation was not expected to decrease.  For incoherent gestalts, despite significantly 
increased facilitation in condition three, participant incoherent partial-word performance 
in Study III (M = .40, SD = .15), was similar to those observed in Study I (M = .41, SD = 
.17) and Study II (M = .39, SD = .19).  While this overall decrease in coherent facilitation 
is interesting and unexpected, it does not shed light on the failure to demonstrate 
decreased coherent facilitation in one or both of the dead air conditions in Study III.  In 
retrospect, prior to beginning Study III it would have been prudent to replicate Studies I 
and II using the computer-presentation methodology employed in Study III in order to 
establish new benchmarks for partial-word performance. 
A more likely explanation for the unexpected pattern of results observed in Study 
III may be found in other methodological differences from earlier studies.  First, 
compared to Study II, in which the coherent advantage disappeared, Study III provided 
participants with an additional opportunity to view each visual gestalt.  Whereas 
participants in Study II saw each visual gestalt one time for a total of 30 seconds, 
participants in Study III saw each visual gestalt two times for a total of 60 seconds.  The 
additional opportunity to view each gestalt and longer total exposure to each gestalt in 
Study III may have provided participants with opportunities to rehearse each gestalt, 
thereby making memory for unsolved gestalts more resistant to degradation. 
A second important difference between Study II and Study III is that the dead air 
interval occurring in Study II was estimated to be 3-7 seconds, while the longest dead air 
interval in Study III was 3 seconds. Thus, it may be that visual memory for unrecognized 
visual gestalts is longer than anticipated, and the dead air intervals employed in Study III 




and Meyer (1987) found that memory sensitization by prompts with rare-word definitions 
could lead to facilitation effects for as long as a half-hour.  Facilitation effects with 
unrecognized, unlabelled visual stimuli would not be expected to last this long; however, 
they may last longer than expected, particularly given the additional opportunities to view 
gestalts and the relatively long duration of gestalt exposures discussed above.  Thus it 
may be that the failure to show decreased coherent facilitation in one or both of the dead 
air conditions in Study III was due to the combined impact of providing participants with 
conditions that made memory for unsolved gestalts more resistant to degradation and of 
using too-brief intervals of dead air between gestalt and partial-word stimuli. 
 The methodological differences noted above could also potentially account for the 
unexpected increase in incoherent partial-word facilitation observed in condition three of 
Study III.  In particular, opportunities for rehearsal of unrecognized gestalts may have 
played a large role in the observed increase in incoherent partial-word facilitation.  As 
noted by Tyler et al. (1979), participants who attempted to solve anagrams and missing-
word sentences were able to recall the words from trials with more difficult anagrams and 
sentences (high effort condition) than easier ones (low effort condition).  From this 
perspective, participants were putting in more effort with incoherent gestalts than with 
coherent gestalts in Study III, which led to increased recall for incoherent gestalts and 
subsequently increased incoherent partial-word performance.  This alone does not, 
however, explain why incoherent partial-word facilitation would increase in condition 
three but not in condition two.  It may be that the effort effect may become more 
pronounced at longer dead air intervals, but it may also be that longer intervals also 




Against prediction, in the longest delay condition in Study III, unsuccessful 
attempts to solve incoherent gestalts led to significantly increased partial-word 
facilitation.  This brings to mind the debate about possible mechanisms of the incubation 
effect in problem-solving, in which, after unsuccessful conscious attempts to solve a 
problem, participants given a period of time off-task prior to returning to the problem 
often demonstrate an increased rate of solution.  This result is usually explained through 
either a spreading activation account or a forgetting account.  In brief, according to the 
spreading activation account, time off-task allows for encounters with new solution-
relevant information, with the result that residual activation energy accumulates to the 
threshold of consciousness at the solution node in the problem-solver‟s associative 
network.  From the forgetting perspective, however, the time spent off-task allows 
problem-solvers to “forget” fixations on information that are irrelevant to a solution and 
to make a “fresh start” using only solution-relevant information. 
Given the events occurring in dead air intervals were the same in both dead air 
conditions, it seems very unlikely that encounters with new information would occur only 
in trials with incoherent visual gestalts in the longest delay condition.  On the other hand, 
given that the overall “whole” portrayed in an incoherent visual gestalt is inconsistent 
with images of the “whole” expected on the basis of activating a correct solution node, it 
may be that the continuing presence of the incoherent “whole” in consciousness interferes 
with problem-solvers‟ attempts to solve partial-word puzzles, setting up a competition 
between correct and incorrect “wholes.”  Thus, it may be that when faced with incoherent 
visual gestalts, problem-solvers may be using time off-task to allow solution-irrelevant 




time off-task the decay is more complete, with the result that interference is decreased, 




Chapter 4 - General discussion 
Summary of findings 
In Study I participants‟ unsuccessful attempts to recognize objects portrayed in 
visual gestalts facilitated their performance on a subsequent partial-word task.  
Facilitation of partial-word performance occurred whether the unrecognized gestalt was 
coherent or incoherent, but significantly more facilitation occurred on trials with coherent 
gestalts than on trials with incoherent gestalts, a finding which was referred to as the 
“coherent advantage.”  Thus, through their unsuccessful efforts to solve gestalts, 
participants acquired useful knowledge in the form of an incomplete or partial implicit 
knowledge about the objects portrayed.  As well, unsuccessful attempts to solve “better” 
coherent visual gestalts provided participants with a greater amount of partial knowledge 
than unsuccessful attempts to solve “poorer” incoherent visual gestalts.   
Before proceeding, it should be noted that a second explanation of the coherent 
advantage observed in Study I cannot be ruled out at this time.  It is possible that the 
increase in coherent partial-word facilitation was the result of partial-word solution phase 
solutions of previously unsolved coherent gestalts.  Since participants in Study I were not 
tested for visual gestalt solution during the partial-word solution phase it is not known 
whether the opportunity to view gestalts a second time, with the corresponding partial-
word puzzles, did in fact lead to additional gestalt solutions favoring coherent gestalts.  
Thus, the coherent advantage demonstrated in Study I could be explained by participants 
solving additional coherent gestalts during the partial-word phase, rather than by 
incremental increases in implicit knowledge without gestalt solutions.  Alternating 




however, should it turn out to be the case that participants are solving previously-
unsolved coherent gestalts during the partial-word phase, then the mechanism underlying 
the coherent advantage should be understood as “all-or-nothing” rather than 
accumulative.  Once solved, the gestalt cannot be “unsolved.”  On trials in which 
participants solve the gestalt in the partial-word phase, one would expect the 
corresponding partial-word solution rate to be similar to the observed rate on trials in 
which the gestalt was solved in the visual gestalt solution phase, i.e., near 100%.  Under 
these conditions, one would expect the partial-word solution rate to be stable and resilient 
to degradation, which was the case in Study III. 
Additional studies would be required to determine how frequently “second-
presentation” gestalt solutions do occur.  A finding that participants are able to achieve a 
substantial rate of second-presentation coherent gestalt solution would support the 
position that additional coherent gestalt solutions were occurring in the partial-word 
solution phase in Study I, and that these late solutions are the source of the coherent 
advantage.  On the other hand, a low second-presentation gestalt solution rate would be 
supportive of an accumulative model in which gestalts remain unrecognized. 
Despite the uncertainty about whether the coherent advantage demonstrated in 
Study I takes place through an accumulative or an all-or-nothing process, in the case of 
unsolved incoherent gestalts partial-word facilitation was clearly not reliant on 
unrecognized gestalt solutions.  There was significant partial-word facilitation following 
trials with unsolved incoherent gestalts in Study I, and the rate of incoherent partial-word 
facilitation did not differ in Study II, in which there was no partial-word solution phase 




facilitation was not caused by unrecognized gestalt solutions.  Overall, the findings with 
incoherent gestalts support the notion that problem-solvers are acquiring and 
accumulating partial knowledge about solutions without having achieved awareness of 
those solutions, a finding consistent with an incremental model of intuition, but not with 
an “all-or-nothing” model.   
Spreading activation was discussed as a likely explanation of how an unsuccessful 
attempt to solve a visual gestalt could facilitate subsequent performance on a related 
partial-word problem.  According to the spreading activation model, any feature within 
the gestalt that seems in some way relevant to the problem-solver can serve as a starting 
point in the search for a solution to the gestalt.  If a known characteristic is experienced 
as somehow similar to the relevant gestalt feature, an activation event may occur at the 
node for that characteristic, sending a spread of activation to associatively-linked nodes 
in the problem-solver‟s associative network.  If the chosen characteristic is, in fact, 
correct for the object portrayed in the gestalt the pattern of residual energy generated 
amongst nodes in the problem-solvers‟ associative network will resemble a weaker 
version of the solution pattern, i.e., the pattern that would exist had the problem-solver 
actually recognized the object.  This weaker pattern may then be refined and “sculpted” 
by additional activation events at nodes for other characteristics experienced as relevant 
to other gestalt features.  Of particular importance in the “sculpting” of the pattern of 
residual energy are the points of intersection in spreads of activation from relevant 
characteristic nodes.  These intersections will occur at nodes representing things that are 
associated with each of the activated characteristics, one of which is likely to be the name 




activated correct characteristic and the correct name of the object, each new activation of 
a correct characteristic node will deposit energy at the correct name node, so that the 
level of residual energy held at the name node increases rapidly toward the threshold at 
which the problem-solver will become conscious of the name as the correct solution to 
the gestalt.   
Even when the problem-solver is unable to accumulate sufficient residual energy 
at the name node to permit conscious awareness of the correct solution, the relatively 
high level of residual energy at the name node may still serve: a) as a useful implicit clue 
that the thing represented by this name node has potential as a solution, and b) as a means 
through which new solution relevant information can be quickly recognized and 
assimilated.  When the problem solver shifts his/her attention from the unsolved gestalt to 
the partial-word puzzle the encounter with the solution word in the form of the partial-
word puzzle may then provide sufficient additional energy to push the level of residual 
energy at the name node above the threshold, resulting in a sudden recognition of the 
name as the solution to the partial-word puzzle. 
It was noted that most participants in the partial-word solution phase of Study I 
appeared to be alternating their attention back and forth between the visual gestalt and the 
partial-word puzzle in their attempts to solve each partial-word puzzle.  It was not clear 
what purpose this alternation served, but alternation of attention was observed with 
nearly all participants tested.  Some participants stated that they found the presence of the 
visual gestalt during the partial-word solution phase distracting, and speculated that they 
might have been more successful with partial-word puzzles had each been presented 




attention was non-essential to the partial-word facilitation effect and simply a distraction 
that wasted resources, or b) alternation of attention was an essential component in the 
facilitation effect. 
If alternation of attention is not important in the partial-word facilitation effect, 
then it is likely that the spreading activation procedure underlying partial-word 
facilitation occurs as described above, i.e., through simple “one-way” inductive spreads 
of activation from “parts” (nodes for characteristics experienced as in some way relevant 
to features of the gestalt) to a “whole” (a node corresponding to something at a higher 
level of abstraction capable of “owning” the activated characteristics, in particular the 
node for the name of the object portrayed).  With each new activation of a correct 
characteristic node the pattern of residual activation will be “sculpted” to more closely 
resemble the correct solution pattern with a relatively large accumulation of residual 
energy at the correct name node.  
A problem-solver using this sort of “one-way” model, here labeled simple 
activation, would not benefit from this alternation of attention in his/her attempts to solve 
partial-word puzzles, and so it would only be a waste of resources.  Thus, if the simple 
activation model is correct, eliminating the opportunity to alternate attention between the 
visual gestalt and the partial-word puzzle during the partial-word solution phase should 
not decrease, and may increase partial-word facilitation by freeing up attentional 
resources. 
On the other hand, since alternation of attention was so frequently observed in the 
partial-word solution phase of Study I, it may be important to the facilitation effect and 




spreading activation takes place through an alternation between inductive activation of 
nodes for characteristics experienced as relevant to gestalt features and deductive 
activation of a high residual energy “potential owner” word node.   
From the alternating activation perspective, the pattern of residual energy 
established through inductive activation of a node for a characteristic deemed relevant to 
a gestalt feature may be most efficiently refined, or “sculpted” by deductive activation of 
a high residual energy “potential owner” node.  Deductive activation of the “potential 
owner” node will send a spread of activation outward to nodes for the “expected 
characteristics” of that “potential owner.”  If the activated “potential owner” is the correct 
solution, resulting high levels of residual energy at each of these “expected 
characteristic” nodes increases the likelihood that the problem-solver will respond to 
corresponding features in the visual gestalt.  When matches occur between expected 
characteristics and actual features, the level of residual energy at each matching 
“expected characteristic” node increases again, marking these nodes as potential sites for 
new inductive activations.  With the inductive activation of each matching “expected 
characteristic” node, additional energy will be deposited at the correct “potential owner” 
node, which may then serve as the site for another deductive activation event, and so on, 
and so on.  With each round of alternating activation, the pattern of residual energy in the 
problem-solver‟s associative network comes to more closely resemble the correct 
solution pattern, in which the node for the name of the object will be amongst the nodes 
holding the highest levels of residual energy. 
In this way, the process of alternating activation provides problem-solvers with a 




energy in which a “potential owner” may be found amongst the nodes holding the highest 
level of residual energy, and b) “refine” the residual energy pattern to verify that the 
identified “potential owner” is the correct solution by preferentially increasing the 
residual energy held at the set of “expected characteristic” nodes for that “potential 
owner” and comparing these expected characteristics with actual gestalt features.  Unlike 
the simple activation model, the alternating activation model requires that participants 
alternate their attention between gestalt and partial-word puzzle in order to “sculpt” the 
residual energy pattern by selectively raising residual energy at correct “potential owner” 
and “expected characteristic” nodes.  If the alternating activation model is correct, 
eliminating the opportunity to alternate attention between the gestalt and the partial-word 
puzzle during the partial-word solution phase should decrease and could eliminate 
partial-word facilitation. 
Study II was designed to determine the importance of alternating activation to the 
partial-word facilitation effect observed in Study I.  With the elimination of opportunities 
for alternating activation in the partial-word solution phase, participants in Study II were 
forced to rely on simple activation alone.  Results demonstrated that the elimination of 
opportunities to engage in alternating activation had no affect on partial-word facilitation 
on trials with unsolved incoherent gestalts, but had the effect of eliminating the coherent 
advantage so that coherent partial-word facilitation decreased to a level not significantly 
different from that of incoherent partial-word facilitation in Studies I and II.   
Since incoherent partial-word facilitation in Study II was not different from that 
observed in Study I, it can be assumed that when faced with an incoherent gestalt 




engage in alternating activation.  In retrospect this makes sense because deductive 
activation of a correct solution word node will sensitize a problem-solver to recognize a 
particular set of characteristics and spatial relationships amongst those characteristics.  
While some or all of these characteristics may match features present in the incoherent 
gestalt, the expected spatial relationships amongst characteristics will be so discrepant 
with the actual spatial relationships amongst incoherent gestalt features that the problem-
solver will likely give up attempts at deductive activation. 
On the other hand, when given the opportunity to alternate attention back and 
forth between a coherent gestalt and its partial-word puzzle, as was the case in Study I, 
participants may successfully employ alternating activation to gain additional increments 
of partial knowledge, or, alternatively, additional gestalt solutions, that lead to increased 
partial-word facilitation, i.e., the coherent advantage.  When denied the opportunity to 
alternate attention back and forth between a coherent gestalt and its partial-word puzzle, 
as was the case in Study II, participants could not employ alternating activation to gain 
these additional increments of partial knowledge/additional gestalt solutions, and, as a 
consequence the coherent advantage disappeared.   
Given that intuition, whose products appear in consciousness in an “all-or-
nothing” fashion, appeared to occur through an incremental, accumulative process 
involving states of implicit partial knowledge in Study I trials, the question arose, “Is it 
the case that the coherent advantage, which was „all‟ in Study I, and „nothing‟ in Study II, 
is generated by an incremental accumulative process?”  In other words, is it necessarily 
the case that the coherent advantage degrades suddenly and completely as it had in Study 




Studies in Part B were designed to examine this question by incrementally 
reducing opportunities for alternating activation to determine, first, whether there is a 
point at which the coherent advantage is disrupted, and, second, whether the coherent 
advantage degrades in an abrupt or gradual manner.  Part B studies reintroduced the 
partial-word solution phase gestalt presentation, but unlike in Study I, in which the visual 
gestalt and the partial-word puzzle were presented together throughout the entire partial-
word solution phase, in Part B studies the onset of each partial-word puzzle was delayed 
by some amount relative to that of its visual gestalt.  In another change from Part A 
studies, in Part B stimulus items were presented on a computer monitor rather than 
printed on sheets of paper.   
Preliminary Study B was completed using coherent gestalts only and four within-
participants partial-word delay conditions.  Preliminary Study B failed to demonstrate the 
expected degradation of coherent facilitation in any partial-word delay condition, but it 
was reasoned that this may have been because each of the delay conditions allowed for 
some alternating activation, either through some simultaneous presence of gestalt and 
partial-word puzzle onscreen or through representations of gestalts in memory.  It was 
noted that the observed partial-word facilitation in Preliminary Study B was somewhat 
less than would be expected on the basis of the results of Study I, but it was not clear why 
partial-word performance would decrease as a result of the changes in methodology.   
Study III was completed using coherent and incoherent gestalts and three 
between-participants partial-word delay conditions.  Delay condition one was equivalent 
to the longest delay condition in Preliminary Study B, in which the visual gestalt 




immediately replaced by the partial-word puzzle.  In the other two partial-word delay 
conditions intervals of “dead air” were inserted between the offset of the visual gestalt 
from the screen and the onset of the partial-word puzzle.  It was reasoned that in both 
conditions two and three the length of the dead air intervals exceeded the theoretical limit 
of the visual memory buffer, and so participants‟ mental representations of unrecognized 
gestalts were expected to degrade prior to the appearance of the partial-word puzzle, 
thereby decreasing or eliminating opportunities for alternating activation.   
It was predicted that in delay condition one the level of coherent partial-word 
facilitation would be similar to that observed in Preliminary Study B, but in conditions 
two and three the level of coherent partial-word facilitation would decrease.  It was 
unclear whether the decrease in coherent partial-word facilitation would occur in an 
abrupt and complete manner as it had been in Study II, or whether it would be gradual 
and stepwise, with some decrease occurring in condition two and a further decrease 
occurring in condition three.  It was also predicted that incoherent partial-word 
facilitation would be unaffected by dead air intervals and would not differ in any partial-
word delay condition.  Results of Study III failed to support either prediction.  There was 
no significant decrease in coherent partial-word facilitation in any delay condition, and 
also against prediction, incoherent partial-word facilitation increased significantly in 
delay condition three. 
What has been shown 
 First, participants who attempt but fail to recognize ambiguous visual stimuli 
show facilitated performance on related problems.  The pattern of results on trials with 




Study II supports the idea that participants were accumulating implicit partial knowledge 
about solutions to gestalts in the absence of achieving solutions.  This result strongly 
supports the idea that, through their unsuccessful attempts to solve a visual gestalt, 
participants are generating and accumulating implicit partial-knowledge about the 
solution in the form of a pattern of residual energy amongst nodes in the associative 
network that resembles the pattern that would exist had the participant achieved 
conscious recognition of the object represented in the gestalt, i.e., the solution pattern.   
Since consciousness is, however, a serial process that cannot accept a complex 
pattern of residual energy as meaningful information, in order to be useful to 
consciousness there must be a “distillation” of the pattern into a representative that can be 
passed into consciousness as an information-dense “bite-size” chunk.  The most likely 
candidate to represent a pattern of residual energy will be something at a fairly high level 
of abstraction that can integrate all of the activated elements in a meaningful way.  One 
such something will be the name of the object, whose node will be closely associated 
with all of the nodes within the pattern of activation.  Fortunately for the “distillation” 
process, because of its close association with other nodes in the pattern, the name node 
will be amongst the nodes that have accumulated the highest levels of residual energy in 
the pattern, bringing it closer to the threshold of consciousness. 
Second, the “quality” of the unrecognized visual stimuli appears to impact on the 
amount of partial-knowledge that can be accumulated from it, which will be directly 
reflected in the amount of partial-word facilitation that occurs.  For both coherent and 
incoherent unsolved gestalts the node for the correct solution word should be amongst the 




working with an unsolved coherent gestalt should be able to generate a pattern of residual 
energy that more closely approximates the correct solution pattern, and to accumulate 
more energy at the correct solution node than a problem-solver working with an unsolved 
incoherent gestalt.  In fact, in the context of the partial-word solution phase in Study I, 
juxtaposition of the partial-word puzzle with the previously unsolved coherent gestalt 
may result in such a rapid accumulation of residual energy that some previously unsolved 
gestalts become solved.  As has been noted, it is not clear at this point whether the 
additional increment of partial-word facilitation provided by unsolved coherent gestalts in 
Study I was due to increases in implicit partial knowledge without gestalt solution, or to 
additional late solutions of the previously unsolved gestalts.  Further research will be 
required to determine whether the mechanism underlying the coherent advantage is 
incremental or abrupt.   
Third, the differences in the pattern of partial-word facilitation for coherent and 
incoherent gestalts observed in Study I suggest that when the problem-situation permits, 
participants are able to engage in a bi-directional search for a solution through a process 
of alternating activation, initiated from the “parts” of the problem situation and moving 
toward a “whole” at a higher level of abstraction capable of “owning” those parts, and 
then reversing direction to move from that “whole” back to the “parts” of the problem 
that should be present in the problem-situation for that “whole” to be the correct solution.   
Separate but interconnected processing of imagistic and verbal/semantic elements 
of the problem situation would be predicted by Paivio (1991), who described the 
functional independence of verbal and non-verbal systems.   From this perspective, the 




that can facilitate recall.  Paivio noted that despite their functional independence, the two 
systems are interconnected so that processing can occur: a) “representatively” from one 
unit to another within its system (word-to-word, image-to-image), b) “referentially” from 
a unit within one system to a unit within another (word-to-image, image-to-word), or c) 
“associatively” to units in both systems simultaneously.  In this thesis, Paivio‟s referential 
processing has been described as inductive activation (image-to-word) and as deductive 
activation (word-to-image).  As well, under specific conditions, for example, when the 
gestalt is coherent and the gestalt and partial-word puzzle are both accessible, these 
processes may be combined in what has been described as alternating activation.  As 
noted above, while alternating activation with coherent gestalts leads to increased partial-
word facilitation, at this time it is not clear whether this takes place through increases in 
implicit partial knowledge, or through additional late gestalt solutions.  Thus, while it is 
unclear whether alternating activation is exactly the simultaneous processing of verbal 
and non-verbal information described by Paivio, the additional increment of partial-word 
facilitation on Study I trials with coherent gestalts is suggestive of a qualitatively 
different process than that which takes place on trials with incoherent gestalts.   
Fourth, “part-to-whole” processing appears to be conserved when conditions 
prevent participants from fully engaging in the “whole-to-part” processing.  When the 
problem situation was changed to prevent participants from engaging in “whole-to-part” 
deductive activation, problem-solvers were still able to accumulate partial-knowledge 
through “part-to-whole” inductive activation.  It is possible that some alternating 
activation may occur even under these conditions, since some high residual energy “part” 




procedure, but this is purely speculative.  In any case, it appears that “part-to-whole” 
processing is a fallback strategy that is employed when the necessary conditions for 
“whole-to-part” processing are not met by the problem situation.   
In this vein, an important theme in recent research is that problem-solvers have a 
range of problem-solving strategies available to them in any given problem situation, and 
will choose a strategy on the basis of which is most likely to be effective given the 
characteristics of the problem environment.  Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) have proposed 
a model of the mind as an “adaptive toolbox” containing many simple heuristic “tools” 
designed for specific problem-solving situations.  Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) point 
to Simon‟s (1956) observation that the human mind is adapted to real-world 
environments, and that problem-solving algorithms have evolved to cope with situations 
in which the problem-solver has limited time to make a decision, has limited information 
available, and has limited computational capacity.  Simon described the operation of the 
mind in the environment as “bounded rationality,” and noted that most real-world 
problems rarely require an optimal solution, merely a solution that meets the needs of the 
current situation, i.e., a “satisficing” solution that can successfully exploit the structure of 
the environment without extensive data collection, summation, and integration 
procedures. 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) have described a set of “fast and frugal” 
cognitive heuristics that can operate on a simple recognition principle, rather than on the 
summation and integrative processing of data.  Using population data for German cities, 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein found that three such heuristics performed extremely well in 




which of two cities, e.g., Heidelberg or Bonn, has more inhabitants.  Unlike classical 
inferential models, these fast and frugal heuristics do not assume “unlimited time, 
knowledge and computational might” (p. 650), but, nonetheless, can be used to 
successfully perform inference tasks using limited knowledge as an input, and users can 
actually “profit from lack of knowledge” (p. 652).   
Perhaps the best known of these fast and frugal heuristics, the “Take the Best” 
(TTB) heuristic employs a limited search procedure without summation or integration of 
data.  According to the TTB, if one alternative of a pair is recognized and the other is not, 
the recognized alternative is chosen.  If neither is recognized, the choice is random.  If 
both are recognized, a search process begins through cues, or facts about the alternatives 
that have been rank ordered in terms of their cue validity (a subjective ranking of the 
likelihood that a cue will discriminate which of the alternatives has the highest criterion 
value).  When a cue is discovered that does discriminate in favor of one of the 
alternatives, the search process is halted and that alternative is chosen.  Gigerenzer and 
Goldstein (1996) note that in the task of choosing between two recognized cities, a 
possible cue with high cue validity might be whether either of the pair has a professional 
major league soccer team.  If one city is recognized to have a professional major league 
soccer team and the other is not, the city with the team would be the alternative chosen. 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) tested two other heuristics that can operate on 
even less information than the TTB heuristic, the “Take the Last” (TTL) heuristic, and 
the Minimalist heuristic.  In the TTL heuristic, there is no ranking of subjective cues on 
the basis of likelihood of discriminating between alternatives.  In this model, when two 




simply tried first, and if that cue fails to discriminate the cue that discriminated on the 
trial before last is tried, and so on.  Thus, the TTL heuristic requires less information to 
operate than the TTB heuristic, since nothing needs to be known about cue validity.  All 
that needs to be known to use the TTL heuristic is when a cue was last used successfully.  
In the Minimalist heuristic, cues are simply tried randomly and there is no need to know 
anything about cue validity or about when a cue was last used successfully.  
Richter and Späth (2006) state that problem-solvers can use these sorts of 
recognition-based heuristics effectively if two conditions are met in the problem 
situation: first, some, but not all of the alternatives must be recognized, i.e., there must be 
recognition variance; and second, there must be a correlation between recognition and the 
criterion that is to be inferred, which they refer to as recognition validity.  Further, 
Richter and Späth state that if the recognition validity correlation is larger than the 
correlations that exist between cues and the criterion, which they refer to as knowledge 
validity, a “less-is-more” effect can occur, so that a problem-solver with less knowledge 
can actually perform better on criterion judgment tasks than a problem-solver with more 
knowledge.   
There has been empirical support for the less-is-more effect: Gigerenzer and 
Hoffrage (1995) have shown that Germans made more successful decisions about which 
city in pairs of US cities had the larger population than did Americans; Borges, 
Goldstein, Ortmann, and Gigerenzer (1999) have shown that amateur investors basing 
their investment decisions on the recognition principle made better choices than experts; 
and Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2002) have shown that over the course of repetitive 




predicting which city in pairs of US cities had the highest population decreased.  The 
latter finding is particularly illustrative of the less-is-more effect, in that problem-solvers 
with quite minimal knowledge about a problem situation can employ these sorts of fast-
and-frugal heuristics to perform prediction tasks very successfully, but as their 
recognition knowledge of previously unrecognized alternatives increased, prediction 
performance decreased.  Logically, a problem-solver with complete knowledge of the 
problem situation would have zero recognition variance for either alternatives or cues, 
and would be unable to use the recognition heuristic at all.   
Since recognition-based heuristics can be used effectively only when boundary 
conditions are met in the problem situation, it is likely that problem-solvers will have 
other procedures for use when these conditions are not met.  It may be that some 
problems lend themselves to a variety of different types of problem-solving procedures, 
and for these types of problems, the choice of procedure is likely to hinge on 
characteristics of the problem situation and personal preference.   
Bröder and Schiffrin (2003) note that, from the “adaptive toolbox” perspective, 
people appear quite competent in the choices they make about which heuristic is most 
likely to be effective in a given situation.  One factor that has been shown to be important 
in a problem-solver‟s choice of a heuristic is the relative cost of obtaining information 
from the environment versus retrieving information from memory.  In studies in which 
participants “bought” information to help them predict which of pairs of stocks would be 
more profitable, Bröder (2000) found that 65% of participants employed a TTB heuristic 




nothing.  Newell and Shanks (2003) also found that participants were more likely to use a 
TTB heuristic as the cost of obtaining information from the environment increased.   
Bröder and Schiffrin (2003) stated that representational format of the problem 
should also play a role in participants‟ choice of problem-solving procedure, and that 
sequential procedures, such as the TTB heuristic, should be better suited for problems in 
which information is verbally encoded and more likely to be retrieved from memory in a 
sequential manner, whereas simultaneous and compensatory processing is more likely to 
be engaged by problems presented in a pictorial format.  In the above mentioned studies, 
Bröder (2000) found that participants used the TTB heuristic more frequently when 
information was verbally presented and used compensatory procedures more frequently 
when information was presented pictorially.   
Bröder found, however, that even when the experimental conditions clearly 
favored the use of the TTB heuristic not all participants chose to use this approach, which 
led to the conclusion that there are distinct individual differences in the choice of 
problem-solving procedures.  Newell and Shanks (2003) obtained similar results, finding 
that fully 25% of participants violated the TTB stopping rule, despite experimental 
conditions strongly manipulated to favor use of the TTB heuristic.  Thus, it appears that 
when problem conditions permit a range of effective problem-solving procedures, the 
choice of procedure is partly down to the personal preference of users. 
With respect to the “adaptive toolbox” model described above, the distinction 
between simple and alternating activation presented in this dissertation may reflect 
choices that problem-solvers are making about the most appropriate problem-solving 




detected in a gestalt, problem-solvers choose alternating activation, a procedure that is 
particularly attuned to the overall wholeness, or spatial organization of gestalt features, 
and which can effectively exploit wholeness as useful information in problem-solving.  
On the other hand, when faced with an incoherent gestalt, or when conditions do not 
permit alternating activation, problem-solvers choose simple activation, a procedure that 
is less reliant on the overall gestalt and more reliant on recognizable individual features.   
Fifth, the unexpected increase in incoherent partial-word performance observed in 
the longest partial-word delay condition in Study III resembles an incubation effect 
(Smith & Blankenship, 1989), in which a break in problem-solving leads to improved 
performance.  This finding may offer some insight into a possible mechanism of 
incubation in which problem-solvers spontaneously switch from incremental, integrative 
problem-solving procedures to a simpler, faster non-compensatory heuristic procedure, 
triggering a “less-is-more” effect. 
Knoblich, Ohlsson and Raney (2001) note that attempts at problem-solving often 
reach an impasse, at which point the problem-solver feels “stuck” despite the fact that 
achieving solution does not require skill or information beyond that possessed by the 
problem-solver.  After some period of time off-task, i.e., an incubation period, the 
impasse can resolve allowing the problem-solver to rapidly solve the problem.  Silveira 
(1971) has noted that incubation effects tend to be greater when the incubation period 
occurs at a later stage in problem-solving, which was the case in Study III in which the 
facilitation effect occurred only in the longest delay condition.  The increase in 
incoherent partial-word facilitation observed in the longest delay condition in Study III 




partial-word facilitation not only increased in the longest delay condition, but actually 
increased to the point that it was not different from coherent partial-word facilitation, thus 
eliminating the coherent advantage although not in the expected way. 
As noted by Kohn (2005), the mechanism underlying the incubation effect has 
been explained through relief from mental fatigue (Woodworth & Schlosberg, 1954; 
Posner, 1973); through continuing incremental work on the problem during the 
incubation period, either consciously (Browne & Cruse, 1988; Weisberg & Alba, 1981) 
or unconsciously (Yaniv and Meyer, 1987; Bowers et al., 1990); and through forgetting 
incorrect fixation (Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Smith & Vela, 1991).  As Kohn (2005) 
states, the mental fatigue hypothesis has largely been discounted as an explanation for 
incubation effects, since incubation can occur even when problem-solvers engage in 
difficult tasks during the incubation period (Smith & Blankenship, 1991).  Likewise, the 
conscious incremental hypothesis has difficulty explaining studies that show incubation 
effects when incubation intervals are filled with tasks that would interfere with conscious 
problem-solving efforts (Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Smith & Vela, 1991).  However, 
there is substantial evidence for both the unconscious incremental hypothesis and the 
forgetting fixation hypothesis. 
 The unconscious incremental account of incubation employs a spreading 
activation model similar to that discussed in this thesis.  According to Yaniv and Meyer 
(1987), initial problem-solving attempts activate memory traces critical to the problem‟s 
solution to sub-threshold levels.  The relatively high residual energy at these traces 
facilitates recognition of the target word in a subsequent encounter in the environment.  




solution to a problem prompts more efficient assimilation of new solution-related stimuli 
from the environment.  Unfortunately, such an explanation cannot adequately explain 
why facilitation should suddenly increase in the longest delay condition in Study III on 
incoherent trials, but not on coherent trials.  If the explanation for increased incoherent 
facilitation in condition three is that problem-solvers simply have more time to employ 
unconscious incremental procedures, one would expect both coherent and incoherent 
facilitation to increase in condition three, which was not the case. 
With regard to the forgetting fixation hypothesis, as Knoblich, Ohlsson and Raney 
(2001) note, insight-type problems are particularly likely to trigger an initial direction 
that is unhelpful in solving the problem.  Activation of an incorrect mental representation 
at the start of problem-solving may lead to the activation of related concepts, ideas, 
analogies, etc. that are not useful to the goal of solving the problem at hand, while 
simultaneously blocking activation of more useful knowledge elements.  According to the 
forgetting fixation hypothesis (Smith, 1995), once fixation on an incorrect association has 
occurred continued problem-solving attempts may simply lock the incorrectly fixated 
association into an ongoing competition with the correct solution.  An incubation period 
can facilitate achievement of a correct solution by allowing the incorrect fixation to 
dissipate and become less accessible than the correct solution.  Knoblich et al (2001) 
suggest that this may occur through deactivation of the incorrect knowledge element that 
has constrained consideration of other options (Ohlsson, 1992), or by the process of 
chunk decomposition, in which components of a perceptual chunk are separated, 





For participants in Study III working with an incoherent gestalt, the organization 
of features within the gestalt will, at best, be discrepant with the expected organization 
activated by the deductive activation of a correct hunch node.  The resulting mismatch 
between the expected organization of characteristics and the actual organization of gestalt 
features will likely seriously limit the amount of energy that can passed to the correct 
hunch node through inductive activations of matching organization nodes.  At worst, the 
organization of incoherent gestalt features may actually resemble something other than 
the correct solution, leading to the activation of competing hunch nodes and the above-
mentioned interference/blocking effect.  As discussed above, this competition could be 
resolved in favor of the correct solution by the insertion of an incubation period, i.e., a 
dead air interval of long enough duration to allow for selective degradation of the 
incorrect fixation.  With increasing durations of dead air interval, memory for an un-
named organization of gestalt features would likely become increasingly difficult to 
maintain.  On the other hand, relatively large accumulations of residual energy at nodes 
for gestalt features may be less difficult to maintain.  Thus, memory for the incoherent 
spatial organization may fade rapidly compared to memory for gestalt features, allowing 
participants to focus their efforts on gestalt features that support the correct solution 
pattern. 
It is possible, however, that the process of forgetting is non-specific, rather than a 
selective forgetting of an incorrect fixation.  It may be that that both incorrect and correct 
patterns of activation begin to degrade during the longer period of dead-air in condition 
three.  With residual energy patterns fading, problem-solvers may make the implicit 




situation.  Problem-solvers may abandon further attempts to use integrative spreading 
activation procedures and switch to a fast-and-frugal recognition-based heuristic 
procedure, and in so doing trigger a “less-is-more” effect.  The dramatic increase in 
incoherent partial-word facilitation observed in condition three of Study III may be 
understood as a “less-is-more” effect.   
For participants faced with the dilemma of resolving the competition between two 
“potential owners” as patterns of residual activation fade may very well prompt a 
decision to switch strategies from an integrative attempt to refine weights within the 
residual energy pattern to a simpler, faster procedure geared to operate with limited 
information; a procedure similar to the TTB heuristic described above in which the 
problem-solver invokes a limited search procedure with a full-stop rule whenever a 
discriminating fact is discovered that favors one alternative over another.  If the problem-
solver chooses to approach the problem in this way competition between false and correct 
“potential owners” may be decided successfully through a single recognition-based 
decision.  Thus, counter-intuitively, as information in the problem situation decreases, 
switching to a simpler heuristic procedure can lead to increased incoherent partial-word 
facilitation, which was what was observed in condition three of Study III. 
Thus, problem-solvers appear to be acutely attuned to changes taking place in the 
problem situation and competent in their implicit decisions about appropriate problem 
solving strategies.  In Study II, in response to changes in the problem situation that 
prevented use of the strategy of alternating activation with coherent gestalts, participants 
chose to “fall back” on a simpler strategy, i.e., simple activation.  In a similar way, when 




strategy of accumulation and integration of partial-knowledge through spreading 
activation participants chose to “fall back” on a simpler, recognition-based heuristic 
procedure with a limited search and a stopping rule that specifies a halt to the search at 
the discovery of the first piece of evidence that favors one alternative over the other, 
similar to the TTB/TTL/Minimalist approaches.   
In summary, problem-solvers appear highly sensitive to changes in the problem 
conditions, and cope with these changes by making intelligent, implicit decisions about 
the most appropriate problem solving strategy to meet the new problem situation.  In the 
tasks encountered by participants in the current set of studies, when conditions were 
optimal, e.g., opportunity to alternate attention between a coherent gestalt and its partial-
word puzzle, participants chose alternating activation as the appropriate procedure.  
When conditions changed, e.g., incoherent gestalts or no opportunity to alternate 
attention, participants chose simple activation as the appropriate procedure.  When 
conditions changed further, e.g., incoherent gestalts/unresolved competition between 
“potential owners”/patterns of residual activation fading rapidly, participants chose to use 
a “fast-and-frugal” heuristic to quickly resolve the competition between alternatives.   
What has not been shown 
 As noted above, while it has been proposed that the coherent advantage 
demonstrated in Study I takes place through incremental increases in implicit knowledge 
generated by alternating activation, the possibility that the observed increase in coherent 
partial-word facilitation is due to additional solutions of previously unrecognized 
coherent gestalts taking place during the partial-word solution phase cannot be ruled out.  




partial knowledge to successful solution so rapidly that it resembles the sort of 
“simultaneous processing” described by Paivio (1969).  The frequency of occurrence of 
solution of previously unsolved coherent gestalts in the partial-word solution phase 
requires further investigation. 
In Part B the primary objective was to determine whether the disappearance of the 
coherent advantage was necessarily abrupt, as it had been in Study II.  It was predicted 
that with the insertion of a sufficient length of dead air interval between the offset of the 
partial-word solution phase gestalt and the onset of the partial-word puzzle, participants‟ 
memory for unrecognized gestalts would degrade, thereby preventing them from using 
alternating activation procedures and decreasing coherent partial-word facilitation.  In 
Study III, however, the predicted decrease in coherent partial-word facilitation did not 
occur at any interval length employed. 
It is possible that Study III failed to demonstrate the expected degradation of 
coherent facilitation due to methodological differences between Study III and Study II, in 
which degradation of the coherent advantage had occurred.  It was noted that overall 
coherent partial-word facilitation was somewhat less in Study III than was observed in 
Study I, suggesting that something had impacted globally on participants‟ coherent 
partial-word performance.  In retrospect, prior to beginning Study III, it would have been 
prudent to replicate Studies I and II using the computer presentation methodology 
employed in Study III to establish new benchmarks for partial-word performance. 
 Likely of more importance with respect to failure to show decreased coherent 
partial-word facilitation in Study III is that Study II participants saw the visual gestalt for 




gestalt twice, for a total of 60 seconds.  The additional exposure and longer duration of 
exposure to each gestalt in Study III may have served as a sort of rehearsal that permitted 
participants to extend the length of time that gestalts could be maintained in memory.  It 
may be that by shortening gestalt exposures degradation of coherent facilitation will 
occur at the durations of dead air employed in Study III, however it may be necessary to 
employ both shorter exposure to gestalts and longer dead air intervals to overcome the 
effect of repeated exposure to each gestalt.  Also, having participants engage in some sort 
of unrelated activity during dead air intervals, rather than simply waiting for the onset of 
the partial-word puzzle, may be effective in disrupting rehearsal effects, allowing 
memory for gestalts to degrade as expected in Study III.   
 As well, as discussed above, it may be that the coherent advantage was the result 
of additional, unrecognized solutions of previously unrecognized coherent gestalts during 
their presentation in the partial-word solution phase, rather than by increases in partial, 
implicit knowledge.  If upon further study this turns out to be the case, then one would 
not expect the coherent advantage to degrade with increasing intervals of dead air, since 
conscious recognition of a gestalt at its second presentation should produce a result 
similar to that which occurred on trials in which gestalts were solved during the visual 
gestalt solution phase presentation, i.e., near-perfect partial-word performance. 
In any case, while the predicted degradation of the coherent advantage did not 
occur in Study III, this result neither supports or condemns the alternating activation 
model proposed in this thesis.  If further studies demonstrate that the second-presentation 
coherent gestalt solution rate is substantial, then increased implicit partial knowledge is 




an “all-or-nothing” model it would not make sense to pursue the idea of demonstrating 
gradual degradation of the coherent advantage.  If, on the other hand, it can be shown that 
the second-presentation coherent gestalt solution rate is minimal, modifications to Study 
III procedures to more effectively isolate and incrementally decrease access to memory 
for gestalts may yet show that coherent facilitation degrades with decreasing 
opportunities to engage in alternating activation.  This still leaves an as open question 
whether such a degradation would be abrupt, which would be the case if problem-solvers 
respond to the changes in the problem situation by abruptly switching from alternating to 
simple activation, or gradual, which would be the case if problem-solvers choose to 
employ alternating activation for as long as it provides some benefit over simple 
activation. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
 So, you are faced with a difficult and puzzling problem.  What should you do?  
Anecdotal reports and empirical evidence presented in this thesis and elsewhere indicate 
that problem-solvers are often successful in their attempts to solve puzzling problems 
using intuitive procedures.  It is even likely that problem-solvers will have a wide range 
of potentially useful intuitive procedures available to them in most problem situations, 
and, from the perspective of the “adaptive toolbox” model described by Gigerenzer and 
Selten (2001), human beings appear to be very sensitive to changes in the problem 
situation and competent at choosing the most appropriate procedure for a given problem 
situation.  While personal preference appears to play some role in the choice of problem-
solving procedures, the results of the studies included in this thesis demonstrate that, in 




by making implicit, intelligent choices about the most appropriate procedure to employ in 
the changed problem situation.   
When a problem-solver is faced with a difficult, puzzling problem and the 
elements of the problem situation seem very familiar and the available information 
appears rich, the problem-solver should probably stay focused on active problem-solving, 
since these are conditions that favor a problem-solving procedure that involves 
alternation between inductive activation from “parts” of the problem situation to a 
“whole” potentially capable of owning those parts, and deductive activation from a high 
residual energy “potential owner” to “parts” that should be present in the problem 
situation for that “potential owner” to be the correct solution.  As has been noted in this 
thesis, when the information present in the problem situation is coherent and conditions 
permit, problem-solvers can employ this sort of alternating activation procedure to 
achieve greater facilitation of performance on a related task that is greater than can be 
gained through a simple inductive activation procedure. 
On the other hand, when the elements of the problem situation seem unfamiliar 
and the available information in the problem situation appears sparse, confusing, and 
contradictory, perhaps the best problem-solving strategy would be to allow the mind to 
simply “wander” amongst the elements in the problem situation, activating nodes for 
characteristics that are in some way relevant to “parts” of the problem.  If no solution 
seems immediately apparent and you have the experience of feeling “stuck,” it may be 
beneficial to take a break from active problem-solving.  The feeling of being stuck may 
indicate that interference, in the form of a competition between correct and incorrect 




for one or both of two things to occur that may lead to a resolution of the competition in 
favor of the correct solution.   
First, the incorrect pattern may simply degrade at a more rapid rate than the 
correct pattern.  Termination of input activation supporting the node for the incorrect 
pattern may cause it to degrade from memory particularly rapidly, since it is likely to be 
based on fewer pieces of information than its correct competitor.   Any subsequent 
encounter with new solution-relevant information in the environment may then benefit 
the correct residual energy pattern but not the incorrect pattern, thereby resolving the 
competition in favor of the correct solution.   
Second, it may be that both correct and incorrect patterns of residual energy 
degrade at a fairly similar rate.  For the problem-solver this represents a dilemma, since 
both patterns are now degrading and becoming less accessible.  Under these conditions, it 
would make sense for the problem-solver to abandon further attempts to accumulate and 
integrate partial-knowledge through spreading activation, and instead switch to a rapid, 
non-compensatory heuristic strategy to increase the likelihood of making a correct 
decision between the competing “potential owners.”   
Future studies 
 As noted earlier, it is not clear whether the coherent advantage results from 
increases in implicit knowledge without additional gestalt solutions or from unrecognized 
second-presentation gestalt solutions.  In either case, the process of alternating activation 
may play a role; however, before speculating further additional research is required to 
clarify the frequency of second-presentation solutions of previously unsolved coherent 




participants are asked to attempt to provide a solution to the visual gestalt in the partial-
word solution phase instead of the partial-word puzzle.  A resulting second-presentation 
coherent gestalt solution rate similar to the Study I first-presentation coherent gestalt 
solution rate of 46% would lend support to the incremental increasing partial knowledge 
explanation of the coherent advantage, while a rate similar to the Study I partial-word 
solution rate of 55% would lend support to the “all-or-nothing” late solution model. 
It would also be prudent to replicate Part A studies using the computerized 
presentation of stimuli employed in Part B in order to establish that the effects 
demonstrated in Study I and II are maintained with the new methodology.   
With respect to the failure to demonstrate degradation of the coherent advantage 
in Part B, as noted earlier, it may be that solutions of previously unrecognized coherent 
gestalts occurred in the partial-word solution phase, and under these conditions increasing 
the duration of dead-air intervals would have little effect on the coherent partial-word 
solution rate.  Whether a gestalt is solved in the visual gestalt solution phase or the 
partial-word solution phase, one would expect that the partial-word solution rate for that 
item to be close to 100% regardless of the delay condition.  On the other hand, from the 
perspective of the increased implicit partial knowledge explanation, the failure to 
demonstrate degradation of the coherent advantage in Part B could indicate that 
participants‟ ability to maintain the “whole” of an unsolved coherent visual gestalt in 
memory is simply greater than the proposed theoretical limit, due to the repeated 
exposure to gestalts and longer durations of gestalt exposure employed in Study III.  
Thus, if it can be shown that the rate of additional solutions of previously unsolved 




demonstrate coherent advantage degradation should include shorter overall exposure to 
each gestalt, as was the case in Study II, dead-air intervals of longer duration, and the 
inclusion of a distractor task during dead-air intervals to interfere with conscious or 
unconscious rehearsal procedures. 
With respect to the unexpected increase in incoherent partial-word performance in 
condition three of Study III, this is an effect that needs to be replicated.  In a follow-up 
study not included in this thesis for methodological reasons, the increased incoherent 
partial-word facilitation observed in the longest dead air interval in Study III was 
observed again under similar conditions, but this needs to be formally replicated.   
In future research the less-is-more effect observed on trials with unsolved 
incoherent gestalts in condition three of Study III should be the focus of closer 
examination.  It may be that the less-is-more effect can be enhanced by arranging 
conditions to favor fast-and frugal procedures.  Given that the less-is-more effect seems 
most likely to occur when problem-solvers have a fairly minimal amount of knowledge 
about elements of the problem situation and must obtain discriminating information from 
memory rather than from the environment, problem conditions should limit the potential 
for participants to accumulate partial knowledge through spreading activation and hinder 
any strategies that might extend memory for unsolved gestalts.  Thus, a procedure 
employing a single gestalt presentation, very short durations of gestalt exposure, dead air 
intervals of varying lengths, and a distractor task between the gestalt identification phase 
and the partial-word solution phase would increase the likelihood that participants will 




In Study II, elimination of the partial-word solution phase gestalt presentation led 
to dissipation of the coherent advantage.  Since it appears that participants are employing 
a simple activation strategy for both coherent and incoherent gestalts under these 
conditions, it would be interesting to observe whether manipulating problem conditions 
to favor fast-and-frugal heuristics as described above would have any impact on coherent 
facilitation.   It seems unlikely that a less-is-more effect could be triggered with coherent 
gestalts, since: a) problem-solvers likely obtain too much good information from a 
coherent gestalt to permit successful use of a recognition based fast-and-frugal heuristic 
procedure, and b) it seems unlikely that there will be the necessary competition between 
correct and incorrect “potential owners” to engage a fast-and-frugal decision heuristic.  It 
is not clear what an increase in coherent facilitation under these conditions would 
represent, since, as noted above, fast-and-frugal heuristics are unlikely to be engaged by 
coherent gestalts, and since “forgetting” would involve the loss of useful, rather than 
misleading information.  It seems much more likely that coherent gestalts will prove 
resistant to fast-and-frugal processing, and arranging conditions to favor use of fast-and-
frugal heuristic procedures will likely result in a decrease in coherent facilitation due to 
reduced exposure to sources of useful information and reduced time on task. 
It would also be informative to reverse the direction of stimuli, i.e., using partial-
word puzzles as clues to the solution of visual gestalts.  It is likely that facilitation of 
gestalt solution will occur for both coherent and incoherent gestalts, but it is unclear 
whether facilitation will differ for coherent and incoherent gestalts.   It seems logical that 
the clue value of the unsolved partial-word puzzle will be the same in either case, and so 




incoherent gestalts.  It would also be possible to employ a graduated partial-word clue 
approach by manipulating the completeness of each partial-word puzzle.  This could 
provide another demonstration of the relationship between the quality of clues and the 
amount of partial knowledge that can be obtained, as reflected in the amount of resulting 
gestalt facilitation.  It may also be that reversing the direction of the stimuli will favor the 
use of fast-and-frugal heuristics.  As noted by Bröder (2003), while presentation of 
stimuli in an imagistic format favors simultaneous processing through compensatory 
summing and integration procedures, such as spreading activation, presentation in a 
verbal format favors sequential processing through non-compensatory procedures, such 
as fast-and-frugal heuristics.  In summary, the increase in incoherent facilitation 
demonstrated in the longest delay condition in Study III could be examined in more depth 
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